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ABSTRACT 
Lasers have been used in the entertainment industry since 1964, when they were used in 
the film Goldfinger. Laser display shows commenced in about 1973. It would be 
reasonable to expect laser safety to have been adequately addressed over the last 
twenty-five years. This research showed that the industry was not able to assess the 
risks from its work. A national survey of the competence of enforcing officers showed 
that they rarely had the necessary expertise to judge the safety of shows. Therefore, 
there was often a wide gulf between the laser companies and those responsible for 
enforcing entertainment and health and safety legislation. 
A hazard assessment methodology has been developed which considers any laser show 
as a series of modules which may have different hazards associated with them at 
different stages of the life cycle, and different people would potentially be exposed to 
these hazards. 
A number of laser radiation exposure situations have been assessed, including audience 
scanning. A theoretical understanding of the laser scanning issues and the application of 
measurement techniques to enable assessments to be carried out against internationally 
recognised maximum permissible exposure levels were developed. The conclusion was 
that the practice of audience scanning was not acceptable in its current form. A number 
of laser companies worldwide have accepted this view as a direct result of this research. 
A means of presenting the risk assessment for a laser display has been developed which 
provides benefits for the laser company, the venue manager, event promoter and the 
enforcing officer. It is recognised that a complete assessment may not be possible in the 
time available and a focused approach to the assessment is presented. In summary, if 
audience scanning is intended, the assessment is complex, but if this practice is not 
intended then the assessment can be straightforward. 
Suggestions are made for applying the risk assessment methodology to other laser 
applications. 
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1. General Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Laser radiation was first demonstrated practically by T H Maiman in 1960 using a pink 
ruby crystal (Maiman 1960). Since then many materials have been made to exhibit laser 
characteristics. The number of laser applications continues to increase every year. High 
radiant power lasers and those which utilise chemicals can present special hazards, such 
as the effects of fumes from the laser/workpiece interface, high voltages and carcinogenic 
properties of the chemicals. In many applications the laser radiation is contained by 
engineering design making the 'associated hazards' more important in safety terms. 
However, there are a number of applications where, because of the function of the 
application, laser radiation is accessible. These applications include the use of lasers for. 
guidance systems for military uses, research and development, medical applications, 
alignment work within the construction industry and for display and entertainment. 
The largest number of people potentially at risk from laser radiation are those who attend 
events where lasers are used for display and entertainment. The applications range from 
hand-held laser pointers used in lecture theatres, where the audience may consist of, say, 
five to a hundred people, to open air events using multi-watt lasers where the audience 
may run to tens of thousands. 
Apart from the actual use of lasers for entertainment, by the use of beams onto screens or 
into the air, the display of laser products at, for example, trade exhibitions, may also 
present risks (from exposure to laser radiation and other agents) which may not have been 
envisaged by the designers of the product. 
The audiences attending laser displays will cover all age-ranges and social groups. 
Nightclubs arid discotheques will appeal to the age range from 16 to about30. Live music 
will cover the complete age range, although rock and pop music tends to appeal to 
audiences from about 12 to 30 years. Classical music and particularly open-air concerts 
can cover the whole age range. Laser displays may also be included in pleasure parks 
which will attract family groups. The average family tends to assume that their safety is 
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assured when attending any event aimed at them. There is a belief that "they", whoever 
they may be, will have taken all reasonable measures to provide a safe show. This 
assumption cannot necessarily be applied to some uses of laser displays in, for example, 
raves. Here the element of risk, with the possible availability of drugs, is potentially the 
attraction. The research here is primarily concerned with the safety of the family group 
although, of course, the same safety principles should always apply. However, the balance 
. of risk may be less clear in some areas. 
In the United Kingdom guidance on the safety aspects of lasers used for entertainment and 
display is promulgated by the Health and Safety Executive. Until October 1996 this was 
PM19 (HSE 1980). This states that the maximum permissible exposure levels (as 
specified in the American National Standards Institute publication ANSI Z136.l (1976» 
should not be exceeded for the public or for a height up to 3 m above where the public can 
stand and 2.5 m to any side of where they are permitted. The author has been involved 
with a number of display companies in his capacity as one of the National Radiological 
Protection Board's laser safety advisers. The standard of knowledge of the laser operators 
gives some cause for concern. Their appreciation of the safety aspects, relevant safety 
standards and guidance, measurement and calculation methods is limited. It also appeared 
that this lack of knowledge also extended to the enforcing authorities. This prompted the 
research reported here. During the course of the research, input has been provided to the 
development of new guidance. 
1.2 Historical Perspective 
The laser's first involvement with the entertainment industry was probably in the James 
Bond movie Goldfinger which was released in 1964. The laser appeared to be a helium-
neon laser emitting a red beam and was allegedly cutting gold, something that is 
extremely difficult even now with high power industrial lasers. Safety issues were 
immediately raised in this application since the implication was that James Bond was 
about to be cut in two by the laser radiation. 
The artistic features of visible laser beams were recognised, especially the naturally low 
divergence, brightness and unique speckle pattern _when reflected from matt surfaces 
2 
(Hecht 1992). The first actual laser show is believed to have taken place in Los Angeles 
in 1973 (Hecht 1978).· A review of the early years of lasers in art and entertainment can 
be found in Kallard (1979). 
The rock group The Who are generally recognised as pioneering the integration of the 
laser effects with music. John Wolff provided The Who with a few 90-second bursts of 
laser light from eleven lasers during their performances (Kallard 1979). By 1977 Genesis 
were using lasers on their world tour (Brockum International 1977) and Tangerine Dream 
. were touring with LASERIUM from Laser Images Inc. Tangerine Dream's tour brochure 
for 1978 specifies a 22 W Spectra Physics double-ended argon laser (Concert Publishing 
1978). Today lasers are commonly used for entertainment either as stand-alone 
presentations or accompanied by music, which may be recorded or live. Systems may be 
very sophisticated and computer controlled or may be second-hand lasers and hand-held 
mirrors. The technology is discussed in Chapter 4. 
The use of lasers for entertainment would initially have involved the combined expertise 
of artists and scientists. Lasers were initially constructed and operated by people who 
should have been aware of the safety issues. If they were not aware then they were likely 
to be injured or killed. It may be reasonable to assume that the knowledge of safety issues 
would have passed from the scientists to the artists but there is little evidence for this. The 
pioneering applications of lasers for entertainment do not appear to have involved direct 
exposure of people (the audience) to the laser radiation. This practice only appears when 
the capability to move laser beams around was developed, some time in the early 1970s. 
HOLOCO certainly should have had the capability to assess the safety of their early laser 
shows (W olff et a11977) but do not seem to have done so. 
Laser games have become popular in the 1990s. Several systems are used in the UK but 
they are all based around a 'gun' containing a laser emitting visible radiation coupled with 
an infrared diode which is used to communicate with target areas. This application of 
lasers for entertainment is unique in that it can reasonably be expected that untrained 
members of the public will be intentionally targeting other members of the public with 
laser radiation. 
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The original aim of this research was to consider modes of failure which would result in 
audience exposure to the laser radiation. However, it became obvious that the audience 
were routinely exposed to laser radiation - so-called audience scanning. The next stage 
was to consider modes of failure which. would result in audience exposure at levels in 
excess of the maximum permissible exposure (MPE) levels. An understanding of the 
techniques used to generate scanned beams and the development of instrumentation 
which could measure them was essential. 
There was naturally an initial reluctance on the part of the laser display companies to any 
external influence on their, extremely competitive, business. However, it became clear to 
a number of the larger display companies who wished to work towards a greater 
understanding of the risks associated with their activities that there was an element of 
commercial interest in wanting to be able to claim that their shows were 'safe'. 
The research has been a process of mutual leaming. The laser companies have been very 
open about the displays they produce. The enforcing officers have equally been very open 
about the practical issues of assessing these displays. 
January 1997 saw the formation of a professional body for the laser entertainment 
industry. This was triggered by the presentation of, amongst other things, the findings 
from this research. 
There is no doubt that education and training will be a major part of the development of 
this industry in the future. This will not only apply to the laser companies themselves but 
also to the laser system manufacturers, the venue managers, the promoters and also the 
enforcing officers. 
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1.3 Summary 
Lasers have been used in entertainment for over thirty years and inIight shows for about 
twenty-five years. The initial applications would have involved collaboration between 
scientists and artists. Safety should have been part of the normal working practices from 
the beginning. 
The development of turn-key laser systems would have taken the scientist out of the laser 
entertainment framework. The use of lasers to scan audiences should have triggered 
questions on the safety issues. The laser entertainment industry would be working 
alongside other entertainment professionals who would be facing many of the associated 
hazards from the use of lasers. However, there is specific guidance on laser radiation 
hazards in entertainment but nothing which considers the other hazards. 
Family groups attending events using lasers expect their safety to be assured. Ideally this 
requires the laser event to be staged in a professional and safe manner, which stands up to 
audit. The fall-back position should be enforcement of safety both within the management 
of the event and the venue, and the legal framework. 
1.4 Aim of the Study 
The aim of this study was to determine the status of laser safety in the entertainment 
industry and identify a methodology for assessing the risks. In particular, the following 
issues needed to by studied: 
• current legislation, guidance and standards, and knowledge and compliance with these; 
• differences of approach by the industry and enforcing officers; 
• common safety issues; 
• whether a methodology could be developed which would be useful to all parties; 
• whether specific risks needed to be quantified. 
The results from the assessment may not be restricted to the entertainment industry and 
therefore the application of the research to other laser applications will be investigated. 
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1.5· Research Methodology 
An outline of the methodology for the research to achieve the aims in section 1.4 is 
presented below. 
Figure 1.1 Research Methodology 
Review Current Legislation, Standards and Guidance 
I 
Understand Technology of Laser Displays 
I 
Identify Key Safety Issues 
I 
Identify Enforcem ent Issues 
. I 
Assess Levels of Display Laser Safety Expertise 
I 
Quantify Specific Hazards 
I 
Develop an Assessm ent Methodology 
I 
Demonstrate Effectiveness of Assessment Methodology 
I 
Can the Methodology be Applied to Other Laser Applications? 
I I Conclusions I 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
As has already been stated in the Introduction, the laser is approaching forty years of age 
and has been used in entertainment for almost as long. It would be reasonable to expect 
that guidance, either official or from the industry, would be available to address the safety 
issues. In practice, the guidance is limited. This chapter reviews the implications of 
guidance which is available, how these have built on formal standards, and the legal 
issues in the UK and elsewhere. Of particular concern is how any published material 
assists those staging laser events, those who promote or host such events, and the 
enforcing authorities to assess the risks from the use of lasers. 
2.2 Laser Entertainment Guidance 
There are few specific guidance documents relating to the use of lasers in the 
entertainment industry. UK guidance is described in this section along with guidance from 
elsewhere in the world. 
2.2.1 Guidance Note PM19 
The official guidance on the use of lasers in the entertainment industry in the UK until 
October 1996 was PMI9, published by the Health and Safety Executive in December 
1980 (HSE 1980). Since this document was published about seven years after the first 
laser show in the UK it would be reasonable to expect it to have addressed many of the 
safety issues. That the document remained the only formal guidance document fOr sixteen 
years would also suggest that it must have been successful. 
Many of the guidelines in PM19 are derived from statements made by the US Bureau of 
Radiological Health in 1977 and 1978 (Sliney and Wolbarsht 1980). These statements 
required that anyone putting on a laser display should be considered a manufacturer of a 
laser product. The US Federal Product Compliance Standard, 21 CFR 1 040.1 0 (FDA 
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1976), required that only class I or class n laser products may be sold as "demonstration 
laser products". Inorder to use a laser product of a higher laser class, it was necessary to . 
have a "variance" from the requirements of 21CFRI040.10 having met a number of 
criteria. These criteria were transferred to the requirements of PM 19 and include a 
requirement for the accessible emission limit for class I (termed class 1 in PMI9) not to 
be exceeded where the audience is to be seated or standing. Separations of 3 m vertical 
and 2.5 m laterally also come from the US guidance, for supervised performances. 
The most important part of PM19 is the requirement for the operator of any display laser 
product to provide health and safety enforcement officers with "sufficient information, 
sketches, calculations, radiometric measurement data, etc, to demonstrate that the system 
can be used safely and without risks to health". This shows that the requirement for a risk 
assessment has existed in UK guidance since 1980. Irrespective of the content of the 
remainder of the guidance, this should have provided clear guidance of what was required 
to meet the general requirement for risk assessment under the Health and Safety at Work 
etc Act 1974 (HMSO 1974) and the later Management of Health and Safety at Work 
Regulations 1992 (HMSO 1992). 
Another key to the pedigree of PMI9 is the reference to the US ANSI Standard Z136.1 
(ANSI 1976) for maximum permissible exposure (MPE) and accessible emission limit 
values. The laser classification scheme was not introduced into the UK until the adoption 
of the British Standard BS 4803: 1983 (BSI 1983). However, the ANSI standard was 
updated in 1979 and it introduced further guidance on laser displays, including guidance 
on the time base to be used. This is still contained in the current ANSI Standard (ANSI 
1993), which states in 4.5.1 that· "the applicable MPE may be determined by using the 
classification duration defined as the total combined operational time of the laser during 
the performance or demonstration within any single period of 3 x 104 seconds". 
The failings with PM 19 are generally through omission. It appears to be assumed that 
laser radiation will not be scanned across the faces of members of the audience, so-called 
audience scanning. At least there is no indication of how such an· assessment should be 
carried out. A strict application of the guidance given would be that a scanned beam 
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should be analysed on a single pass of the beam across the eye, with no account taken of 
repeated exposures. 
Appendix 3 of PM19 provides a suggested profonna for presenting the necessary 
infonnation to the enforcing officer. These tended to be completed by laser display 
companies to varying degrees, but most followed a generic pattern, thought to originate 
from one or two longer standing laser display companies. At the start of this research it 
was considered that the infonnation supplied was too generic to be meaningful. However, 
it was recognised that an enforcing officer presented with the minimum infonnation may 
consider the infonnation was meaningful without fully understanding the technical and 
safety issues. Viewing one Appendix 3 profonna in isolation would not easily identify the 
lack of specific infonnation about a particular event. 
PM19 only covers laser radiation. The other safety aspects, such as fire, explosion, 
electric shock, etc, are only mentioned in passing in the introduction. 
2.2.2 Guidance Note HS(G)95 
PM 19 was replaced by a further publication from the Health and Safety Executive in 
October 1996, HS(G)95 (HSE 1996a). This document is specifically titled to only include 
laser radiation. HS(G)95 is intended to be a goal-setting document with little specific 
guidance on how to achieve these goals, as is the current climate of UK legislation and 
guidance. The guidance again stresses the need for risk assessment and clearly sets down 
the requirements for this through from the designer of the equipment to the laser operator. 
Examples of equipment are given in HS(G)95 to illustrate specific points. However, some 
of these have not been thought through. For example, an example of an external optical 
component is given as a mirror mounted on a wall bracket using a ball joint. Such devices 
are generally subject to severe vibration and most products would now be expected to 
have no vertical movement by design such that the mirror mount, even if it becomes 
. loose, does not tilt the beam down into the audience. 
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The guidance is now set in tenns of maximum permissible exposure only, which is more 
logical, rather than referring to the classification of the laser display. 
Audience scanning is considered, and recognised as a high risk activity by the requirement 
to have supervision. Chapter 4 of the guidance considers an Installation Safety 
Assessment. Several pages are dedicated to the issue of audience scanning, although there 
is no practical guidance on how to actually carry out the assessment. A lot of emphasis is 
placed ori scan failure systems. An interesting footnote at the bottom of page 8 states 
"HSE recognises that measurement down to the applicable MPE and of scanned 
emissions may be impracticable". This demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of 
the measurement issues and the technology available to undertake the assessments. 
There are a number of questions which need to be asked about this replacement to PMI9. 
Is it better? In many ways it is, because it does include some more background 
infonnation, but that does not mean it is more helpful for either the laser company or the 
enforcing officer. Discussions with both parties suggested that they preferred specific 
guidance so that a consistent level of enforcement could be expected across the UK. Does 
it provide practical guidance on risk assessment? No, it gives some pointers but again no 
practical guidance. Probably the most significant omission from HS(G)95 compared with 
PM19 is the requirement to notify the enforcing authority. In an ideal world, with self 
regulation of the industry, this would not be necessary. However, an indication that such 
notifications are not necessary may mean that laser displays may take place without the 
necessary safety management and control needed to ensure that they are carried out with 
the minimum of risk to the public. 
2.2.3 Non-UK Guidance 
There are a small number of guidance documents issued by other countries. Laser Light 
Show Safety - Who's Responsible (FDA 1986) published by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in the US provides some background infonnation on lasers and 
hazards, but only mentions the laser radiation hazard. It covers the Government 
requirements, mainly in tenns of requiring a variance from the FDA to operate laser 
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displays. Mention is made of possible additional State and local requirements. There is 
nothing in the document to explain what a laser show is, nor is audience scanning 
covered. 
The FDA have also issued a number of documents aimed specifically at their inspectors. 
Examples include the Compliance Guide for Laser Products (FDA 1985) and the Analysis 
of Some Laser Light Show Effects for Classification Purposes (FDA 1979). Appendix B 
of the former document includes a statement on Clarification of Certain Laser Light Show 
Requirements. This includes audience scanning and scanning safeguards. The statement 
recognises that scanned laser radiation with a peak power in excess of 5 m W has an acute 
risk of injury if it were to slow down or stop. No account appears to be taken of the effect 
of multiple pulses as the laser radiation is scanned. Scanning safeguards are considered a 
"critical performance feature" for high power laser shows. The statement does recognise 
that, at the time of issue, the FDA had "not received data to show that any scanning 
safeguard system is adequate for audience scanning". 
The second document includes a number of calculations of laser light show effects using 
galvanometer scanning systems. It includes sawtooth, triangular and sine wave drive 
signals, all generated from analogue sources. The assessments consider time bases for the 
duration of example effects and compare the energy into a 7 mm aperture with class I 
accessible emission limits. However, no consideration is taken of multiple pulses as the 
beam is repeatedly scanned across the eye. 
On 13 December 1979, the Health Protection Branch of the Health and Welfare Canada 
issued guidance (Morrison ·1979) which appears to be based on the FDA 
recommendations of 1978, and therefore is similar to PMI9. 
The National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia issued a Code of Practice 
for the Safe Use of Lasers in the Entertainment Industry in 1995 (NHMRC 1995). This is 
one of a pair of documents published at the same time, the other one covering the use of 
lasers in schools. The approach taken in the two documents is similar, even though the 
intended targets are so different. The Code of Practice only considers the laser radiation 
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issues, although the reader is referred to other Australian documents for cryogenic coolant 
and high voltage safety. Annexe B provides a flowchart for the recommended alignment 
procedure. The procedure described suggest that the author has little or no practical 
experience of a laser light show installation, being more appropriate for a laboratory 
environment than an entertainment venue. Annexe C recommends a proforma for a 
Display Safety Record. This requires an assessment of the hazards but does not consider 
the risks having assessed the hazards. 
2.2.4 Summary of Entertainment Laser Guidance 
The number of documents available for specific guidance on the safe use of entertainment 
lasers is small. All concentrate on the laser radiation aspects, with no guidance on non-
radiation hazards. Although a requirement for risk assessment was included in the 1980 
UK guidance (PMI9) this has not been practically addressed. There is clearly the potential 
for conflict between laser display companies and enforcing officers where guidance, such 
as HS(G)95, uses a goal-setting approach. The means for achieving the goals rely on an 
understanding of both the laser safety issues and the practical aspects of laser displays. 
Most other countries appear to have no guidance on the safe use of laser displays. Only 
the US, Canada and Australia have issued guidance. These all suffer the same deficiencies 
as the UK guidance. 
2.3 General Entertainment Guidance 
If no practical specific guidance is available for laser display companies then there may be 
general guidance aimed at the entertainment industry which fills the gap. This is reviewed 
for the UK. The documents include formal guidance from government, professional 
association guides and books aimed at the industry. 
2.3.1 Fire Precautions Guide 
In 1990 the Home Office/Scottish Office published a guide covering fire precautions in 
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entertainment venues which was revised in 1994 (HMSO 1994a). Lasers are covered in 
three paragraphs (11.40 to 11.42). The first paragraph introduces the laser and the hazard 
potential. The second paragraph states that certain lasers can present a fire risk and states 
that licensees should ensure that lasers should be installed and operated by experts 
although it does not give any guidance to the licensee on how he is to determine the level 
of expertise. The final paragraph refers to PM 19 and BS 4803: Part 3 (assumed to be the 
1983 edition). The publication of a revised standard, BS 7192: 1989 (BSI 1989), was not 
considered when the document was revised for publication in 1994. However, the 
Introduction states that the current version of any British Standard should be used. 
The guide has no statutory force but it does state (paragraph 6.51) that no lasers should be 
. installed or used without approval. This approval is defined as approval in writing by the 
licensing authority. An obvious omission is that the guide does not define what the licence 
is for. It can be assumed that the reference is to the entertainment licence. The legislation 
concerning entertainment licensing will be considered later. 
2.3.2 Pop Concerts Guide 
The Health and Safety Commission, the Home Office and the Scottish Office jointly 
published a guide which has become known as either the Pop Guide or the Purple Guide 
on account of the colour of its cover (HMSO 1993). The guide has a very practical 
approach to the safety aspects of events involving large groups of people. It covers 
management and planning of events, two aspects that do not appear to feature highly in 
many events involving lasers. 
Appendix I covers the legal aspects of putting on a pop concert. Three paragraphs are 
devoted to the legal requirement to undertake a risk assessment and a degree of practical 
guidance is provided. This is a six step process which covers identifying the hazards 
through to safe systems of work and review. However, the guidance is not detailed 
enough for anyone needing to carry out a risk assessment for the first time and by hiding 
the requirement in an appendix, the implication is that such as assessment is not part of 
the main management function. 
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Chapter 10 of the guide covers special effects and pyrotechnics and includes lasers . 
. Reference is made to the then guidance, PM19 and the expected revision HS(G)95. 
The requirement for a laser safety officer (LSO) is discussed in paragraphs 10.6 and 10.7. 
The code suggests that the LSO could be an external consultant. Handover documents are 
mentioned in 10.7 and 10.8. The closest that laser companies normally get to these are the 
appendix 3 forms from PM 19. Paragraph 10.8 suggests that the handover document 
"should contain a detailed specification of the intended scope of the display and the 
operator should not deviate from that specification. The document should be specific to 
the venue where the laser display is to occur and should include a drawing of the laser 
display area in both plan and elevation. The positions of laser sources, mirrors and target 
areas should be clearly marked, along with the relevant distances and dimensions. The 
licensing authority will normally ask to see a copy of the handover documents". The onus 
appears to be placed on the licensing authority to ask for any documentation relating to 
the laser display, rather than such information being provided up front as required by 
PMI9, and perhaps represents the views of the Health and Safety Executive which were 
eventually introduced into HS(G)95. Documentation as specific as that suggested here is 
extremely rare, even for permanent laser installations. 
2.3.3 National Outdoor Events Association 
The National Outdoor Events Association (NOEA) have published a comprehensive code 
of practice covering many aspects of outdoor events "other than Pop Concerts and Raves" 
(NOEA 1993). Members of NOEA are expected to comply with the code of practice but it 
is also intended for "Organisers (who will know what they can expect to receive), the 
Suppliers (who will know what they are expected to provide), Inspecting Officers (who 
will receive clear guide lines and check lists) and all members of the trade associations 
connected with the Industry (who will then monitor the performance of its members in 
these activities)". 
This code starts with risk assessment and provides suggestions for categories for hazard, 
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risk potential, event type and attendance group. However, the code does recognise that 
simple assignment of numbers to each of these categories may not be adequate and full 
detailed assessments may need to be carried out to satisfy all legal requirements. 
Laser are defined as "high intensity lighting or strobes arranged for displays". The section 
on lasers comes within the Electrical chapter. It is interesting that the electrical hazards 
are considered first. The code requires the installation to be carried out by a "competent 
engineer skiIled in this particular field of operations". The code goes on to say there may 
"exist non-electrical risks such as radiation or the induction of epilepsy from such 
equipment". The code refers to PM 19 and to a loose-leaf annexe accompanying the code. 
The description of the laser classification system is misleading: particularly classes 3A 
and 3B appear to have been combined into one class and the description is more 
appropriate to class 3A. The annex refers to BS 7192: 1989 (BSI 1989), although BS EN 
60825: 1992 (BSI 1992) was available at the time of publication. 
2.3.4 Institute of Lighting Engineers 
The Institution of Lighting Engineers (ll..E) produced a code in 1995 which included 
lasers (ILE 1995). The code was produced by a panel with major input from one of the 
laser display companies. As such, much of the organisational and technical content is 
quite good. However, there are some basic misunderstandings of the real personnel 
exposure situations and the risks involved. In particular, the document considers that 
calculations in support of risk assessments are inaccurate and should only be used when 
measurements are not possible. However, there is no specific guidance on how the 
measurements should be carried out. A worrying suggestion is that laser power meters 
should be used. It is unlikely that these would respond correctly to a scanned laser beam. 
2.3.5 Focal Guide 
The Focal Guide to Safety in Live Performances (Thompson 1993) considers many safety 
issues relating to events where lasers are likely to be used. Although the book starts with a 
chapter on "Safety, Risk and Hazard" this is not followed through into practical guidance. 
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Advice is presented on the associated hazards from laser events, such as staging, 
electricity, fire, smoke machines and audience management. A chapter is dedicated to 
lasers which includes a cursory introduction to laser entertainment technology. When 
considering the safety evaluation of scanned laser effects, it is assumed that high speed 
scanning is acceptable for high power lasers provided adequate scan-fail detection and 
control systems are incorporated. No account appears to be taken of the multiple exposure 
situation under such scanning conditions. Laser classification is described and it is 
difficult to see what this achieves since most lasers used in the entertainment industry 
have the potential to cause eye injuries, ie they are class 3B or class 4. It would have been 
more appropriate to consider the maximum permissible exposure alone. 
2.3.6· Summary of General Entertainment Guidance 
The official and industry general guides to safety in the entertainment industry address 
many of the issues which are common, such as management and planning. However, risk 
assessment, although introduced is not covered in any detail. Lasers are introduced in each 
of the guides but generally reference is made to the specific UK laser guidance 
documents. The advantage of these broader guides is that they address many of the safety 
issues associated with the use of lasers which are not covered in the specific laser 
guidance, such as electricity, fire and manual handling. However, the practical guidance 
on risk assessment appears to be no further developed for these sections of the industry 
than it is for the laser radiation. 
2.4 Laser Safety Standards 
Reference has been made to the accessible emission limits and maximum permissible 
exposure (MPE) levels for laser radiation. These are tabulated in Standards. The MPE 
levels are derived from experimental data, essentially comparing the effect on the eye or 
skin with various quantities of laser radiation incident on the respective organ. Some data 
also comes from incidents involving accidental exposure of people to laser radiation. 
The first fully reported laser injury occurred in February 1964 (Rathkey, 1965) when a 
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student in Oregan, USA, received an eye exposure from a ruby laser pumped with an 
argon flash lamp. However, the biological research into potential eye injuries had been 
started some years earlier. Zaret et al (1961) reported experimental results on 'optical 
maser' exposures of rabbit eyes in 1961. The radiant exposure levels used for the 
experiments was 2 ~ 104 greater than the current value for the maximum permissible 
exposure (BSI, 1994). The authors compared the results with effects produced after 
exposure to the optical radiation from atomic bomb explosions. 
Laser Focus World published an account by Decker (1977) which graphically describes 
what it is like to receive an injury from a laser. Decker was not wearing goggles, which 
were available, when he received a 6 mJ, 10 ns pulse from a neodymium:YAG laser 
operating at 1064 nm. Although his vision was not lost completely in the exposed eye, he 
continued to have numerous floating objects in his field of view. 
McKinlay and Harlen (1984a) reviewed the damage mechanisms over the different 
wavelength regions (ultraviolet, visible and infrared radiations). In a companion paper 
(McKinlay and Harlen, 1984b) they compared the threshold injury data with maximum 
permissible exposure (MPE) levels in. the laser standards. They concluded that the MPEs 
were adequate to ensure the protection of most people. However, they did raise the 
question of exposure to blue laser radiation producing minimal photochemical repairable 
lesions. They suggested caution if such exposure is prolonged. 
Mellerio (1991) summarised the interaction mechanisms for optical radiation and the 
potential for damage. Photochemical, thermal and ionisation mechanisms are considered. 
Pleven (1986) and Bandle and Holyoak (1987) have published reviews of known laser 
injuries. In the first report, fourteen accidents in research environments were reviewed 
which occurred between 1973 and 1986. Most of these occurred in France. Pleven's main 
conclusion was that although the accidents could have been prevented, there was concern 
at the ignorance of clinicians in dealing with the injuries. Over fifty cases are reviewed in 
the second paper: none from the UK. Although most of the accidents relate to radiation 
damage to the eyes, references are also made to fatal electric shock and radiation induced 
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fires in medical applications. 
RockwelI (1997) has reviewed laser accidents over the thirty two years from 1964 to 
1996. The Rockwell Laser Industries (RU) database covers 330 events of which 241 were 
eye incidents (220 resulting in eye injuries) and 89 related to skin or non laser beam 
incidents, discussed below. Eleven of the eye incidents involved laser show operators and 
16 spectators although the details of the incidents are not reported. These represent 3.3 
and 4.9% of the incidents in the database, respectively. 
All of this data is used as input to make recommendations on MPE values. The MPE 
values can then be used to determine accessible emission limits (AELs) which consider 
the level of laser radiation people can be exposed to having made a number of 
assumptions, such as control measures. This is the basis of the laser classification scheme 
widely used throughout the world. 
2.4.1 British Standards 
Laser safety standards have evolved since soon after the laser was first successfully 
demonstrated. These standards have been applicable to all laser applications, including 
laser displays. They are intended to lay down manufacturing standards for laser products 
and include tables of maximum permissible exposure (MPE) levels for the two critical 
organs, the eye and the skin. 
The development of the MPE level with the development of British laser safety standards 
can be followed to determine if the level has changed significantly since the first standard 
was published in 1964 (Ministry of Aviation 1964). The corneal MPE values are 
summarised in table 2.1 for a visible laser beam for a single exposure to a pulse of 0.01 s, 
an accidental exposure to a continuous wave (cw) beam assuming the natural aversion 
response of 0.25 s, and exposure to a train of pulses. 
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Table 2.1 Comparison of MPE for Visible Laser Radiation 
. .. . 
Standard Single Pulse Accidental Exposure to Pulse Train 
0.01 s Exposure (0.25 s) for 1000 s, 100 Hz and 1 
to cw Beam ms pulses (MPElpulse) 
Ministry of Aviation 2mJm-2 5mJm-2 0.2mJm-2 
1964 
Ministry of 1 mJm·2 0.3 Jm-2 0.003 mJ m-2 
Technology 1969 . 
BS 4803: 1972 1 mJm-2 0.3 J m-2 0.003mJm-2 
. 
BS 4803: 1983 0.57 J m-2 6.36 J m-2 1 mJm-2 
BS 7192: 1989 0.57 J m-2 6.36 J m-2 1 mJ m-2 
BS EN 60825: 1992 0.57 Jm-2 6.36Jm-2 1 mJm-2 
. 
BS EN 60825-1: 1994 0.57 J m-2 6.36J m-2 1 mJ m-2 
It can be seen that the MPE level has remained unchanged since the publication of BS 
4803: 1983. Guidance document PM19 contains a table which agrees with the 1983 and 
later values in table 2.1 for the single pulse and cw exposure situation. However, the 
scanned condition is not specifically addressed. The only change to the MPE values since 
the laser was first used in laser light shows appears to be the relaxation in all three values 
intable 2.1 between 1972 and 1983. 
The current British Standard (BSI 1994) contains three sections. Sections 1 and 2, 
definitions and manufacturer's requirements, respectively, are normative and should be 
complied with. Section 3 is the user's guide and there is a reference to the use of lasers for 
entertainment (sub-clause 12.4): 
Only Class 1· or Class 2 laser products may be used for demonstration, display or 
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entertainment in unsupervised areas. The use of lasers of a higher class for such 
purposes should be permitted only when the laser operation is under the control 
of an experienced, well-trained operator and/or when spectators are prevented 
from exposure to levels exceeding the applicable MPE. 
The British Standard recognises that laser radiation is not the only hazard which needs to 
be addressed. Clause IJ considers these 'hazards incidental to laser operation'. The 
rationale behind the inclusion of other hazards for lasers is based on incidents over the last 
thirty five years. 
Many lasers operate at high voltages, or at least have an input from the mains supply (230 
V in Europe). The laser assemblies are also heavy, presenting a risk of mechanical 
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damage to installers and others in the vicinity. The types of lasers used in the 
entertainment industry do not generally use chemicals such as fluorescent dyes. However, 
in industry such materials are widely used and need to be subject to special care. The 
review of laser-related incidents by Rockwell (1997), reports non-radiation laser incidents 
as follows: 24 fires; 12 electric shock incidents (5 of which were fatal) and 4 embolisms 
(gas injection into blood stream), three of which were fatal. There were also 11 other 
incidents of a similar nature which were as a result of, for example, equipment failure. 
There is no specific data on incidents involving lasers in the entertainment industry. 
This analysis demonstrates that non-laser radiation hazards have killed people. Certainly 
high voJtages will be present around many entertainment lasers. High power lasers will 
also have the potential to cause fires and there is some anecdotal evidence that they have 
done so in entertainment venues. 
2.4.2 International Standards 
Most British Standards involving lasers are initiated and developed through the work of 
the International Electrotechnical Commission technical committee 76. The current 
British Standard on laser safety is technically equivalent to IEC 60825-1: 1993 (IEC 
1993). It was recognised by the members of technical committee 76 that the base standard 
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did not give adequate guidance for the use of display lasers. This was developed in a 
Technical Report, IEC 60825-3: 1995 Guidance for Laser Displays and Shows (IEC 
1995). The status of this document is that it is a code of practice and not a standard. 
IEC 60825-3 builds on the Australian code of practice reviewed in section 2.2.3. Ancillary 
personnel and performer MPEs are introduced to recognise that these persons may be 
trained in laser safety issues, something that cannot be assumed for the audience. 
The International Radiation Protection Association (!RPA) Non-Ionizing Radiation 
Committee published guidelines on protection against non-ionising radiations in the 
journal Health Physics. These have been compiled into a comprehensive manual (!RP A, 
1991). This includes a chapter on guidelines on limits of exposure to laser radiation of 
wavelengths between 180 nm and 1 mm. In May 1992 IRPA established an independent 
scientific organisation - the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation 
Protection (ICNIRP). This body revised its laser radiation guidelines in 1996 (ICNIRP, 
1996). The exposure limits are identical to the maximum permissible exposure limits in 
the IEC standards. 
The American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) publish 
threshold limit values (TLVs) for physical agents, including lasers. The TLVs from the 
1992-1993 edition are incorporated into a proposed European Directive on Physical 
Agents (CEU, 1994). Again, the expressions used for the TLVs are identical to the 
maximum permissible exposure values in the IEC standards for the visible part of the 
electromagnetic spectrum. 
2.4.3 Summary of Standards 
Laser safety standards have primarily been developed for the manufacture of equipment 
such that persons are protected from exposure to laser radiation. The inclusion of other 
hazards has been recent. The maximum permissible exposure levels have remained 
constant within the visible part of the electromagnetic spectrum since about 1983. The 
same standard is applied throughout the world, produced by the International 
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Electrotechnical Commission. The scientific basis for the maximum permissible exposure 
levels continues to be studied by the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation 
Protection. It is significant that the maximum levels of exposure for the visible region of 
the electromagnetic spectrum is identical in all of the standards, although the terminology 
may be different. 
None of the standards use risk assessment, except within IEC 60825-1 for the use of class 
1. Sub-clause 9.2 uses the concept of "reasonably foreseeable conditions of operation" in 
the definition of a class 1 laser product. 
2.5 Legislation 
The regulation of the use of lasers in the entertainment industry is complex. Many of the 
concerns from the laser display industry were from the confusion as a result of this 
complexity. Health and safety legislation applies to all work activities, irrespective of 
where that work is carried out. There is no specific health and safety legislation covering 
the use of lasers. However, much of the work will be subject to non-laser-specific health 
and safety legislation covering general health and safety, specific hazards and specific 
work activities. Some laser display events will require an entertainment licence. Some 
laser-related equipment will be subject to legislation concerning its supply. 
2.5.1 Enforcement of Health and Safety Legislation 
The principal health and safety legislation in the UK is the Health and Safety at Work etc 
Act 1974 (HMSO 1974). This legislation was the result of a report from a Committee 
chaired by Lord Robens (Robens 1972) into the status of health and safety legislation in 
the UK. Significantly, the Committee was asked to consider whether changes to 
legislation were needed to protect members of the public from hazards "arising in 
connection with activities in industrial and commercial premises". The report from the 
Committee describes a number of incidents where members of the public have been killed 
or injured as the result of the work activities of others. Most legislation at the time only 
dealt with the health and safety of employees and the recommendations from various 
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. official tribunals and investigations had not been addressed. Section 1 of the Health and 
Safety at Work etc Act states that one of the aims of the Act is to protect people who are 
not employees but who may be at risk due to the activities of people at work. This 
provision clearly applies to the public attending an entertainment event where lasers are 
used and the laser display company's staff. and others, are at work. 
The enforcement of health and safety legislation in the UK is either by the Health and 
Safety Executive or by the local authority. The division of responsibility is laid down in 
the Health and Safety (Enforcing Authority) Regulations 1998 (HMSO 1998), which 
replace earlier Regulations (HMSO 1989). 
A summary of the relevant premises where the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and 
local authority (LA) will be the enforcing authority are presented in table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 Enforcement of Health and Safety Legislation 
Premises Enforcing Authority 
. 
Laser Company's Premises Generally HSE 
University Campus HSE 
Arts, Sports. Games, Entertainment or Other Cultural or LA 
Recreational Activity 
As above, but LA is Owner or Operator HSE 
Fairground HSE 
Radio, Television or Film Undertaking HSE 
Sea-Going Ship HSE 
Zoo or Wildlife Park LA 
. . 
It can be seen that HSE are the enforcing authority for a greater range of types of 
establishments where lasers may be used for entertainment. However; the number of 
premises falling within the "Arts, Sports, Games, Entertainment or Other Cultural or 
Recreational Activity" category are large. Enforcement within the local authority is 
generally carried out by Environmental Health Officers (EHOs), whose duties may also 
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extend to enforcement of the Public Health Acts. 
The Health and Safety Executive is a national body. The enforcement is carried out 
through regional inspectors who can call on specialist inspectors when necessary. At the 
time of writing, the HSE had four specialist inspectors with responsibility for radiation, 
including lasers. These, in turn, are supported by a member of staff from the Directorate 
of Science and Technology who develops HSE guidance in this area and represents the 
organisation at national and international level. 
Local authorities operate autonomously throughout the UK and, in England, may by a 
county council, if there are no district councils within the county, district councils, 
London borough councils, the Common Council of the City of London, the Sub-Treasurer 
of the Inner Temple, the Under-Treasurer of the Middle Temple or the Council of the Isles 
of Scilly. In Scotland the local authority is a council for a local government area and in 
Wales a county council or a county borough council. Therefore, there are many local 
authorities, all of which may have a number of staff who enforce health and safety 
legislation. 
2.5.2 Health and Safety Legislation 
The Health and Safety at Work etc Act is an enabling Act. There are a number of 
Regulations, made under the Act, which are, or could be, relevant to the use of lasers for 
entertainment. These are summarised in table 2.3. 
Risk assessment is introduced in the Health and Safety at Work etc Act. The concept of 
"so far as is reasonably practicable" to ensure work activities are "safe and without risks 
to health" is used throughout. The duty applies firstly to the employer, but also to the 
designer, manufacturer, supplier and installer as well as generally to the employee. All of 
these are important for the laser entertainment industry, but perhaps the most important is 
the last. The employees setting up and operating a laser display will need to ensure that 
the laser display is safe and without risks to health. The Act gives no guidance on how 
safety should be demonstrated and risks assessed. 
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Table 2.3 Safety Legislation Relevant to the Use of Lasers in the Entertainment 
Industry 
Title Abbreviation 
Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 HSAWA 
. 
The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences RIDDOR 
Regulations 1995 
Ionising Radiations Regulations 1985 IRR 
Electricity at Work Regulations 1989 EAWR 
Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations1992 MHSWR 
.. 
Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1992 PUWER 
. 
Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992 MHOR 
Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 WHSWR 
Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992 PPEAWR 
Health and Safety (Display Screen Equipment) Regulations 1992 HSDSER 
. 
Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 1994 COSHH 
The Health and Safety (Safety Signs and Signals) Regulations 1996 SSR 
The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992 (HMSO 1992) requires 
a "suitable and sufficient" assessment of the risks from a work activity to be carried out 
(Regulation 3). Again, little practical guidance is provided in the Regulations on how to 
achieve this. General practical guidance has followed the introduction of the legislation 
after recognition by the HSE and others that many small and medium size businesses did 
not understand what was required for a suitable and sufficient assessment of risks. Indeed, 
many businesses appeared to consider that such assessments did not apply to them, and 
were only an issue for the chemical or nuclear industries. The "Five Steps to Risk 
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Assessment" was a simple approach to risk assessment which is applicable to many work 
activities (HSE 1998). HSE also recognised that the issuewas risk management and not 
only risk assessment (HSE 1995). 
There is no specific health and safety legislation relating to the use of lasers. The general 
legislation described above applies in many cases. Where national or international 
standards, or industry-specific guidance exists, these may be used as a measure of good 
practice for the practical application and enforcement of the general health and safety 
legislation. 
2.5.3 Entertainment Licensing Legislation 
Certain entertainment activities are licensed by local authorities. The officers may be from 
the Environmental Health department and therefore also involved with the enforcement of 
health and safety legislation or they may be in separate departments. Different legislation 
applies in different parts of the UK and in certain types of venue. The different legislation 
is summarised in table 2.4. 
"Reasonableness" is used in licensing legislation as opposed to "as far as is reasonably 
practicable" in health and safety legislation. Reasonably practicable is taken to mean that 
the time, trouble, cost and physical difficulty of taking steps to avoid the risk are not 
wholly disproportionate to the risk. The size or financial position of the employer is not 
taken into account in this calculation. However, reasonableness may go further and local 
authorities may impose requirements under the entertainment licence which will achieve 
higher standards than those required under health and safety legislation (HMSO 1993). 
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Table2.4 Entertainment Licensing Legislation 
Legislation . Comments 
Local Government (Miscellaneous Applies to England and Wales (except London). 
Provisions) Act 1982 For open air events, safety is a specific 
consideration. Uses the concept of 
reasonableness. Licence conditions can be 
specified. Covers public dancing or music or 
"any other public entertainment of a like kind". 
London Government Act 1963 Applies to London. No distinction between 
indoor and open air events. 
Civic Government (Scotland) Act Applies to Scotland. Covers locations where 
1982 payment of money or money's worth is made for 
entertainment or recreation. 
Private Places of Entertainment Applies to private premises operated for private 
(Licensing) Act 1967 gain and public not admitted. 
Theatres Act 1968 Covers theatres where dancing or music do not 
form a significant part of the entertainment. 
2.5.4 Product Supply Legislation 
Article 18 of the Single European Act (BU 1987) introduced Article 100 A to the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Cominunity. Article 100 A established the internal 
market, ie provided for the free movement of goods between member states which should 
provide a basic level of health and safety to consumers. The Electrical Equipment (Safety) 
Regulations 1994 (HMSO 1994) covers equipment operating between 50 V and 1000 V 
AC, which includes most electrical equipment involved in laser displays. The Regulations 
refer to harmonised standards which should be used as the guide to the essential health 
and safety requirements such equipment should be expected to meet. In terms of laser 
equipment this will be the current British Standard on laser safety (BSI 1994). 
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Although the Electrical Equipment (Safety) Regulations were made under consumer law 
(Consumer Protection Act 1987) and are generally enforced by Trading Standards 
Authorities (Department of Trade and Industry), the Regulations are also relevant to 
workplace legislation such as the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and the 
Provision and Use or Work Equipment Regulations 1992, where the Health and Safety 
Executive or Local Authority Environmental Health Officers will be the enforcing 
authorities. 
2.5.5 Summary of Legislation 
It can be seen that the legislation concerning the use of lasers in entertainment is complex. 
The complexity is compounded by the lack of specific legislation for the use of lasers. 
The enforcement of the general legislation may be by different agencies and different 
groups of people within those agencies. 
In summary, health and safety legislation will always apply. The enforcement will either 
be by the Health and Safety Executive or the local authority. Entertainment legislation 
may apply. If dancing or music forms part of the entertainment then it probably does 
apply. This is enforced by the local authority. Mains-powered equipment supplied as part 
of the laser display may be subject to product legislation. Enforcement of the supply will 
be by the Department of Trade and Industry, but there may also be implication under 
health and safety legislation. 
The role of the police and fire services also need consideration. The use of lasers may 
cause a disturbance if used in the open air. The fire service may be involved due to the use 
of high voltages, water and the risk of fire from laser radiation. 
Open air use of lasers may have an effect on air safety. The Air Navigation (No. 2) Order 
1995 (HMSO 1995) can be used to control the use of lasers. Persons can be prosecuted 
for endangering the safety of aircraft (Article 55) or for exhibiting lights which may 
endanger aircraft taking off or landing, or which may be mistaken for landing lights 
(Article 99) .. The author assisted with drafting guidance for the use of lasers in airspace 
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(CAA 1998). Airspace safety is enforced in the UK by the Civil Aviation Authority. 
2.6 General Risk Assessment 
It is obvious from the literature that no specific guidance is available for undertaking risk 
assessment for the use of lasers in the entertainment industry. There is limited guidance 
on risk assessment for the entertainment industry as a whole. However, other sectors such 
as the chemical and nuclear industries have been undertaking risk assessments for a 
number of years. 
The Health & Safety Executive (HSE) published a report which looked into the 
tolerability of risk from nuclear power stations (HSE, 1988). This introduced the concept 
of 'individual risk' as compared with the 'societal risk'. The individual's perception of 
risk is very dependent on their perception of whether there is a positive benefit to them 
and whether their exposure to the risk is voluntary. The HSE use this concept further in a 
document on quantified risk assessment (HSE, 1989). 
Death has been the usual outcome that has been associated with risk. However, the quality 
of life is now recognised as being important. One of the simplest ways of quantifying a 
risk is to take the number of incidents of a particular outcome per unit time or number of 
times the activity took place. However, consideration also has to be given to 
circumstances where the link between the cause and effect is not certain and some 
assumptions have to be made, and where no incidents have occurred, either because the 
probability of the outcome is very small or because the activity has not yet commenced. In 
this case 'best estimates' are used (Royal Society, 1992). 
Taking the specific case of a family attending an entertainment event which includes the 
use of lasers, the perception will be that the risk to them is zero. The tolerability of risk 
will also be low. For a specific event it will not be acceptable to expose the public to a 
known hazard without quantifying the hazard and minimising the risk, taking account 
both the probability of exposure to the hazard and the consequences of exposure. In this 
sense best estimates could be used provided. the hazards have been identified and 
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quantified. It would be reasonable to expect control measures to be implemented if the 
risk was too high. 
This approach is used, for example, when considering crowd management at 
entertainment events. Some of the incidents have resulted in many deaths, for example in 
Jerusalem in 1834500 people died; 190 children died in a stampede against a restricted 
doorway in a theatre in Sunderland in 1883; and 99 football supporters died when they 
were crushed against a barrier in Hillsborough in 1989 (KIetz 1993). The significance of 
. these incidents is twofold - first the number of people involved; and second the apparent 
inordinate amount of time before anything is done about the risk of repeat incidents. The 
Pop Guide (HMSO 1993) provides formulae for calculating the maximum number of 
people inside an event to minimise the risk of crowd-related problems. The HSE have 
also produced a guide on managing crowd safety (HSE 1996b) which is a practical guide 
to the safety issues which need to be considered. The parallels with laser safety in the 
entertainment industry are clear. A large number of people have been exposed to the 
hazard for a number of years and the potential for causing injury to a large number of 
. people exists. 
The military have been interested in the use of probabilistic risk assessment for laser 
safety for some years (Smerden 1986, Gardner and Smith 1995). The use of laser range 
finders on aircraft during training flights can potentially give rise to public exposure. The 
nominal ocular hazard area can extend over many square kilometres if taken literally from 
standards. The argument suggested is that although the MPE may be exceeded, the actual 
probability of exposure is very small. To support this, the concept of the minimum 
ophthalmoscopically visible lesion (MOVL) is used, which is assumed to be a 30 J.lm 
retinal lesion. An acceptable risk level of lO-s is used. Whilst this approach may be 
acceptable for military applications, it is less likely to be acceptable for routine public 
exposure in entertainment. An important factor is again the perception by the average 
family that the activity, ie going to a laser display, should be safe and without risk. 
A formal approach to risk assessment is to consider the components of the laser display 
equipment and consider what can go wrong. There are a number of standard texts on 
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methods for carrying out the analysis, for example (Cox and Tait 1991; Modarres 1993; 
Henley and Kumamoto 1992; and K1etz 1992). However, as pointed out by K1etz (1991) 
one of the major factors is the human being, either as the manager, or as the person 
carrying out a physical activity. A report from the Advisory Committee on the Safety of 
Nuclear Installations (ACSNI 1993) supports this view and suggests that a positive safety 
culture is very important. An analysis of the individual components of each laser display 
may not be viable considering the time constraints, certainly on temporary installations. 
However, for permanent installations, if the risk of exposure is high and the number of 
people at risk is large, then it may be appropriate to utilise the more formal techniques 
such as hazard and operability studies, hazard analysis and failure modes and effects 
analysis. However, as stated above, the nature of the industry is such that assumptions 
may still need to be made about the human factors in the assessment. 
2.7 Training 
Section 2.6 has identified the importance of the human element in the assessment of the 
risks. Training can form an important part of risk management. The current laser safety 
standard (IEC 1993) provides some guidance on the training required for users of class 3A 
or higher laser products. The standard suggests that this training should include: 
familiarisation with system operating procedures 
the proper use of hazard control procedures, warning signs, etc 
the need for personal protection 
accident reporting procedures 
bioeffects of the laser upon the eye and the skin 
The standard also requires a Laser Safety Officer to be appointed if a laser of class 3B or 
class 4 is used. 
Vassie et aI (1993) reported that many of the laser manufacturers in the UK had difficulty 
understanding the current British Standard on laser safety. Many purchasers of laser 
products will rely on the manufacturer for education and training in the first instance. It 
would be reasonable to expect laser display companies of some standing to have laser 
safety training programmes which include all of the hazards from working in the industry. 
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It would also be reasonable to see customer training provided, perhaps under the guidance 
of the company Laser Safety Officer. 
Trade associations often have an important role in the maintenance of practical standards 
for particular industries. However, the development of such associations, particularly in 
the UK has to be seen in the context of the competition between laser display companies. 
Many companies have spawned other companies through personal differences between 
employers and employees. 
The International Laser Display Association (lLDA) is a US-based organisation founded 
in August 1986. It publishes its own journal (Laserist) and holds an annual conference. 
There are currently seven committees: Awards; Technical; Safety; Ethics; Terminology 
Standardization; Planetaria and Science Centers; and Public Awareness. TIDA publish 
(ILDA 1993) a glossary of terms used in the laser entertainment industry aimed primarily 
at new laser operators and technical standards. 
A Canadian laser display company, Laser FIX International, publishes its own journal for 
. the laser light show industry (Laser Effects). This has a worldwide circulation. Laser FIX 
International also organises an annual laser light show conference and exhibition which 
includes tutorial sessions. 
Both ILDA and Laser FIX International operate sites on the Internet, with electronic 
mailing lists for the exchange of information. 
There is no major involvement of UK laser display companies in these two ventures. 
Following a joint presentation of new guidance by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE 
1996a) by NRPB, Loughborough University and the Health and Safety Executive on 8 
January 1997, many of the laser display companies got together and formed a professional 
association. Initially this was called the British Entertainment Laser Association, but the 
"British" was deleted within a couple of months to avoid limiting the membership to the 
UK. The birth of this organisation could be seen to be as the result of implied tighter 
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regulation of the industry and therefore was initially a pressure group. 
2.8 Conclusions 
There are a number of guidance documents covering the use of lasers in the entertainment 
industry. None of these give practical guidance on assessing the risks. Most of the 
documents are official, ie have been written by regulators rather by the industry. The 
guidance that has been written by the industry contains errors and demonstrates a lack of 
understanding of many of the safety issues. 
The guidance for the exposure of persons, and particularly members of the public, to laser 
radiation is consistent and clear. People should not be exposed to laser radiation in excess 
of the maximum permissible exposure (MPE). The values for the MPEs are 
internationally agreed and have remained the same for the visible region of the 
electromagnetic spectrum since at least 1983. However, there is no clear guidance on how 
to assess laser shows for compliance with the MPE values. 
The enforcement of the use of lasers in the entertainment industry is complex and needs to 
take account of health and safety legislation, entertainment licensing and product 
legislation. The enforcement is likely to be spread over different agencies, and many 
enforcing officers are unlikely to deal with the entertainment use of lasers regularly, even 
, 
in major population centres. 
Laser radiation is unlikely to kill people. Many of the associated hazards, such as 
electricity, working at height and manual handling do have a risk of death. There is 
specific legislation covering many of these hazards and general entertainment industry 
guidance. However, laser displays are usually seen in isolation, as is clear from the 
guidance documents available. 
Industries who work together in professional associations tend to develop their own 
standards, both technical and safety. The laser display industry in the UK is highly 
competitive with a high degree of animosity between companies, many of which share 
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evolutionary paths. This is likely to lead to a reluctance to be open about the technology 
used for laser display products. 
The conclusion is that the industry is likely to be very protective of its activities, 
especially as there appears to have been little formal involvement of regulatory authorities 
in assessing the risks from actual performances. The prevailing view of the laser 
companies is that they have been carrying out this activity for a number of years and that 
they know what they are doing. The view of the regulators is likely to be that the industry 
is not helpful and probably not able to demonstrate the risk management of their 
- activities. Such views are likely to see each party on either side of a ravine with a large 
gap of understanding between them, .but each, hopefully, will have the common aim of 
seeing the safe use of lasers in the entertainment industry. It was clear, therefore, that it 
was necessary to understand the technology and issues associated with putting on a laser 
display, the practical approach to assessing the risks, and the problems of enforcement. In 
essence, the laser display companies had to be able to provide risk assessments which 
were meaningful, and which could be assessed by enforcing officers to ensure legal 
compliance. If this could be achieved, it should be possible to build a bridge between the 
two opposing sides and ensure the safety of all who attend entertainment events using 
lasers. 
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3. Background for the Research 
3.1 Introduction 
There are a number of applications for lasers in the entertainment and display industry. 
The examples described here represent a cross section of these applications and are events 
where the author was involved either as the laser safety adviser to the enforcing authority 
or attended at the request of the organisers or venue operator. The involvement was at the 
start of the research. 
There is currently no published comprehensive review of the laser systems used by the 
entertainment industry in the UK. This puts the enforcing officer at a disadvantage in that 
slbe may not be familiar with the technology and have no reference to turn to. At the start 
of this research the laser companies were reluctant to reveal details of the hardware used. 
This was justified by them on the basis of fierce competition within the UK. This 
approach appears to be different from that in the United States and Canada where 
standardisation has been encouraged and shows are transferred between companies on 
magnetic tape. Laser FIX International have recently published a guide to the equipment 
used in North America (Roberts, 1996), but this does not cover the safety aspects of 
individual components in any detail. 
3.1.1 Details of Laser Display Systems 
An outline block diagram of a simple laser display system is presented in figure 3.1. 
In order to use laser radiation for entertainment, it is necessary to have laser beams that 
are visible. This means that the radiation should be within the wavelength range 400 to 
780 nm, and a proportion of the beam needs to enter the eye to stimulate the optical 
sensors on the retina. The eye does not respond equally to all wavelengths. Therefore, in 
order to achieve the same level of "brightness", different irradiance levels on the retina are 
required. The absolute luminosity curve for the eye's photopic (high light level) response 
is presented in figure 3.2 on a linearnog scale to emphasise the contribution at the visible 
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wavelength extremes (after Anderson 1989). Combining visible radiation of different 
wavelengths produces white light. Since the mixture relies on the visual perception of the 
light, it is important that the irradiances on the retina are matched to the inverse of the 
curve in figure 3.2. The use of multiple colours is more important for graphical images 
than for beam effects. These are discussed in more detail below. 
Secondary Optics 
PLAN VIEW -Not to scale 
Figure 3.1 Simple Laser Display System 
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A number of different types of laser are used in the entertainment industry. The types 
described here are restricted to those which emit laser radiation in the visible part of the 
electromagnetic spectrum. It is unlikely that lasers emitting infrared radiation will be 
employed but it is accepted that there may be some experimentation with lasers emitting 
ultraviolet radiation (UVR). UVR can be used to induce fluorescence in certain materials, 
including cosmetics. However, the collimated nature of laser radiation is a disadvantage 
for such applications. 
There is limited information about the number of lasers used in the entertainment industry 
but there is an indication of the number of units sold per year from the annual review and 
forecast covering all laser applications published by Laser Focus World. The information 
relating to entertainment also covers laser pointers, laser-based information displays, 
display holograms and laser projection systems. The data from the 1995, 1996, 1997 and 
1998 review and forecasts are presented in table 3.1 for world-wide sales (Anderson 1995, 
1996, 1997 and 1998). All other categories were zero. It was recognised that China and 
Asia represent growing entertainment markets. 
Diode lasers, including laser pointers, have not been included in this table. The data was 
collected by contacting manufacturers throughout the world. However, it is known that a 
. number of laser display companies are using metal vapour lasers whereas the data in table 
3.1 suggests that these have moved out of favour. The sudden growth of diode-pumped 
solid state lasers is ably demonstrated. 
Table 3.1 only considers lasers sold new into the entertainment industry and also probably 
ignores small manufacturing bases. A number of the lasers used in the entertainment 
industry move into the sector as second hand products from other industries. There are 
also a small number of dedicated manufacturing bases. However, the latter probably 
represent less than ten units per year in the UK, although most of these are solid state 
lasers. 
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Table 3.1 Laser Focus World Review and Forecast of Worldwide Laser Sales (Units) 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
(Actual) (Actual) (Actual) (Actual) (Forecast) 
Solid State - 40 50 15 20 25 
Lamp Pumped 
Solid State - 0 0 20 50 90 
Diode Pumped 
Ion < lW 316 207 154 200 200 
Ion> 1W 257 289 305 286 299 
He-Cd 20 25 0 0 0 
He-Ne 5500 7000 7750 5000 5000 
Metal Vapour 5 0 0 0 0 
Total 6138 7571 8244 5556 5614 
. 
This section reviews some of the laser display systems used and is based on discussions 
with a number of laser companies. Although there was a belief that they all had unique 
systems, they were all very similar in concept, if not in detail. The safety issues associated 
with the various components of the laser display are presented. Further details of the 
equipment used are contained in Appendix I. 
3.1.1.1 Lasers 
Table 3.1 shows the types of lasers sold for use in the entertainment industry. Each have 
safety issues associated with them (see table 3.3). The wavelengths used for entertainment 
applications from each type of laser are summarised in table 3.2. 
38 
Table 3.2 - Principal Wavelengths from Lasers Used in Entertainment 
. 
Type of Laser . Principal Entertainment Wavelengths 
. (nm) 
Solid State - Lamp or Diode Pumped 
Nd: YAG (frequency doubled) 532 
Ion 
Argon-ion 457.9,476.5,488.0,514.5 
Krypton-ion 406.7, 413.1, 468.0, 530.9, 568.2, 
647.1,676.4 
Mixed Gas or "white light" 457.9, 476.5, 488.0, 514.5, 530.9, 
. 568.2,647.1,676.4 . 
He-Cd 441.6, 537.8, 636.0 
He-Ne 543.5, 594.1, 604.0, 611.9, 632.8, 
640.1 
Metal Vapour 
Copper Vapour 510.6, 578.2 
Gold Vapour 628.0 
Dye Lasers Various 
Semiconductor Lasers Various 
As has already been discussed in 3.1.1, the eye's response, in terms of how bright a light 
source is for a fixed irradiance, depends on the wavelength. White light can be generated 
by mixing the wavelengths either from a single laser or two or more lasers. However, in 
order to achieve true white light (as perceived by the eye) it is necessary to mix the 
irradiances at each wavelength in inverse proportion to the photopic response of the eye. 
There are essentially two types of visible effect that are produced: beams in the air and 
graphical images. Usually, the effects are mutually exclusive, ie with graphical images it 
is preferable not to have the beams visible in the air; and with beam effects it is generally 
undesirable to see the eventual target site of the beams. 
The safety issues associated with each of the types of laser in table 3.2 are summarised in 
table 3.3. Some of the hazards will only be accessible during maintenance or servicing of 
the laser. However, since these operations are routinely carried out by staff from the laser 
companies it is important that they are included here. 
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Table 3.3 - Hazards Associated with Entertainment Lasers (in Addition to Visible Laser Radiation) 
. 
Type of Laser Invisible Laser Incoherent Optical High Weight Moving Coolant X-Rays Temperature Implosion Chemicals 
Radiation Radiation Voltages Parts 
Solid State - ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ 
Lamp pumped . 
Solid State - ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ 
Diode Pumped 
. 
Ion ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ 
. 
He-Cd ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ 
He-Ne ,/ ,/ ,/ 
Metal Vapour ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ . ,/ 
Dye ,/(1) ,/(1) ,/ ,/ ,/ . ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ 
Semiconductor ,/(1) ,/(1) 
Key: ,/ this hazard generally exists for this type of laser. 
,/(1) depends on the specific type of laser. The hazards associated with dye lasers may be due to the pumping laser. 
The typical mode of operation and current maximum radiant powers for typical 
entertainment lasers are summarised in table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 Summary of Common Entertainment Lasers 
Laser Mode of Operation Radiant Power Range (in 
Entertainment) 
Helium·Neon Continuous < 1 mWt075mW 
Argon·ion . Continuous 50mWt050W . 
Krypton·ion . Continuous 50mWt05W 
Mixed Gas Continuous 50mWt05W 
Helium·Cadmium Continuous 
.. 
up to 150mW 
. 
Copper Vapour Pulsed up to 100 W average 
Gold Vapour Pulsed up to 5 W average 
Neodymium:YAG Continuous or Q·switched up to 50 W average 
(frequency doubled) 
Semiconductor Continuous up to 5 W (array) 
It is possible that other lasers could be used for entertainment applications but the list 
considered in this section represents the majority of the types of lasers in use today. The 
continuous development of the semiconductor laser wiII mean that three·colour 
semiconductor products wiII eventually come on to the market. 
As described in the previous chapter, laser radiation safety appears to be well addressed, 
with information to assess the magnitude of the hazard· given in the current British 
Standard (BSI, 1994). In order to make the assessment for a given laser, the following 
information wiII be required: 
• wavelength; 
• radiant power or energy; 
• pulse characteristics; 
• beam divergence; and 
• initial beam diameter. 
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There may be some inconsistencies in the way some of this data is presented by 
manufacturers. The beam is generally assumed to have a Gaussian profile. The beam 
diameter may be quoted at the lie or lIe2 points. The divergence may be quoted as a fuII 
or half angle. It is also possible that some lasers will have a beam waist outside the laser 
aperture. 
3.1.1.2 Associated Equipment 
A semiconductor laser may be a complete unit, including all power sources. Most of the 
other lasers will at least have an electrical power cable which needs to be connected to an 
electricity supply. Lasers, such as the argon-ion laser, may consist of a laser head, an 
"exciter" unit, which provides the necessary high voltages, a control module, cooling 
water supply and all of the associated cables and pipework to connect the various parts 
together. 
A summary of the equipment associated with running an entertainment laser is presented 
in table 35, along with the resultant hazards. 
Table 3.5 Hazards from Associated Equipment 
Equipment, etc Hazards 
Generator Noise, High Voltages (may be three-phase 
supply), Fuel, Heat, Fumes, Weight 
Laser Exciter High Voltages, Weight 
Control Module Uncontrolled Access 
Cooling Plant Noise, Water/Coolant, Pressure, Heat, 
Weight 
Water Storage Tanks Weight, Water (potential risk of drowning) 
Support Stand Weight, Stability 
Electrical Cables/Control Cables 
. 
High Voltages, Trip Hazards 
Cooling Pipes Trip Hazards, Pressure, Water/Coolant 
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3.1.1.3 Optical Systems 
The laser may be used without any other optical components to produce a display. 
However, it is more likely that the beam will be directed through optical systems to 
produce various visual effects. 
There are three optical systems which need to be considered: 
• the transfer of the beam from the laser to one or a number of primary optical 
processing systems; 
• primary optical processing, normally within an optical bench; and 
• secondary optics, normally mounted around the venue and including the final target 
site(s) for the laser beam(s). 
Any. one of the optical systems can alter the characteristics of the laser beam, including 
the temporal characteristics, the radiant power or energy, beam diameter and beam 
divergence. 
The transfer of the beam from the laser to the primary optical system may be through the 
open air, through a beam tube or through a fibre optic cable. The laser may be mounted 
within an enclosure with the primary optical system, it may be coupled directly to the 
enclosure, or may be remote. 
The optical systems may contain a number of components which may also alter the 
characteristics of the beam. Typical components are summarised in table 3.6. Further 
descriptions of the individual components are given in Appendix 1. 
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Table 3.6 Summary of Components in Optical Systems 
Component Characteristics 
Beam Dump May be a specific absorber block, local shielding within the primary 
optical system or part of the venue structure. Essentially, the place . 
where the beam is terminated. May be the place where reflected beams 
from, for example, dichroic filters are dumped. Should be sufficient to 
cope with the maximum irradiance likely to be encountered at that 
position. 
Beam Scanners Deflect beam under control. May be mirror mounted on motor shaft, 
galvanometer pairs or acousto-optic modulators. Used to generate 
aerial beam effects and· images on. screens. Can be considered a 
moving form of the_plane mirror. 
Beam Splitters An incoming beam is split into two beams. The split may be 50-50, or 
any other ratio. Can be used to generate more than one effect 
simultaneously from a single laser beam. 
Beam Stop Generally, a mechanical shutter placed in the beam path. May be 
activated by a solenoid. May be switched out of the beam path at the 
start of a show and back in at the end of the show. 
Colour Selectors May be dichroic mirrors or a polychromatic acousto-optic modulator. 
The dichroic mirrors may be mounted on rotary actuators. 
Consideration has to be given to the unwanted portion of the beam. 
Diffraction May be transmission or reflection .. May have zero order suppressed. 
Grating Beam power effectively split over a greater area. 
Effects Wheel May contain a number of optical components such as diffraction 
gratings, and also a straight through position. The wheel rotates under 
. control to select the differentjJositions . 
Lenses May be used to focus or diverge the laser beam. May be used as part of 
the Z-BIanking system or to increase the beam divergence at the exit 
aperture of the primary optical system. The use of a lens anywhere in 
the beam path will suggest that the beam divergence provided by the 
manufacturer of the laser will not be valid for the beam after the lens. 
The use of a convex lens may produce a focal point external to the 
aperture from the primary optical system 
Luminaires Glass or plastic which influences the path of the beam. Shower glass 
or other optically transmitting material which has a surface texture is 
generally used. A prism or a polychromatic acousto-optic modulator 
may be used to split the colours before passing through the luminaire. 
Masking Plates Physical blanking plates which may be located at the exit apertures of 
the primary optical system to restrict the possible beam paths to avoid 
exposure, for example, of the audience. May also be incorporated into 
secondary optical components to reduce the effect of unplanned 
component movement. 
Mirror Balls A secondary optical component which has multiple facets of either 
plane or diffraction mirrors. The facets may be of similar dimensions 
to the laser beam, in which case the beam is scanned across the mirror 
ball, or the beam may be diverged through a lens to fill the mirror ball. 
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Table 3.6 Summary of Components in Optical Systems (continued) 
Component Characteristics 
Plane Mirrors Front or rear silvered mirrors. Assume total reflection with all beam 
characteristics except direction conserved. 
Projection May be a standard projection screen or may be any other surface, 
Screens including buildings, trees and clouds, on which the laser beam is 
projected. The projection screen may have reflecting surfaces or may 
transmit a proportion of the incident beam. 
Rotary Actuators Usually has something mounted on an arm which is introduced into 
the beam under control. Can be used to switch beam paths, block 
beam paths and remove specific wavelengths from the laser beam. 
Z-Blanking Generally either a galvanometer or an acousto-optic modulator 
which switches the beam on and off under control. Used so that the 
beam position can be moved without being seen. 
3.1.1.4 Control Systems 
The laser display is usually controlled by one of three methods: manually, programmable 
controller, computer-based controller. The controller generally does not control the laser 
itself: this was considered in 3.1.1.2. However, it will control all of the primary optical 
system and possibly secondary optics. It may control associated equipment such as smoke 
generators, electric screens, water screens, etc. Programmable controls are considered here 
to include systems which incorporate a tape player to present pre-recorded laser shows. 
The controller will be linked to the equipment it is intended to control. This may be by 
wire, fibre optic cable link or by radio/infrared free-in-air link. Each of these will have 
safety issues associated with them. The trend towards computer control and digital 
communications may provide the opportunity for increased fault tolerance but also 
provides the opportunity for communication over greater distances via network systems. 
This may result in global control of many laser displays in different countries· at the same 
time from a central point. This approach is already used for permanent small-scale laser 
displays in shopping malls. These are generally used to display textual images and logos 
and are programmed from a central location (Lissack, 1995). 
A summary of the safety issues associated with the control systems is presented in table 
3.7. 
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Table 3.7 Safety Issues from Control Systems 
Item Safety Issues 
Manual Controller . Degree of operator control. Potential for pressing wrong 
button. Ability to alter show from what has been agreed. 
Programmable Controller Programmin g errors. 
Computer-based Controller Computer failures. Interference from other equipment. 
Programming errors. 
Communication Channels Loss of communication. Interference with communication. 
Operator Training. Degree of control. Pressure of work (stress). 
Power Supplies Failure. Malfunction. What happens to optical systems 
under these circumstances? High voltages. 
3.2 Lasers in Entertainment 
A number of applications of lasers in entertainment were reviewed to consider whether 
the conclusions from chapter 2 were valid, ie laser radiation issues were readily addressed 
using the guidance and standards available and that the main safety issues related to the 
non-beam aspects and practical risk assessment. 
It was necessary to analyse each of the events using a common format. This would also 
highlight areas which needed further investigation. A description of each of the events 
studied is presented in Appendix B. 
The inclusion of an event in this chapter does not necessarily imply that the public were 
exposed to an unacceptable risk. Of equal concern was whether the laser company could 
quantify the hazards and therefore make a judgement about the magnitude of any risks. As 
already stated in Chapter 1, the average family attending an event provided for their 
entertainment assumes that their safety is assured. 
Each of the events is identified by a letter (A-H), for reference in the summary table. An 
outline of the events is presented in table 3.8 
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Table 3.8 Outline of Laser Events 
Event Description 
A Outdoor Classical Laser and Firework Concert 
B Outdoor Classical Laser and Firework Concert 
C Outdoor Display at a Marina 
. 
. 
D Drive-In Movie and Laser Show 
E Trade Exhibition 
F Trade Conference 
G Medical Laser Exhibition 
H Laser Tag Game 
3.3 Analysis of Laser Events 
Factors of interest in analysing the events described in Appendix B include whether the 
event could be assessed in advance, ie whether adequate documentation was available; 
whether the event could be assessed on the day, but before the start time of the event; and 
whether the risks were adequately assessed and/or controlled. 
None of the laser companies involved in the events were able to supply adequate 
information in advance to enable a judgement to be made. Although an appendix 3 to 
PM19 was supplied for seven of the eight events, the information was either not 
appropriate, incomplete or wrong. In all these cases, the companies considered that the 
information they had supplied was adequate and events had been approved in the past on 
the basis of similar paperwork. 
Some of the assessments were carried out with either Environmental Health Officers or 
venue safety managers. They did not understand the information they were being provided 
with. In all cases, proactive consideration of safety was considered by the laser company 
staff to be detrimental to their work. There appeared to be an ethos that raising safety 
issues would imply an unacceptable risk and this was not what the promoters wished to 
hear. 
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There were several cases of the actual event not matching the paperwork provided. In one 
case (event A), the arrangement for the stage was changed on the day. At another (event 
C) further construction work took place after the initial assessment, which altered the 
risks. 
Practical preparation and planning prior to the events appeared to be limited. It was usual 
for the equipment to arrive on site and then to be constructed into a laser display system 
using a range of components. Generally, inadequate time was allowed for construction 
and alignment to take place. 
At most of the events, audience exposure to the laser radiation was either planned or 
reasonably foreseeable. None of the laser companies had the ability to assess the 
magnitude of the hazard, or the risk of injuries taking place. All laser companies were 
experienced, in that they had undertaken many events previously. They appeared to rely 
on a lack of reported incidents from previous events to justify the lack of risk. 
Whilst the quantification of the laser radiation hazard was an obvious issue, the associated 
hazards often had more immediate impact. Outdoor events in particular suffered the 
problems from trying to operate essentially laboratory equipment in a relatively hostile 
environment. Water and electrical power were always a problem. Since they are so vital to 
the operation of the laser display, and must be an issue at most outdoor laser events, it was 
astonishing how surprised the laser company staff appeared to be that they experienced 
problems. 
The enforcing officer or venue safety manager generally did not have experience of 
assessing laser events. However, rather than consider the issues they should have been 
familiar with, such as electrical and mechanical safety, they considered the laser event to 
be completely different. The laser radiation safety issue may have been minor compared 
with the risk of electrocution and working at height. 
The laser companies were normally working alongside other sectors of the industry, such 
as fireworks companies, stage construction companies, and lighting and sound engineers. 
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These sectors generally presented a professional (to the uninitiated) image with good 
preparation and equipment that appeared to be designed and constructed for the 
environment in which they were intended to work. The staff from these other companies 
generally considered the laser companies to present an amateur image and, in some cases, 
considered them a danger to everyone working in the vicinity. 
None of the events fully complied with the requirements of PM19. 
3.4 Conclusions 
Table 3.9 summarises the eight events assessed and brings together the common factors 
which needed to be investigated further. Consideration is given to the paperwork supplied 
by the laser company, such as thePM19 Appendix 3 (HSE 1980). 
The selected examples reported here demonstrate that exposure in contravention of the 
then Health and Safety Executive Guidance was occurring. There were no events attended 
by the author where everything was satisfactory. There was a wide range of knowledge 
amongst Environmental Health Officers (EHOs). The laser companies have been known 
to use this to their advantage. However, further research was required to identify the 
extent of the involvement of EHOs with laser displays. It would not be reasonable to 
expect EHOs to be experts in assessing laser displays if they are rarely required to assess 
them. A more effective use of public money would be to seek assistance from a third party 
when necessary. It was necessary to survey the enforcing officers to determined the extent 
of their involvement in laser displays. However, it was found that all of the EHOs had 
expertise in the non-laser-radiation hazards, but because they were dealing with a laser 
product did not always use this expertise to work through the problem systematically. 
They saw the use of lasers as being special. 
The stage at which the EHO became involved in the event, and the stage at which they 
sought external advice, also had a bearing on how the final event could be influenced to 
ensure that the risks were minimised. 
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The human factor has been shown to be a major component in the display events 
discussed, but engineering and administrative controls were also found to be inadequate. 
It was clear that some of the laser companies wished to provide shows with the risk to 
everyone minimised. However, their technical ability to do this was limited. In other 
instances, the desire to expose personnel directly with the laser radiation was driven by 
the perceived customer desire for this. It is likely that this ethos will only be overcome by 
the laser companies demonstrating that they can produce more effective shows without 
the need for the beams to go into audience areas. This requires an understanding of the 
eye's response to laser radiation in terms of visual perception rather than health effects. 
A common comment from the laser display operators was that the enforcing officers did 
not understand the 'special'. problems associated with the laser display industry. Equally, 
the enforcing officers considered the laser display companies unhelpful. The root of the 
problem appeared to be an inconsistent approach to assessing laser displays throughout 
the UK, possibly due to the lack of specific legislation. This was generating friction 
because operators found it difficult to understand why a show could be considered 
acceptable in one location, but not in another. There was also no recognised approach to 
either tackling or assessing the risks from the activity. 
It is obvious from these assessments that there is a wide gulf between the laser display 
companies and the enforcing officers. 
The methodology used to progress an improvement to the level of laser safety was to 
understand the tasks involved in putting on a laser display (including an understanding of 
the technology), identify whether it was possible to develop a protocol for identifying the 
hazards, quantifying these hazards, assessing the risks and presenting the conclusions. 
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Table 3.9 Summary of Common Factors from the Laser Events 
. Event A B C D E F G 
. EHO Experienced? N ? N N N/A N/A N/A 
Collaboration? P P P P N N P 
Risk Assessment? N N N N N N N 
Training - use Y Y Y Y N/A Y N/A 
. 
Training - safety . N N N N N N N 
Mechanical Stability N N N Y N Y N/A 
Goggles Available N Y N N N/A N N/A 
Written Procedures N N N N N N N 
Laser Controlled Area N N N N N/A N N/A 
App 3 PM19 Supplied? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
App 3 PM19 Adequate? N N N N N N N 
EMC Problem? Y N N N N/A N N/A 
Operation/control Y Y Y Y N/A Y N/A 
Human Factors Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: Y = Yes, N = No, ? = not known, P= Partial, N/A = not applicable 
'laser safety support provided at the request of the EHO 
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H 
N/A 
N 
N 
N/A 
N 
N/A 
N 
N 
N/A 
N 
N/A 
N 
N/A 
Y 
4. Surveys 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 outlined the problems with a small number of events. This showed that there 
was limited knowledge about laser radiation issues and laser displays amongst enforcing 
officers. Laser display companies were perhaps using this, but were also unable to 
demonstrate that the displays they were putting on were safe, and venue managers 
generally assumed that the laser display companies knew their business. In order to 
acquire a better understanding of the magnitude of this problem, surveys were carried out 
of the three identified groups. It was recognised that some groups would be more 
forthcoming with information than others. 
4.2 Enforcing Officers 
Local authorities are the enforcing authority for safety legislation at most entertainment 
venues and this function is normally performed by Environment Health Officers. 
Therefore, the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health was approached for support 
for a survey of Chief Officers. A questionnaire (Appendix C) was prepared using multiple 
choice, closed and open questions, and peer reviewed before distribution by the 
Epidemiology Group at NRPB. It was then sent to all pre-April 1996 local authorities 
(483) on the UK mainland and Northern Ireland. The respondents were at either Principal 
or Chief Environmental Health Officer level. Therefore, it can be assumed that the 
respondent either was fully aware of the experience and training requirements of their 
staff or were in a position to acquire such information. 
4.2.1 Number of Laser Displays 
Out of 483 local authorities canvassed, 277 sent replies, although one was anonymous. 
This represents a return of 57.3%. Of these 277 returns, 92 (33.2%) had dealt with laser 
displays in the preceding twelve months. covering 244 identified uses of lasers. The 
anonymous reply had not dealt with a laser display. The distribution of replies by county 
is presented in Table 4.1. The distribution of the number of displays dealt with is shown 
in figure 4.1 and tabulated by type in table 4.2 
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Table 4.1 Distribution of Questionnaire Replies by County 
County RepJies/No. No. of Laser County RepJies/No. No. of Laser 
of Districts Displays of Districts Displays 
Avon 4/6 6 Humberside S/9 0 
Beds 2/4 0 Kent 8/14 3 
Berkshire 4/6 1 Lancs 9114 S 
Borders 114 0 Leics 6/9 3 
Bucks 4/6 . 13 Lincs 4n 6 
Cambs 2/6 1 Lothian 2/4 6 
Central 2/3 0 Merseyside 3/S 1 
Cheshire S/8 3 Mid Glamorgan 3/6 0 
Cleveland 2/4 0 Norfolk sn 10 
Clwyd 4/6 1 NYorks 4/8 1 
Cornwall 3/6 1 Northants . 4n 2 
Cumbria 2/6 2 NIreland 10/26 3 
Derbyshire 7110 2 Northumberland 6/6 2 
Devon 9/10 S Notts 2/8 2 
Dorset 4/8 0 Oxon 4/S 6 
Dumfries 114 0 .. Powys 3/3 0 
Durham . S/8 0 Shropshire S/6 4 
Dyfed S/6 6 Somerset 2/S 1 
E Sussex 6n 23 S Glamorgan 2/2 2 
Essex 9/14 17 S Yorks 114 . 0 
Fife 113 0 Staffs 7/9 8 
Gloucs 2/6 0 Strathclyde 6/19 4 
Grampian 3/S 0 Suffolk sn 3 
Greater 17/33 48 
London· 
Surrey 9111 10 
. 
G Manchester SilO 4 Tayside 3/S 0 
Gwent 3/S 1 Tyne & Wear 3/S 0 
Gwynedd lIS 0 Warwickshire 4/S 3 
Hampshire 7/13 2 WGlamorgan 2/4 0 
Hereford 6/9 2 WMidlands sn 9 
Herts 3/10 2 WSussex sn 2 
Highland 3/8 0 WYorks 3/S 3 
Wiltshire 4/S 4 
S3 
. \ 
Table 4.2 Breakdown of Laser Displays Dealtwith by Local Authorities 
No. of No.ofLAs Penn. Penn. Temp. Temp. 
Displays Indoor Outdoor Indoor Outdoor 
I 41 7 1 16 18 
2 19 13 1 14 10 
3 12 10 0 17 10 
. 
4 5 0 1 8 11 
5 4 7 2 8 3 
6 6 5 0 18 10 
7 0 0 0 0 0 
. 
8 2 3 0 10 3 
. 
9 0 0 0 0 0 
10 1 0 0 10 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 
. 
12 0 0 0 0 0 
13 I 0 0 12 I 
14 11 0 0 13 I 
58 local authorities (63.0% of those who had dealt with laser displays) provided 
infonnation on the type of lasers used and this data is presented in figure 4.2. It was 
recognised that the detailed infonnation relating to particular events may not have been 
available. However, it could also be concluded that, in some cases, the local authority may 
not have requested the relevant infonnation at the time. 
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It can be seen that the majority of lasers displays make use of argon or krypton/argon 
lasers. The neodymium: YAG laser has just started to appear but, with the smaller size and 
lower electrical power requirements for diode-pumped Nd: YAG laser than for the gas 
laser, is likely to increase in popUlarity. It was interesting that the He-Ne laser still figured 
highly. It is assumed that these were mainly installed in smaller venues. 
Figure 4.1 Number of Laser Displays Assessed 
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4.2.2 Level of Expertise 
The local authorities were asked to judge their level of expertise in dealing with laser 
displays. They were asked to initially indicate how many staff they had within each of the 
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three categories: No experience; Basic knowledge; and Experienced. Many respondents 
just ticked the boxes rather than entering numbers. To assist with classifying staff into the 
three groups 6 questions were provided. Answers to the questions were not required but 
several forms were returned with answers. None of these had completely correct answers. 
The data from the self-assessment of expertise is presented in Table 4.3, divided into 
those who had dealt with laser displays in the preceding twelve months and those who had 
not. Where boxes were ticked instead of a number provided, the tick was replaced by 1. 
Therefore, this data may represent an underestimate of the actual number of individuals. 
Table 4.3 Level of Expertise in Local Authorities for Dealing with Laser Displays 
Dealt with Laser Displays in 
Category Preceding 12 Months? Total 
No Yes 
No experience 138 46 184 
Basic Experience 102 73 175 
Experienced 4 11 15 
At the time of the survey the current guidance from the Health and Safety Executive was 
PMI9. Therefore, respondents were asked to report on their familiarity with the document 
and whether they had a copy of it. 
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Table 4.4 Familiarity with HSE PM19 
Dealt with Laser Displays 
Category in Preceding 12 Months? Total 
No Yes 
Never heard of it 50 9 59 
.. 
Know of its existence 159 45 204 
. . 
Seen forms provided by laser 29 35 64 
companies 
Working knowledge 31 55 86 
Detailed knowledge 5 8 13 
It was interesting that the number of people who considered themselves experienced at 
assessing laser displays was more than those who considered that they had a detailed 
knowledge ofPM19. 
When asked if they had a copy ofPM19, 87.7% of the respondents said that they did. This 
is broken down into 88.0% of those who had not dealt with a laser display and 96.7% of 
those who had. The latter group consisting of three local authorities who had dealt with a 
laser display, without a copy of PM19, although it was not possible to judge whether they 
felt they had the expertise anyway or were using some other document to assess the 
display against. 
4.2.3 External Assistance 
It had been recognised from the author's own experience that local authorities commonly 
bring in expertise from third parties to assist when necessary. This would be particularly 
cost-effective for a local authority which may encounter one, or a few, laser displays per 
year. Therefore, the questionnaire asked who the local authority would turn to for further 
advice. Six options were given plus an "other". Respondents were encouraged to tick all 
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that applied. The data is presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. 
Table 4.5 Where would you go for further assistance? 
Dealt with Laser Displays in Total 
Category Preceding 12 Months? (out of 277) 
No Yes 
(out of 185) (out of 92) 
Other local authority (LA) . 129 (69.7%) 40 (43.5%) 169 (61.0%) 
.. 
Chartered Institute of 70 (37.8%) 20 (21.7%) 90 (32.5%) 
Environmental Health (CIEH) 
Health and Safety Executive 164 (88.6%) 77 (83.7%) 241 (87.0%) 
(HSE) 
NRPB 74 (40.0%) 43 (46.7%) 117 (42.2%) 
Loughborough University (LU) 9 (4.9%) 10 (10.9%) 19 (6.9%) 
Consultants 24 (13.0%) 17 (18.5%) 41 (14.8%) 
AIl local authorities provided an answer to these questions. Only one said that they would 
not seek any external advice, citing the Building Control section of the authority as their 
point of reference. It is not known if the officers in Building Control seek external advice 
in this instance. 
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Table 4.6 Specified replies to "Other" 
. 
Category No. displays Who else did they specify? 
in 12 months 
Other University 0 CIEH,HSE 
3 LA, CIEH, HSE, NRPB, LU, 
Consultant 
Health & Safety Agency 0 LA 
Northern Ireland 
. 
Building Control 3 Consultant 
1 None 
Laser Display Company 13 LA,HSE 
Institute of Lighting 0 LA,HSE 
Engineers 
Royal Environmental 0 LA, CIEH, HSE, NRPB 
Health Institute of Scotland 0 LA,HSE 
. 
As Appropriate 0 LA, CIEH, HSE, NRPB, LU, 
Consultant 
. 
. 
Perhaps the most significant answer here was the local authority who used a laser display 
company to provide them with consultancy support and the number of laser displays 
assessed on behalf of that local authority (13). From the experience shown in chapter 3, 
questions must be raised on the competence of the laser display company to provide such 
advice. 
4.2.4 Training 
The preceding sections suggest that the necessary expertise to assess laser displays does 
not exist in most local authorities. As has already been stated, it is valid for local 
authorities to bring in external assistance when required. Indeed, this may be the most 
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efficient and cost-effective use of limited resources within local authorities. However, the 
questionnaire asked if local authorities required training and, if so, to what level and in 
what format. 
236 of the 277 respondents (85.2%) said that they would like some form of training for 
their staff. Of these, 149 (out of 185) had not dealt with a laser display in the previous 
twelve months and 87 (of 92) had. Of those that said they did not need training 36 had not 
dealt with a laser display and 5 had . 
. The levels of training suggested were: 
• Overview seminar (up to 2 hours) 
• Basic awareness (1 day) 
• Working knowledge (2 days) 
• Detailed knowledge (4 days) 
There was also the option to tick "1 do not have enough knowledge to judge". A number 
of respondents used this box in addition to other boxes. The number of ticks for each 
option is presented in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7 Training Requirements 
Dealt with Laser Displays in Total 
Category Preceding 12 Months? (out of 277) 
No Yes 
(out of 185) (out of 92) 
. 
Overview seminar 40 (21.6%) 12 (13.0%) 52 (18.8%) 
. 
Basic awareness 102 (55.1%) 57 (62.0%) 159 (57.4%) 
. 
Working knowledge 61 (33.0%) 53 (57.6%) 114 (41.2%) 
Detailed knowledge 9(4.9%) 11 (12.0%) 20(7.2%) 
I do not know enough to judge 21 (11.4%) 4 (4.3%) . 25 (9.0%) 
. 
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Four local authorities identified a need for training at all four levels, thirteen identified a 
need at three levels (1 I at the lower three and 2 at the upper three). This simple analysis 
shows that there is a desire for training from local authority staff. However, it is 
recognised that this may be positively biased. The wish to pay for, and spare the time to 
attend, training may not be borne out in practice. 
The questionnaire asked which format the respondent would like to see the training take: 
formal lectures only; lectures supported by syndicate exercises; or a workshop (worked 
examples with demonstrations). 23 I replies were received and many specified more than 
one choice of format. Since many local authorities suggested they required several levels 
of training, this is reasonable. The counts were as follows: formal lectures only - 27; 
lectures supported by syndicate exercises - 6 I; and workshop - 173. This is based on an 
equal cost for all options and the bias is perhaps as expected. The respondents were then 
asked to choose again if the cost was weighted 1:1.5:2 for the three options. 168 replies 
were received to this, again with several local authorities choosing more than one option. 
The counts were shifted towards the lectures only as follows: formal lectures only - 33; 
lectures supported by syndicate exercises - 63; and workshop - 88. Although it was not 
possible to identify this from the data, it is possible that the bias towards the workshop 
option would have come from more experienced staff who had attended training in a 
similar format. 
The next question considered how far the respondent would be prepared to send their staff 
for training and to put these in order of preference. Options given were: 
I. Anywhere in UK 
2. A regional centre - eg Glasgow, Leeds or Oxford 
3. Up to lOO miles 
4. Up to 50 miles 
5. Within the County of this local authority only. 
It may be expected that all respondents would choose option 5. However, from the 
author's experience of training, more experienced staff tend to prefer to be trained with 
personnel from outside their immediate work environment. This also has the benefit of 
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being remote from the disruptions of the office. 
There were 234 replies to this question (giving at least one preference). The data is 
presented in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8 Preferred distances to travel for training 
Option 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
1 0(0%) 0 0 6 125 
, 
2 41 (17.5%) 20 25 81 0 
. 
. 
3 28 (12.0%) 14 90 34 0 
4 48 (20.5%) 110 19 0 0 
5 117 (50.0%) 13 7 11 6 
Members of the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health have a Continuous 
Professional Development (CPD) scheme (CIEH 1996). Although there is currently no 
requirement for formal examinations foIIowing training, a question was asked to 
determine if the respondents felt that any training should be foIIowed by a formal 
examination. 63 of the 236 respondents who required training said yes (26.7%). These 
were roughly equally divided between those who had dealt with laser displays in the 
preceding twelve months (29) and those who had not (34). Of these 63, 62 answered yes 
to the question on whether the examination should be accredited. Eleven chose more than 
one of the options. The data is presented in Table 4.9. Those respondents who replied 
"other" did not specify any of the given options. Generally, the written answer given by 
these respondents suggested that they did not have a preference or the accreditation should 
be given by whoever gives the training. One respondent was more specific and suggested 
the Royal Environmental Health Institute of Scotland. 
\ 
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Table 4.9 Preference for Accreditation Body for Examination 
Dealt with Laser Displays in 
Preceding 12 Months? Total 
Category (out of 62) 
No Yes 
(out of 34) (out of 28) 
Chartered Institute of 18 (52.9%) 7 (25.0%) 25 (40.3%) 
Environmental Health 
Health and Safety Executive 8 (23.5%) 6 (21.4%) 14 (22.6%) 
NRPB 12 (35.3%) 13 (46.4%) 25 (40.3%) 
. 
Loughborough University 3 (8.8%) 0(0%) 3 (4.8%) 
Other 2 (5.9%) 4 (14.3%) 6 (9.7%) 
: 
4.2.5 Specific Comments 
Six of the 277 respondents made specific comments on the returned questionnaires: 
"Hands on experience with practical procedures is important." 
"I have attended a number of training events on display lasers. Usually the physics and 
technology is taught very well but the organisers have a very poor understanding of the 
role of inspectors and the application of the law. The status of PM 19 and the role of BS or 
ISO Standards is also misunderstood. EHOs do not normally have to make PM19 
calculations themselves. I would, however, welcome a course which helped in the 
interpretation of calculations and demonstrated clear pitfalls. I would be very 
disappointed by another course where the role of the law and the enforcer was 
misunderstood." 
"A formal examination would put the price up too much." 
. ''The need to use expertise is too infrequent - training would be out of date too quickly." 
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·'W ould not be able to justify training in our own district - possibly as part of a Liaison 
Group involving other local authorities." 
"Level of use of lasers in the types of premises currently in use in this District doesn't 
justify specialist training. I buy in expertise where needed and we are happy to admit we 
don't know it all! Our premises are changing and so will our training needs." 
In summary, these comments support the argument for third-party assistance rather than 
specific training courses for some local authorities. However, they also suggest that 
training which has been provided may not be meeting the needs of the local authorities. 
4.3 Venue Managers and Laser Display Companies 
The questionnaire to the Environmental Health Officers provided a reasonable response. It 
was considered important to balance these views with those from the entertainment 
industry. A questionnaire was prepared to assess the knowledge of venue managers, laser 
display companies and anyone else involved in the industry. This was included with the 
December 1995 edition of Disco International (O'Hagan et ai, 1995) along with a 
supporting article. A copy of the questionnaire is included as Appendix D. Approximately 
8000 copies of the magazine were distributed. No replies were received. There are 
probably a number of reasons for this, including: suspicion of officialdom, lack of 
interest, concern over the use of the information, and the requirement to pay return 
postage or fax costs. Although a reply-paid option had been suggested, the editorial 
management of the magazine were reluctant to use valuable space for this. 
Subsequent to the questionnaire, working relations were developed with a number of laser 
display companies which allowed measurement techniques to be developed, as described 
later. Attempts to audit chains of night-clubs on behalf of the holding companies met with 
a poor response. Most of the data presented in later chapters has been obtained through 
involvement with the local authorities. 
An impromptu survey was carried out of a number of the more established laser display 
. companies during a meeting held at NRPB on 8 January 1997 to launch the Health and 
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Safety Executive's new guidance, HS(0)95 (HSE 1996a). Ten companies provided 
replies. Their estimate of the number of fixed and temporary instaIJations taking place in a 
twelve month period was 554. Those completing the survey considered that they 
represented about 50% of the market, suggesting about 1100 instaIJations per year. When 
this figure is compared with the results from the EHO questionnaire (277 laser displays 
for 57.3 % of the local authorities) this suggests that either the non-responding EHOs are 
assessing a higher proportion of laser displays or that a significant number are not being 
assessed. It could also be concluded that the laser display companies are over-estimating 
the number of installations they undertake per year. 
4.4 Training Courses 
The enforcing officers had identified a need for training and the data from chapter 3 
suggests that both the laser display companies and venues/promoters would also benefit. 
The case for training the staff from the laser display companies is clear: competent staff 
should be employed. However, for both the enforcing officers and the venues/promoters 
the cost of training (and the development of that training through practical experience) 
needs to be balanced against the benefits of using third parties to provide the detailed 
assessment. 
A one day course will cost the actual course fee, travel and subsistence and time away 
from work. There will also be a need for further commitment to ensure that the participant 
applies the knowledge gained and retains any competence. A laser display operator should 
apply the knowledge on a regular basis and hopefully provide a return on the investment 
in a reasonably short time. However, for the enforcing officer and venue/promoter, the 
knowledge may be of benefit in the short term, especially if the purpose of attending the 
training course was to gain sufficient knowledge to assess a specific event, but of less 
practical use at other times if the training is not reinforced. 
The use of a specialist consultant to provide advice to a local authority for each laser event 
may be cost effective if the number of events per year in small. Working alongside a 
consultant may also be an effective means of training an enforcing officer. Another factor 
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which needs to be considered is that the enforcing officer is also likely to be involved with 
other aspects of the event, such as food safety, hygiene and other health and safety issues. 
There may also be different parts of the local authority involved with the event where 
entertainment licensing is covered by someone other than the Environmental Health 
Officer. A consultant may be able to provide the liaison between the relevant parties and, 
through experience, know the right questions to ask and, more importantly, know that the 
answers to these questions are correct. 
NRPB and Loughborough University first offered a training course on "Laser Safety in 
the Entertainment Industry" in August 1994. This was intended as a one-day awareness 
course for enforcing officers, venue managers, promoters and laser display companies. It 
was recognised that enforcing officers would have a reasonable appreciation of health and 
safety, and possibly entertainment,legislation. However, they were unlikely to have much 
knowledge about the technical aspects of laser displays. 
Topics covered in the training included: 
• The Use of the Laser 
• Details of Laser Display Systems 
• Laser Radiation Hazards 
• Associated Hazards 
• Legislation, Standards and Guidance 
• Risk Assessment. 
An important aspect of any training course is the feedback received. This is both in the 
form of experience of the participants and formal reviews. Participants were asked to 
assess each presentation and provide supporting comments. They were also asked to 
assess the course overall. 
The general comments suggested that the course had provided a useful introduction. 
However, a number of participants considered that some topics would benefit from a 
workshop format. Most of the participants asked to be involved with further research into 
a methodology for assessing laser displays. 
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Most of the participants on the courses were either enforcing officers or venue managers. 
It was proving very difficult to attract participants from the laser display community. The 
conclusions to be drawn from this could include that they considered they did not need the 
training, the training was not appropriate, or they were not prepared to accept training 
from persons outside of their industry. 
The one day awareness course was obviously meeting some of the needs of the 
enforcement officers and venue management. These were likely to be persons who 
wanted an overview of laser displays and sufficient expertise to know when to call in 
external assistance. This was borne out by requests for advice from the course participants 
when laser displays required assessment in their geographical areas. The next level to 
consider was the group who wanted to assess most displays themselves but still be able to 
appreciate their limitations. This would also hopefully appeal to managers and staff from 
laser display companies. 
In 1996 a series of one day awareness courses were run followed by a one day workshop 
on assessing laser displays. Four such pairs of courses were run throughout the year and, 
for the first time these attracted participants from the laser display industry. The loan of 
laser display equipment and the informal input from the industry assisted greatly in 
developing a successful training strategy. The introductory day was run essentially the 
same as the previous courses but the second day included a greater degree of participation, 
including an assessment of a display using the then Health and Safety Executive guidance, 
PM 19 (HSE 1980). 
Written comments to support numerical assessments suggested that assessing exposure to 
the laser beam was the greatest concern for the course participants. This is despite this 
aspect of laser safety being covered by many standard texts and considered by many 
professionals to be well understood (see Chapter 2). All participants expressed a desire for 
a methodology for assessing laser displays. 
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4.5 Summary 
It has been possible to get quite a good overview of the current situation regarding local 
authorities but the laser display industry itself is more guarded. 
The large return rate for the local authority questionnaire is likely to be because of the 
general acceptance of NRPB as an independent organisation which provides assistance to 
local authorities, for example on radon assessments. The number of laser displays seen by 
local authorities is smaller than expected. Even if the number seen (244) is multiplied up 
for the number of local authorities who did not respond (x 483/277) this only represents 
425 laser displays per year. Even when taking into account that the local authority is not 
the only enforcing body,this must be an underestimate. However, the questionnaire 
would not take into account the number of fixed laser display installations under the local 
authority'S control if they had been installed more than twelve months prior to completion 
of the questionnaire. 
The most significant finding from the local authority questionnaire is the limited 
capability, within the local authorities who replied, to assess laser displays. Only 15 
persons were considered to be experienced in assessing laser safety at such events. It is 
accepted that many local authorities seek further advice when necessary but it likely that 
many rely on the expertise of the laser companies. It is particularly interesting that one 
local authority stated that they use a laser display company to advise them. This particular 
local authority had dealt with thirteen laser displays in the previous twelve months. 
The lack of response from the other side of the industry was disappointing. Some of the 
reasons are suggested above. However, it does raise the question of how many venues 
suspect that their laser safety may not pass scrutiny. 
The training courses have provided direct contact with a large number of persons involved 
across the industry from enforcing officers to laser display operators. The value in 
understanding the technology and the safety issues is ably demonstrated by the end-of-
course assessment questionnaires. Wlitten comments and informal discussions suggested 
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that an assessment methodology was required and specific guidance on how to assess the 
laser radiation hazard. It is significant that many enforcing officers followed up the 
training with requests for support to assist with laser entertainment events. This 
demonstrated that the enforcing officers did not feel that the level of training was 
sufficient to allow them to assess laser displays alone. Due to resource constraints it was 
not possible to comply with every request, demonstrating the importance of developing a 
methodology which could at least be used by enforcing officers and others. Such a 
methodology could assist the person with the first stage of the safety assessment and 
perhaps identify the point at which further advice should be sought. In essence, they are 
seeking a practical guidance document which goes further than the limited formal 
guidance currently available. 
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5. Quantifying the Laser Radiation Hazard 
5.1 Introduction 
In many laser display situations there is the potential for exposure to laser radiation. 
Although there is a great deal of guidance on how to assess laser radiation exposure in 
the literature (see Chapter 2) this is identified as the one specific area where there is 
most concern and controversy. Murphy (1997) and Jones (1997) both consider that the 
practice of audience scanning presents little risk of injury. This is one side of the 
argument and, it can be argued, is based on at least ten years of practical experience of 
audience scanning throughout the world. However, the maximum permissible exposure 
(MPE) levels published in the current laser safety standard in the UK (BSI 1994) are 
based on considerable research since the first successful demonstration of the laser. UK 
safety legislation can use the MPE values as a metric against which the risk can be 
judged: if the MPE is not exceeded then the risk is acceptable, if it is exceeded the risk 
becomes more unacceptable as the degree of excess is increased. 
The former UK guidelines on the use of lasers for entertainment (HSE 1980) included a 
proforma (appendix 3) which required the laser display company to provide 
calculations or measurements of exposure levels. In the author's experience such 
information is either not provided or does not relate to the specific event. It. is this lack 
of information and perceived ability to assess the magnitude of the laser radiation 
hazard which is of greater concern than whether actual injuries are occurring. 
This chapter describes the theoretical and practical assessment of the laser radiation 
hazard, so-called quantification of the hazard. This process should form an important 
part of the planning stage of any event. A laser company ought to be capable of 
undertaking such assessments where the risk of exposure to the hazard is more than 
remote. This will include· the manufacture of the laser product at the company's 
premises, alignment on site and any reasonably foreseeable audience exposure 
situations, including intended audience scanning. 
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Comparisons need to be made with published values for maximum permissible 
exposure (MPE). The values in BS EN 60825-1: 1994 (BSI 1994) will be used 
throughout. 
5.2 Primary Laser Beam 
Generally, the worst case condition will be exposure to the full radiant power of the 
laser beam as it exits from the laser aperture. In order to compare the exposure situation 
with the MPE the following parameters are required (assuming the laser radiation is 
emitted as a continuous wave (cw)): 
wavelength 
radiant power 
beam diameter 
exposure duration 
If the laser radiation is emitted as a single pulse or a train of pulses then the radiant 
energy, pulse duration and (if appropriate) pulse repetition rate are required. 
The MPE is given in terms of irradiance rN m·2) or radiant exposure (J m·2). For visible 
laser radiation (400 to 700 nm) BS EN 60825-1 uses a limiting aperture of 7mm: if the 
actual beam diameter is less than 7 mm then the actual radiant power is averaged over a 
disc of 7 mm diameter. Therefore, in these situations the biological irradiance is less 
than the physical irradiance. A description of the rationale for this can be found in, for 
example, Sliney and Wolbarsht (1980, pages 241-242). 
It can be reasonably assumed that any exposure to the primary laser beam will be 
accidental for most of the applications of lasers for display purposes. The exception 
may be laser tag games. For a single accidental exposure, the primary protection 
measure, if the exposure is to the eye, will be the aversion response comprising the 
blink reflex and violent movement of the head. The laser safety standards assume this 
process in completed within 0.25 s. 
5.2.1 Accidental Exposure to a CW Beam 
For exposure durations up to 10 s the MPE is independent of wavelength over the 
wavelength region 400 to 700 nm. For a single accidental exposure the exposure 
duration can be considered to be 0.25 s (Sliney and Wolbarsht 1980, p 223). Therefore 
the MPE (taken from Table 6 ofBS EN 60825-1) is: 
5.1 
C6 is a correction factor to be used where the beam is viewed as an extended source and 
therefore can be set to I here. Substituting for t = 0.25 s, the MPE = 6.36 J m·z. This is 
converted to an irradiance by dividing by the exposure duration, t, to give 25.4 W m·z. 
If the beam diameter (defined in BS EN 60825-1 as the smallest circle which contains 
63% of the total laser power (sub-clause 3.10» is less than or equal to 7 mm then the 
maximum radiant power to not exceed the MPE can be calculated: 
Pma, = MPExAreaofbeam 
1& 
= 25.4 x "4 (0.007 I 
= 0.001 Wor 1 mW 
5.2 
Therefore, if the radiant power of a cw laser beam exceeds I mW, the MPE will be 
exceeded during an accidental exposure if the beam diameter is less than or equal to 7 
mm. The MPE for exposure durations from I ns to 18 IlS is 5 X 10.3 J m·z or 5 x 1O.3/t 
W ·z m. 
The time to exceed the MPE as a function of radiant power into a 7 mm aperture is 
presented in figure 5.1. It can be seen that even at 10 mW, the time to exceed the MPE 
is about 25 Ils. At 5 W, which is typical of many laser display systems, the time to 
exceed the MPE is about 40 ns. Any control measure designed to protect the eyes of 
someone working within the region where the beam diameter is up to 7 mm will have to 
act within 40 ns for a 5 W laser. 
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Figure 5.1 Time to Exceed MPE as a Function of Power 
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A similar assessment can be undertaken for the skin. It is accepted that skin injuries 
may be considered a tolerable occupational hazard by employees of the laser company 
but they will not be tolerable to, for example, the audience. The skin MPE values from 
BS EN 60825-1 are 200 J m-2 from I ns to 100 ns, and 1.1 x 104 to.25 J m·2 from 100 ns 
to 10 s. For exposure durations of 10 s or longer, the MPE is 2000 W m-2• All of these 
values are constant with wavelength over the region 400 to 700 nm. 
The duration of an accidental exposure to the skin is less easy to define. One 
consideration is how long someone remains in the same position, another will be the 
type of activity they are carrying out. Exposure durations of either 10 s or 100 s could 
be justified. The limiting aperture for the skin over the visible wavelength region is 3.5 
mm (BSI 1994, Table 7). For both 10 s and lOO s the MPE is the same - 2000 W m·2 • 
. The maximum radiant power into 3.5 mm from this MPE is 19 mW. The time to exceed 
the relevant MPE as a function of radiant power into 3.5 mm is presented in figure 5.2. 
For a 5 W laser, the maximum exposure duration is about 6 ms. 
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Figure 5.2 Time to Exceed MPE as a Function of Power on Skin 
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5.2.2 Accidental Exposure to a Single Pulse 
If the laser emits a single pulse of laser radiation, where the duration of the pulse 
(defined as the time between the half peak power points at the leading and trailing 
edges of a pulse (BS EN 60825-1 sub-clause 3.60» is 0.25 s or less, the treatment of the 
MPE is similar to the cw situation except that the pulse duration is used for the 
exposure duration. It is then possible to calculate if an exposure to the pulse, either 
received in the eye or on the skin, will exceed the MPE. 
5.2.3 Accidental Exposure to a Train of Pulses 
Exposure to a train (or series) of pulses could result from the output of a pulsed laser or 
a scanned pattern. BS EN 60825-1 requires a three-stage process to determine the 
applicable MPE (sub-clause 13.3) for laser radiation in the visible region where the 
target is the eye. The analysis here will be carried out for pulsed laser emission: scanned 
beams will be considered later. 
Two pulsed lasers are likely to gain prominence in the entertainment industry: the 
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copper vapour laser (inherently pulsed); and the neodymium: Y AG which is 
occasionally used Q-switched. 
The three stages for determining the MPE are as follows: 
1. determine the MPE for a single pulse 
2. apply a correction factor to the single pulse MPE (termed Cs in BS EN 
60825-1) which is N.()·2s, where N is the number of pulses in the 
exposure duration. This will reduce the single pulse MPE and the 
resultant is termed the "reduced single pulse MPE" 
3. determine the MPE for the exposure duration (termed the "average 
MPE") and apply this to each pulse. 
The applicable MPE is the most restrictive of the three. However, if the MPE falls 
below what would have been applicable for continuous exposure at the same peak 
power then the MPE for continuous exposure may be used. An example of this would 
be exposure to a pulsed laser with a peak pulse radiant power of 0.95 mW for an 
exposure duration of 0.25 s. The reduced single pulse MPE could be more restrictive 
than what would have been applicable had the beam been on all of the time. 
Typical operating parameters for a copper vapour laser are (Hecht 1992): 
Pulse duration: 10 ns 
Pulse rate: 10kHz 
The exposure duration will depend on the circumstances. Here, an accidental exposure 
of someone close to the laser will be considered, such as the laser operator during 
alignment. Therefore, it will be reasonable to assume 0.25 s. This exposure duration 
will be termed T, whereas the pulse duration will be t. The first stage is to calculate the 
MPE for the single pulse. Table 6 of BS EN 60825-1 gives an MPE of 5 x 10.3 J m·2 for 
intrabeam viewing, for a 10 ns pulse. The number of pulses, N, in T is given by the 
pulse rate (in Hz) divided by 4, which equals 2500. N.()·2s = 0.1414. Therefore, the 
reduced single pulse MPE = 0.1414 x 5 x 10.3 = 7.07 X 10.01 J m,2, The average MPE for 
an exposure duration of 0.25 s is 18 X TO.7s = 6.36 J m,2. This is divided between the 
individual pulses, ie 6.361N = 6.36/2500 = 2.54 x 10'3 J m,2. It can be seen that the most 
restrictive MPE is the reduced single pulse MPE, 7.07 x 10.01 J m,2. 
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The initial beam diameters from copper vapour lasers tend to be in the region of 20 to 
80 mm. Therefore, they will already be larger than the limiting aperture of 7 mm. 
Assuming a beam diameter of 20 mm, with the energy distributed equally across the 
diameter of the beam, it is possible to determine the maximum radiant exposure that 
can be emitted before the MPE is exceeded. This is determined from the MPE 
multiplied by the area of the beam (since the beam diameter is greater than 7 mm): 7.07 
x 10-4 x nl4 x (0.02i = 2.22 x 10'7 J. For a pulse duration of 10 ns, this represents a 
peak power of 22.2 W. This should be compared with typical devices which produce a 
peak power of 250 kW or over 10,000 times greater. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
an exposure to the primary beam from a copper vapour laser is likely to cause serious 
eye damage in a short period of time. 
Many suppliers of pulsed lasers quote average power and not peak pulse power. Using 
the above example, the average power would be quoted as 25 W, or just above the 
MPE. No account would be taken of the high peak power delivered in each IOns pulse. 
It is therefore important for those who use pulsed output lasers to understand the 
significance of the average power compared with the peak power. A failure to 
understand this issue could result in persons exposed to the beam being at considerable 
risk of eye injuries: it is like being sprayed by a machine gun which, if it is scanned past 
you MAY not result in injury (or worse). However, if the bullet (pulse) happens to 
occur where the person is, the probability of interaction is high. Expressing the output 
of the laser in terms of energy per pulse, and a knowledge of the area, will permit a 
direct comparison with the appropriate MPE per pulse. 
It is concluded that pulsed lasers should not be used for entertainment applications 
unless adequate control measures are in place to ensure that people cannot be exposed 
to the beam. 
5.3 Nominal Ocular Hazard Distance 
An important part of the risk assessment for the use of lasers in the entertainment 
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industry is the distance at which they present a risk of exceeding the MPE, and 
therefore the risk of injury. Generally, the eye is the critical organ and therefore the 
analysis here will concentrate on the distance at which the irradiance or radiant 
exposure equals the MPE, the so-called nominal ocular hazard distance (NOHD). A 
similar analysis is required where the skin is the critical organ, for example during 
alignment work where protective eyewear is worn or for some performer exposures. 
The NOHD is calculated from a knowledge of the applicable MPE, the beam 
divergence, the initial beam diameter and the radiant power or energy of the laser. The 
MPE and the output of the laser must be in similar quantities, ie if the MPE is in terms 
of irradiance, the output of the laser must be in terms of radiant power. 
In general the diameter, d, of the laser beam at a distance, D, from the aperture is given 
by the expression: 
d=a+~D 5.3 
where a is the initial beam diameter and <I> is the full angle beam divergence. This 
expression is valid where <I> is small and measured in radians such that tan( <1» " <1>. The 
irradiance at distance D is determined from the radiant power, P, divided by the area of 
the beam at D: 
. p 
Irradiance = -;r--
-d2 
4 
5.4 
At the NOHD, the irradiance will equal the MPE. Therefore, by substituting for d from 
equation 5.3, and rearranging with D = NOHD: 
NOHD = 
,.-:w> 
V~-a 
~ 
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5.5 
Equation 5.5 can be used to determine the NOHD for any laser used in the 
entertainment industry provided all of the parameters are known. Therefore, it is 
fundamental to any risk assessment that these parameters are known or reasonable 
worst-case assumptions can be made. No account is taken here of the effect of air, or 
smoke, attenuation. The former can generally be ignored over the distances used in 
entertainment applications. Smoke or vapour effects may attenuate the laser radiation 
but the effect may not be consistent with time. For these reason it is recommended that 
no correction factor is applied. 
NOHD values for a number of parameters are presented in Table 5.1 for a single 
accidental exposure to a cw beam. The applicable MPE is 25.4 W m·2• The initial beam 
diameter, a, has been set to zero since, with the distances generally involved, this 
represents a small error on the side of safety .. 
Table 5.1 
Radiant Power -+ 
Divergence J, 
1 mrad 
2mrad 
5mrad 
NOHD as a Function of Radiant Power and Beam Divergence 
for a Single Accidental Exposure to a cw Beam 
lOOmW IW IOW 
71 m 224 m 708 m 
36m 112m 354 m 
15m 45m 142m 
The figure of 224 m at a radiant power of 1 W with a beam divergence of I mrad can be 
used to relate to the NOHD at any other radiant power and divergence (assuming that 
the effect of the initial beam diameter can be neglected). First the NOHD should be 
corrected for the actual radiant power by multiplying the distance by the square root of 
the actual radiant power (measured in watts). This is then divided by the actual beam 
divergence in miIliradians. Therefore, the NOHD for a 10 W laser with a beam 
divergence of 5 miIliradians is 224 x -/1015 = 142 m, which agrees with the figure in 
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Table 5.1. Note that the NOHD should always be rounded up. Generally. this will be to 
the nearest metre. 
The NOHD calculations demonstrate that lasers typically used in the entertainment 
industry present a risk of eye injury over considerable distances. often comparable or 
greater than the dimensions of the venue. In military applications where laser beams are 
intended to travel considerable distances. for example for missile guidance or range-
finding. corrections factors have to be applied for air attenuation of the beam and 
potential scintillation (Sliney and Wolbarsht 1980. Chapter 13). These are not 
considered appropriate for the entertainment industry since the uncertainties do not 
justify the effort in detennining the correction factors. 
5.4 Nominal Skin Hazard Distance 
Generally. the eye is the critical organ when considering exposure to visible laser 
radiation. However. there may be circumstances where the eye is protected. for example 
by protective eyewear. or where perfonnersmay be intentionally exposed on the body. 
well away from the eyes. It is therefore important to quantify the hazard under such 
exposure conditions. 
MPE values for the skin are presented in Table 8 of BS EN 60825-1. As described 
above. an accidental exposure duration to a cw laser beam is less easy to define than for 
the eye exposure situation. A reasonable value to use is 10 s since it is unlikely that 
anyone would nonnally stay in a fixed position for longer than this under the exposure 
conditions considered. A member of the audience may remain stationary for the 
duration of the show. but this is unlikely. However. for this critical group the risk to the 
eyes is likely to be greater than that to the skin. 
The MPE for a single 10 s accidental exposure to a visible laser beam is 2000 W m·2• 
Equation 5.5 can be re-written for the nominal skin hazard distance (NSHD) and the 
data is presented in Table 5.2 using similar parameters to Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.2 
Radiant Power-t 
Divergence! 
I rnrad 
2 rnrad 
5 rnrad 
NSHD as a Function of Radiant Power and Beam Divergence 
for a Single Accidental Exposure to a cw beam 
lOOmW IW IOW 
8m 26m 80m 
4m 13m 40m 
2m 6m 16m 
. 
Again, the reference value of NSHD for I Wand I milliradian can be used to determine 
the NSHD at other radiant powers and divergences if the initial beam diameter can be 
ignored. 
5.5 Scanned Laser Beams 
5.5.1 Introduction 
As described in appendix A, graphical images are produced by a number of methods, 
but most commonly by the action of two mirrors on orthogonally-mounted 
galvanometers. A scanned laser beam will appear as a pulse of laser radiation as it 
passes the eye. If the scan parameters are known then the level of exposure to scanned 
beams can be assessed. This can be followed through to a calculation of NOHD and 
NSHD for each effect. The assessment of the scanned effects assumes that the scanning 
system is operating correctly. If any single failure mode could result in a stationary laser 
beam then the NOHD and NSHD should be based on the direct beam assessments in 
5.2 to 5.4, above. 
In many cases the exact parameters for a given scanned effect will not be known. 
Where they are known, they may only relate to a single part of the scanned effect. The 
analyses presented in this section will assume parameters in order to present the 
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quantification process. 
5.5.2 Methods 
A theoretical analysis of scanned laser beams is developed and this is compared with 
measurements from a number of actual scan patterns. 
5.5.3 Cone Scan from a Cone Spinner 
The simplest, and most reproducible, scanned effect is that produced from a laser beam 
incident on a mirror mounted on the end of the shaft of a rotating motor. The scanned 
image will be a circle on a screen and will be perceived as a cone if the beam is made 
visible in the environment. It is recognised that similar effects can be produced by the 
use of, for example, galvanometers. However, as will be discussed later, the analysis of 
the exposure conditions can be more involved than with a cone spinner. 
Figure 5.3 Cone Spinner 
Scanned Beam 
Input Beam 
A diagram of the geometry of the exposure conditbn from a cone spinner is shown in 
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figure 5.3. Relevant parameters are: 
radiant power of the laser, P (W) 
beam divergence, from the mirror, <I> (radians) 
initial beam diameter, at the mirror, a (m) 
scan speed, f (Hz) 
scan full angle, e (degrees) 
distance of interest, D (m) 
maximum permissible exposure, MPE (W m·2) 
The exposure condition, or time of exposure, needs to be determined at D, assuming a 
limiting aperture for the eye of 7 mm. 
The diameter of the beam at distance, D, is given by equation 5.3. The irradiance at D is 
given by: 
4xP 
Irradiance = 5.6 
1r(a + D~ f 
The beam will trace out a circular path at D. The diameter of the scan is given by D 
sinCe). The approximation of taking the sine of the scan full angle, as shown in figure 
5.3 represents an error of less than I % up to a scan full angle of 16°. Therefore, the 
circumference of the scanned pattern will be: 
Circumference = 1r D sin( El ) 5.7 
The speed of the beam will be f multiplied by the circumference. The exposure duration 
can then be determined, ie the time taken for the beam of the given diameter to cross a 7 
mm aperture. The total exposure duration will be the time taken to travel 7 mm plus the 
diameter of the beam, the largest duration generally being when the centre section of the 
beam passes the aperture. However, the beam diameter has already been quoted using 
an assumption, ie, for a Gaussian beam profile, the point at which the irradiance reaches 
lie of the central peak value (BS EN 60825-1 sub-clause 3.10). The pulse duration is 
defined as the time between the half peak power points on the leading and trailing edges 
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of a pulse (BS EN 60825-1 sub-clause 3.60). If the pulses had been produced from, for 
example, a pulsed laser, then the rise time of the pulse is generally short compared with 
the pulse duration. However, in the scanned example, the rise time may be comparable 
with the pulse duration. The following argument justifies the use of the full width at 
half maximum (FWHM) value in most circumstances. 
Assuming the beam profile is such that the irradiance is constant, ie a flat-topped beam 
. with a square cross section, and that the beam is larger than the detector, which also has 
a square cross-section, the exposure situation will be as presented in figure 5.4. The 
signal will increase linearly as the beam leading edge is scanned across the detector. 
Whilst the detector is completely covered by the beam, the detector output will be 
constant and then fall linearly as the trailing edge passes over the detector. Taking the 
FWHM points and projecting them down to the time axis, the area outside the FWHM 
points equals the area deficit between the FWHM points and the peak value. Therefore, 
it would be reasonable to assume that the exposure consisted of a pulse at the peak 
power for the FWHM exposure duration. 
Figure 5.4 Irradiance as a Function of Time for a 
Square Profile Beam 
FWHM 
Time 
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Figure 5.5 Gaussian Beam Across Small Detector 
FWHM 
Time 
In the actual exposure situation where the beam profile is either Gaussian or a more 
complex mode, and the detector has a circular cross-section, a similar argument can be 
used (figure 5.5). The area from the half maximum out to the 3 cr point is approximately 
34% greater than the area deficit between the half maximum point and the peak. The 
use of a detector which is much smaller than the beam width is an effective beam 
profiling tool when the beam is scanned across the detector face. 
IT the diameter of the laser beam is much smaller than the diameter of the detector, then 
the irradiance will be constant as a function of time while the beam crosses the detector 
(assuming a constant spatial response) even though the beam profile is not flat. The 
leading and trailing edge of the irradiance as the beam enters the detector aperture and 
exits from the aperture should approximate the integral of the beam profile. Figure 5.6 
is a plot of a Gaussian curve (normal distribution) integrated from 3 cr to -3 cr to 
simulate the beam passing onto the detector, a constant region where the whole of the 
beam (within ±3 cr) passes across the face of the detector and then the inverse of the 
integral as the beam crosses the edge of the detector. This simulation assumes a beam 
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diameter, specified at the lie points, which is 28% of the diameter of the detector. The 
linear speed of a scanned beam can be determined from the FWHM and the diameter of 
the detector aperture, ie v = diameterlFWHM or FWHM = diameter/v. In general, the 
exposure time per pulse, t (the FWHM), will be: 
d 
t=- 5.8 
v 
d is the diameter of the larger of the beam and the measurement aperture. Where the 
diameter of the beam and the measurement aperture are the same then this value is 
used. Note that the relevant beam diameter here is the half-power points and not the lie 
or lIe2 which may be specified in the manufacturer's literature. For a Gaussian beam 
profile, the diameter at the lie point is 20% larger than the diameter at the half-power 
point: the lIe2 point is 70% larger. 
Figure 5.6 Gaussian Profile, Beam Smaller Than Detector 
FWHM 
Time 
The MPE for the cone spinner can now be evaluated from the scan parameters. At the 
closest distances likely to be accessible by members of the public the laser beam 
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diameter is probably going to be greater than the diameter of a nominal 7 mm diameter 
detector. Therefore, t, the exposure duration of each pass of the beam equals the beam 
diameter (at the 50% points) divided by the beam speed. The circumference, C, of the 
scan at a distance D (figure 5.3) is given by equation 5.7. The speed is given by fC, 
where f is the scan frequency in Hz. Therefore, t follows from: 
d 
t=-je 5.9 
where d is the beam diameter at distance D. Substituting for d from equation 5.3 and C 
from equation 5.7: 
t 
a+DCl> 
IifD sin(e) 5.10 
A scan rate of 30 Hz should result in a solid image with no flicker. Assuming a scan 
angle of 3°, an initial beam diameter of 0.002 m and a beam divergence of 0.003 
radians, t as a function ofD can be plotted, as presented in figure 5.7. A 7 mm diameter 
detector is assumed, which means that 0.007 is used on the top of equation 5.10 instead 
of a + Dcp until a + Dcp = 0.007, ie at D = 1.67 m in this example. 
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It can be seen that t is approaching a constant value. This will be within 1 % of the value 
for D = 00 when D = alO.O 1 <po For the example above. this occurs when D = 67 m. The 
MPE can be determined by substituting the value for t into equation 5.1. However. the 
MPE can also be expressed in terms of irradiance by dividing by 1. Assuming a value of 
I for C6 the MPE for distances where d > 7 mm can be rewritten as: 
MPE = 18(7ifD sin(e))o.2S W m·2 
a +<I>D 5.11 
The maximum radiant power permitted without exceeding the MPE can be determined 
by multiplying the MPE by the area of the 7 mm aperture (equation 5.2): 
P. = 18n- (7ifD sin(e))o.ZS (0.007)2 W 
malt 4 a+<I>D 5.12 
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This suggests that the maximum power can be increased proportional to r>.2S. However, 
as stated in 5.2.3, the MPE must be modified when the recipient is exposed to a train of 
pulses. For 18 I.Is :s; t :s; 0.25 s, the applicable MPE will generally be the reduced single 
pulse MPE, ie the single pulse MPE multiplied by N·O.2S• N is the number of pulses in 
the duration of interest, termed T. For an accidental exposure it would be appropriate to 
use 0.25 s. However, for audience scanning where the exposure is intentional it would 
be appropriate to use a longer duration. Where the actual duration of the effect is 
known, this could be used. However, for practical purposes the maximum exposure 
duration is unlikely to be greater than 10 s. 
N is equal to fT. Therefore, ~.2S = I1(fTl·2S• Substituting this into equation 5.12 gives 
the maximum peak power permitted into a 7 mm aperture, in a train of pulses: 
18~( 7ifDsin(e) )0.25 2 
Pma, =4 jT(a+<PD) (0.007) W 5.13 
It can be seen that f now cancels out and the maximum peak power becomes 
independent of scan rate and proportional to rO.2S• Therefore, considering an exposure 
duration of 10 s as opposed to 0.25 s only decreases the permitted power by about a 
factor of 2.5. 
If the scan rate is increased sufficiently to bring t to below 18 I.Is, the relevant MPE will 
be the average MPE. The equivalent equation is: 
~ 18T-o·25 
P max = 4 ft (0.007)2 W 5.14 
Substituting for t from equation 5.10: 
P. = ~2 18T-o.2l (0.007)2 Dsin(e) 
max 4 (a + <PD) W 5.15' 
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This again shows that the maximum peak power is independent of the scan speed. 
However, a check should also be made to ensure that the reduced single pulse MPE is 
not more restrictive. These results are extremely significant. A major argument used by 
laser display companies is that the risk of eye damage is decreased by increasing the 
scan speed with any control measure acting before the scan slowed below some 
(unspecified) value. This argument can only be used if increasing the scan speed does 
not increase N. A spreadsheet to demonstrate how the scan speed can be used by 
stalling the scanner for a period of time after each scan and reduce the exposure to 
below the MPE has been developed (Walker 1997). However, this spreadsheet uses the 
assumption that the beam can be scanned faster than commercially available scanners 
will permit, and the beam is assumed to be parked and blanked for a significant 
proportion of the scan frame. Such effects are unlikely to be visually acceptable, even if 
the scanner technology did exist. 
5.5.4 Measurement of Scanned Beams 
As identified in Chapter 3, it was normally difficult to obtain information on the laser 
beam characteristics. The manufacturer's data on the radiant power and the beam 
divergence for a laser may be altered by the optical systems employed to manipulate the 
beam. In order to theoretically assess exposure to beams, as described in the previous 
section with a simple cone spinner, it is necessary to know the scan rate, beam 
divergence, scan angle, initial beam diameter and the radiant power of the laser. 
The use of proprietary laser power meters to assess scanned beams can lead to 
significant errors. As shown in 5.2.3, it is important to know the energy per pulse or the 
peak power. Commercial energy meters are not generally sensitive enough to detect the 
energy in a 5 W beam scanned across a 7 mm aperture in 10 - 100 liS. Depending on the 
design of a power meter, it may indicate true average power or, for modem digital 
sampling detectors, widely varying powers. This is due to the resultant signals at the 
sampling times being either during an actual exposure of the detector or during the 
period between exposures. Power meters such as the Coherent Fieldmaster with a 
silicon LM2 head present an erratic answer which, to the skilled user, indicates that the 
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result is not reliable. 
In order to evaluate scanned beams it was necessary to use a basic design of detector 
which consisted of a silicon photodiode, transimpedence amplifier and an oscilloscope. 
Two detectors were principally used for this research: a Centronics 50 mm2 diameter 
photodiode with a 7 mm diameter circular aperture mask, for direct comparison with 
the MPE and a Hamamatsu S2858-01 detector with integral transimpedance amplifier 
for beam profiling. This technique proved a very effective alternative to commercial 
beam profiling equipment which scans across the beam. 
Equation 5.10 shows that the time of scan across a 7 mm aperture is a function of many 
of the required parameters for input to the comparison with the MPE. If the scan time 
measurement can be made at a number of distances from the effective source it is 
possible to determine these parameters. 
A nominal 1.3 mW helium-neon laser emitting a green beam (543.5) (Ore-Ne) was 
input to a Maplin scanner (cone spinner) driven from a custom power supply. One of 
the two motors in the scanning unit was driven and the laser beam scanned until the 
resultant image formed a solid circle on a screen. The Centronic detector was used to 
measure the scan time, t, as a function of distance from the scanning mirror. 
5.5.5 Results 
The detector voltage as a function of time is plotted in figure 5.8 for distances of 2.5 m 
to 7 m in 0.5 m intervals; figure 5.9 for 7 m to 19 m in 1 m intervals and figure 5.10 for 
15 m to 19 m. 
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Figure 5.8 Maplin Scanner Gre-Ne Laser 2.5 to 7 m 
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It can clearly be seen in figure 5.8 that the laser beam was smaller than the detector 
diameter at distances from 2.5 to 4 m since the detector output is constant for a period 
of time. This plateau is reduced as the distance increases and the beam diameter 
increases. At about 4.5 m the beam diameter is approximately the same size as the 
detector aperture. As the distance is increased beyond 4.5 m the amplitude of the 
detector voltage decreases as a reducing proportion of the beam enters the detector. For 
comparison with the Standard (BSI 1994), the beam diameter is defined at the lie point, 
ie the largest aperture which collects 63% of the beam. The maximum voltage recorded 
when the total beam was collected was 0.35 V. Therefore, 63% of the beam will be 
collected when the peak voltage is 0.22 V. This represents a distance of between 6 and 
7 m. The specification for the Gre-Ne laser gives an initial beam diameter of I mm and 
a beam divergence of 1 milliradian. From this, the beam diameter would be 7 mm at 6 
m. This is consistent with the observed value. 
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Figure 5.9 Maplin Scanner Gre-Ne 7 to 19 m 
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The gain of the detector was increased by a factor of about 10 when the distance was 
increased to 8 m. The 7 m response is multiplied by 10 and replotted in figure 5.9. It 
can be seen on this figure that the amplitude of the pulse seen by the detector continues 
to decrease with increasing distance as the detector samples a smaller segment of the 
beam as it scans past. It is interesting that some structure starts to appear in the pulse 
shape at distances from 17 m. Therefore, the pulses are replotted in figure 5.10. At 19 
m, the theoretical beam diameter is 20 mm, or about three times the diameter of the 
detector. The Ore-Ne was understood to have a TEMoo mode structure and therefore 
should have been producing a gaussian beam profile. To confirm this, a proprietary 
beam profiling device using a CCD camera connected to a laptop computer was used to 
analyse the beam. This device focussed the incoming beam onto a 256 x 256 CCD array 
and produced an output from each element from 0 to 255. This confirmed that the Ore-
Ne was operating in TEMll mode and that the pulse shape seen by the detector as the 
beam scanned past was a section through this TEMll profile. 
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Figure 5.11 Comparison of Measured and Calculated Pulse Widths 
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The pulse width as a function of distance is plotted in figure 5.11. It was possible to 
detennine the scan rate at each distance by increasing the delay on the oscilloscope 
trigger until the next pulse was seen. The scan rate was detennined by the inverse of the 
time between peaks. During the course of the 22 measurements the mean scan rate was 
37.6 Hz (standard deviation 0.4 Hz). Using this value for f, a beam divergence of 1 
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milliradian, an initial beam diameter of I mm and a full scan angle, ~, of 5.60 
(determined from measuring the diameter of the scan pattern as a function of distance, 
D) it was possible to calculate the pulse width using equation 5.10 and these values are 
also plotted on figure 5.11. 
It is of note that the pulse width reaches a constant value once the beam diameter is 
greater than the diameter of the detector. Essentially, the beam forms a constant 
proportion of the scanned circle as a function of distance. The minor deviation between 
the measured and calculated values at increasing distance is considered to be due to the 
increasing importance of the tails of the beam profile as smaller percentage segments of 
the total beam are scanned across the detector. 
5.5.6 Discussion 
Since a cone scan is one of the most popular audience scanning effects, the results from 
this analysis are extremely significant. A typical laser installation will be using a laser 
with a radiant power of 4 W, a beam divergence of 3 milliradians, and an initial beam 
diameter of 2 mm. Assuming a Gaussian beam profile, it is possible to calculate the 
NOHD for a cone for a given scan angle. As has already been shown, the pulse duration 
reaches a constant value with increasing distance, but the proportion of the beam 
entering the nominal 7 mm diameter aperture decreases because of the beam 
divergence. One way of reducing the NOHD, of course, is to increase the beam 
divergence. The closest point of access for the audience should be greater than the 
NOHD. Therefore a balance should be struck between the closest reasonable point of 
access and the beam divergence. 
94 
T bl 5 3 NOHD (H C S a e . m or a one can as a fu nctlOn 0 fD· Ivergence an dS A I can ngle 
Divergence (milliradians)~ I 2 3 4 5 10 20 
Scan Angle (degrees),J.. 
1 248.6 135.6 95.1 73.9 60.8 33.2 18.1 
2 228.0 124.3 87.2 67.8 55.8 30.4 16.6 
3 216.8 118.2 82.9 64.4 53.0 28.9 15.8 
4 209.1 114.0 80.0 62.2 51.1 27.9 15.2 
5 203.4 110.9 77.8 60.5 49.7 27.1 14.8 
6 198.8 108.4 76.0 59.1 48.6 26.5 14.5 
7 195.0 106.3 74.6 58.0 47.7 26.0 14.2 
8 191.8 104.6 73.3 57.0 46.9 25.6 13.9 
9 
. 
189.0 103.1 72.3 56.2 1. 46.2 25.2 13.7 
10 186.6 101.7 71.3 55.5 45.6 24.9 13.6 
The influence of the scan angle and the beam divergence on the NOHD for a 4 W cw 
laser are presented in table 5.3. This has been calculated by setting equation 5.11 as 
equal to the irradiance for a 4 W beam and solving for D equals the NOHD with the 
approximation that the initial beam diameter is zero (equation 5.16): 
NOHD= 4P" TcI> m 
( )
O.2S 
18ncI>2 2Irsin(8) 5.16 
It can be seen from table 5.3 that doubling the divergence reduces the NOHD by about 
50%. However, doubling the scan angle only reduces the NOHD by about 8%. This 
demonstrates the effectiveness of increasing the divergence for beams which may enter 
the audience area. 
These results show that it is possible to determine the exposure condition when the 
laser beam is scanning at a constant speed. However, scanned effects are generally not 
produced using spinning mirrors, they are produced by pairs of galvanometers under 
programme control. The images will range in complexity from circles and straight lines 
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through to sophisticated graphical representations. An introduction to the format of the 
data and the representations of the images is presented in Appendix A. 
5.6 Measurements on Proprietary Scanning System 
. A proprietary laser display system was loaned by a laser display company and 
. measurements made under laboratory conditions to determine the characteristics of 
scanned images. A schematic of the laser and the primary optical system is presented in 
figure 5.12. 
5.6.1 Measurement Method 
Measurements were undertaken using the 7 mm diameter photodiode, transimpedence 
amplifier and oscilloscope arrangement used in 5.5.1. In addition, a custom thermopile 
detector was used to determine average power (Corder 1997). 
Figure 5.12 Proprietary Laser Display System 
Beam Path 
Laser Head 
a b 
Scanned Output Beam 
c d 
Effects 
Controller Optical Bench 
Key: a - height adjusting periscope; b - colour selectors; 
c - blanking telescope; d - scanning galvanometer pair 
An air-cooled argon ion laser was used as the source. The radiant power of the static 
beam was 6.48 mW, measured using a calibrated Coherent Fieldmaster with an LM-2 
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detector. The power output from the laser was 7.90 mW, representing a loss of 18% of 
the input beam through the optical system. The beam diameter was 5 mm at the 
. measurement position (3.95 m from the scanner to the detectors). Theirradiance was 
calculated by averaging the radiant power over a 7 mm limiting aperture and was 168.4 
W m·2• Measurement of the radiant power requires the drive signal to the blanking 
telescope to be disconnected or the mirror moved out of the beam path. Many patterns 
generated by the control system include an element of blanking. As described earlier, 
measurements using a sampling power meter will be in error for beams which do not 
have a constant irradiance with time. 
The assessed scan pattern was a cone, which was collapsed, ie x was fixed, to produce a 
flat (or line) scan in the vertical plane. Measurements were made at 11 positions along 
the scan using the photodiode to determine the duration of each 'pulse' as the laser 
beam scanned past the detector and the number of pulses per second; and the 
thermopile detector to determine the average irradiance. The measured pulse duration 
per scan from the photodiode detector is presented in table 5.4. The thermopile detector 
results are presented in table 5.5. Examples of the output voltage as a function of time 
from the photodiode are presented in figure 5.13 at the end of the scan (position 1 - left 
end of scan pattern in figure A.3) and figure 5.14 for the positions away from the end of 
the scan. It is significant that a person located at either end of the scan would receive 
half the number of pulses as a person at any other point along the scan. At the mid-
position, the spacing between the pulses should be equal. 
5.6.2 Results 
The scan refresh rate was determined from the time between pulses at the end of the 
. scan and was found to be 120 Hz. Therefore, at the ends of the scan, a person would be 
exposed 120 times per second and elsewhere in the scan at 240 times per second, in the 
absence of any aversion response. Assuming the natural aversion response and an 
accidental exposure, then it would be reasonable to assume an exposure duration of 
0.25 s. The number of pulses received, N, would then be the above figures divided by 4. 
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Table 5.4 Measured exposure duration per scan from photodiode detector 
Position t (liS) . NforO.25 S Reduced single Maximum radiant power into 7 
. 
exposure pulseMPE mm to not exceed MPE (mW) 
1 (end) 366 . 30 55.6· 2.14 
2 78.6 60 68.7 2.64 
3 50.0 60 76.9 2.96 
4 36.8 60 83.0 3.20 
. . 
5 30.0 60 87.4 3.36 
. 
6 26.1 60 90.5 3.48 
. 
7 26.2 60 90.4 3.48 
8 26.4 60 90.2 3.47 
9 24.9 60 91.6 3.52 
10 24.7 60 91.7 . 3.53 
11 25.2 60 91.3 3.51 
Measured irradiance and radiant 168.4 6.48 
power through 7 mm aperture 
Table 5.5 Thennopile detector measurements 
Position Measured average irradiance Measured irradiance divided by MPE.verage 
1 21.5 0.85 
. 
2 5.63 0.22 
3 3.60 0.14 
4 2.70 0.11 
5 2.18 0.09 
6 1.90 0,07 
. 
7 .. 1.83 0,07 
8 1.83 0,07 
9 1.63 0.06 
10 I· 1.50 0.06 
11 1.53 0.06 
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5.6.3 Discussion 
The results in table 5.4 demonstrate that the maximum power intoa 7 mm aperture is of 
the order of a few mW. Even at 6.48 mW, the MPE will be exceeded at any position 
along the scan pattern. This can be compared with the MPE for the static beam, which 
would be 1 mW for a 0.25 s accidental exposure. However, if the average power is 
measured and compared with the average MPE, as in table 5.5, then it implies that the 
scan pattern is safe and also that the 'safety margin' between the end of the scan pattern 
and the middle (positions 1 and 10) increases by a factor of 14. 
Figure 5.13 Photodlode Output at Position 1 of Flat 
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Figure 5.14 Photodlode Output Showing Twin 
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The twin pulses close to position I in figure 5.14 clearly show the beam slowing down 
as it crosses the detector the first time and then accelerating away from a stationary 
position during the second pass. The times between 20 and 80% of peak value are 35 lis 
rise, 68 lis fall, for the first peak and 58 lis rise and 28 lis fall for the second peak. In 
comparison, the two pulses at position 3 are symmetrical. 
An inspection of the photodiode output as a function of time on the oscilloscope 
presents the opportunity to understand the nature of the scanned pattern. During the 
study of the time between successive pulses the plot presented in figure 5.15 was 
obtained. 
100 
50 
45 
40 
n 35 
c 
::I 30 
:[ 25 
" ~ 20 
~ 15 
10 
5 
0 
0 
Figure 5.15 Photodlode Output. Position with 3 
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Figure 5.15 shows three peaks per scan cycle. The fourth peak occurs about 8.3 ms after 
the first pulse representing the 120 Hz refresh rate. It was initially thought that the three 
peaks were an artefact of the oscilloscope but further inspection of the scan pattern on 
the screen showed a small section of the pattern which was brighter to the eye. A plot of 
the x,y,z data to the driver boards of the scanners and z-blanking showed that there was 
an overlap of the scan pattern. It appears that the scan pattern had been digitised by 
hand (as a circle) and the engineer had put in a small overlap to ensure that there was no 
gap in the circular pattern. The scan was then blanked to allow the scanners to return to 
the start position and recommence the scan. 
The respective times of exposure to the first three pulses (full width, half maximum) in 
figure 5.15 were approximately 64, 140 and 60 Ils. There is no clear guidance on how to 
assess multiple pulses of different durations. However, it would be reasonable to 
assume that the MPE would be somewhere between that applicable for three pulses of 
60 Ils duration per cycle and three of 140 IlS duration. In both cases, N, for a 0.25 s 
accidental exposure, will be 90. From section 5.2.3, the reduced single pulse MPE will 
be 66.39 and 53.73 W m·2 for the 60 and 140 IlS pulses, respectively. Therefore, the 
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maximum power into a 7 mm aperture is between 2.61 and 2.12 mW. By comparison 
with table 5.4 it can be seen that the small overlap region may present a greater hazard 
than any other part of the scan pattern. 
This exercise demonstrates the importance of using the correct measurement instrument 
to undertake the measurements and the importance of applying the correct MPE 
(Corder, O'Hagan and Tyrer 1997, O'Hagan, Corder and Tyrer 1998). From position 11 
in table 5.5, it can be seen that the average irradiance would suggest a safety margin of 
about a factor of 16. However, the same position in table 5.4 shows that the MPE was 
actually exceeded by a factor of 2. Therefore, the error in this one position is about a 
factor of 32. 
Most scanned laser effects will be more complex than flat or cone scans. They may also 
move and change size with time. Indeed, many scanned effects will be animations. 
Although most complex graphical images will be projected onto screens away from the 
audience, the patterns used to scan across the audience as beam effects, are generated in 
an identical manner. A number of effects from a proprietary laser display system were 
assessed at a number of positions in the scan pattern to determine the maximum radiant 
power into a 7 mm aperture to keep below the MPE. 
5.7 Zig-Zag Pattern 
The x-y data for a zig-zag pattern is presented in figure 5.16. If the value of y is kept 
constant then the scanned pattern will appear as a number of fingers of light in space. 
Figure 5.17 shows the scan drive signals as a function of time. The inertia of the 
galvanometers will mean that the actual movement of the laser beam will not precisely 
follow the drive instructions, but it is still likely that the beam will reduce speed, if not 
stop, at the horizontal positions on the plot in figure 5.17. 
5.7.1 Measurements 
Using the photodiode detector, measurements were made along the scan pattern to 
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determine the exposure duration of a 7 mm aperture. The beam diameter at the detector 
position was 5 mm, the scan width was 0.72 m and the distance between the visibly 
brighter regions of the pattern projected on to a screen was about 53 mm. 
5.7.2 Results 
Figure 5.16 ·Zlg·Zag" Pattern 
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The full width half maximum values for the measured pulsed durations are presented in 
figure 5.18. There appears to be a trend of increasing pulse duration at the dwell points 
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but the durations at the intermediate points (approximately 40 Ils) suggest that the speed 
at these points is relatively constant across the width of the scan pattern. The measured 
exposure durations can be used to determine maximum irradiances at these positions to 
comply with the MPE. Using the minimum (45.8 Ils) and the maximum (289.8 Ils) this 
gives a maximum irradiance of 219 and 138 Wm·2, respectively, for a single pass of the 
beam. Assuming a scan rate of 100 Hz, and an aversion response time of 0.25 s, the 
irradiances reduce to 97.9 and 61.7 Wm·2• These represent 3.9 and 2.4 mW into a 7 mm 
aperture. 
Figure 5.18 Measured Pulse Widths for Zlg-Zag 
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5.8 Complex Graphical Pattern 
The zig-zag pattern is relatively straightforward - each position on the scan pattern is 
visited by the beam in a single pass across. Many images are complex and created by 
re-visiting the same position a number of times. Such images may also be animated. 
The graphical image in figure 5.19 is a single frame from the library of a commercial 
laser display system. The figure (Cuddles) performs an Egyptian dance. Some parts of 
the image are blanked so that the detail around the eye, for example, is clearer than 
implied from the x-y data alone. 
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5.8.1 Measurements 
Measurements were made at a number of positions on the single frame (1 to 7 marked 
on figure 5.19) to determine the irradiance as a function of time, averaged over a 7 mm 
aperture. The laser beam diameter (as determined by eye) was 4 mm at the 
measurement position. The graphical image was 0.35 m from finger tip to finger tip and 
0.46 m from the top of the head to the base of the feet. 
5.8.2 Results 
Figure 5.19 'Cuddles" x-y data 
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The detector output as a function of time is presented in figures 5.20 to 5.26 for 
positions 1 to 7, respectively. 
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Figure 5.20 Cuddles Position 1 
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Table. 5.6 Analysis of Cuddles Scan Pattern 
Position No. of Pulse 
. MPEsinfle Psingle MPEmun Ptrain 
Pulses per Width (Wm' ) (mW) (Wm·2) (mW) 
Frame (",s) 
1. Straight of arm 1 (33 Hz) 28 247 9.5 146 . 5.6 
2. Right hand 1 (33 Hz) 133 167 6.4 98 3.8 
3. Right armpit 2 (33 Hz) 67 198 7.6 117 4.5 
174 156 6.0 92 3.5 
If both pulses same (66 Hz) 174 156 6.0 77 2.9 
If pulses combined (33 Hz) 241 144 5.5 85 3.2 
4. Eye 2 (33 Hz) 86 . 186 7.1 110 4.2 
340 132 5.1 78 3.0 
If both pulses same (66 Hz) 340 132 5.1 65 2.5 
If pulses combined (33 Hz) 426 125 4.8 73 2.8 
5. Left hand 2 (33 Hz) 310 135 5.2 80 3.0 
220 147 5.6 87 3.3 
If both pulses same (66 Hz) 310 135 5.2 67 2.5 
If pulses combined (33 Hz) 530 118 4.5 69 2.6 
6. Top of leg 2 (33 Hz) 59 205 7.9 121 4.6 
99 180 6.9 106 4.0 
If both pul ses same (66Hz) 99 180 6.9 89 3.4 
If pulses combined (33 Hz) 158 160 6.1 94 3.6 
7. Left toe 1 (33 Hz) 159 160 6.1 94 3.6 
. 
5.8.3 Discussion 
The pulse data was analysed for each position. The pulse width was taken as the full 
width half maximum for each pulse. Where the pulse was not resolved at the half 
maximum it was treated as a single pulse. The time to the next pulse, or pulse group, as 
appropriate was determined to ensure that all of the pulses in the single scan of the 
image had been identified. The refresh rate for the scan was 33 Hz. 
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As stated in 5.5.2, there is no guidance within the British or International Standard on 
how to analyse groups of pulses where the time interval between the pulses is not a 
constant value. Therefore, for positions 3 to 6, which all were visited more than once 
during a scan cycle, the MPE was calculated using the following options: each pulse 
was analysed independent of the other pulse; both pulses were assumed to have the 
pulse width of the longer duration pulse; and it was assumed that there was only one 
pulse per scan cycle of duration equal to the sum of the duration of the individual 
pulses. This is presented in table 5.6. The final column of table 5.6 gives the maximum 
power averaged over a 7 mm aperture in order not to exceed the MPE. The range of 
pulse widths is from 28 to 530 fls, but the power limit only ranges from 2.5 to 5.6 mW. 
This result supports the argument presented with the simple scan pattern (table 5.3) that 
the power averaged over 7 mm diameter apertures for compliance with the MPE must 
be much lower than the radiant powers of the lasers typically used in the entertainment 
industry. 
5.9 Conclusions 
Measurement of the characteristics of the laser beams used in laser displays is important 
for quantifying the laser radiation hazard. This is required as input to the risk 
assessment. Generally, if the irradiance is less than the maximum permissible exposure 
then the risk of injury is low. As the irradiance is increased above the MPE then the risk 
of injury increases. This takes no account of other sub-threshold effects such as dazzle, 
distraction and after-images. For a seated audience such effects may not be significant. 
However, if the laser beams extend beyond the confines of the venue then such effects 
may be important, for example pilots and drivers of motor vehicles may be at particular 
risk. 
Many lasers used in the entertainment industry are Class 3B or Class 4 and the radiant 
powers may be 20 W or more. Lasers with radiant powers of the order of 5 W are 
routinely used for audience scanning. It is important to appreciate that, with a scanned 
laser beam, the peak power is incident on. the target for a period of time. For many 
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years, assessments of audience scanning effects have been carried out using laser power 
meters which, at best, give an indication of average power and may not respond at all, 
. thus giving the impression that the exposure condition is· well below the MPE. It is 
therefore extremely important for either scanned effects to be analysed properly, or for 
worst case assumptions to be made. The latter includes measurement of the stationary 
beams at the closest audience locations. 
It is possible to predict the irradiance conditions for simple scanned patterns, such as 
cones. The analysis presented in this chapter was supported by measurements of an 
actual scan pattern to demonstrate that the speed of the scan had no effect on the MPE. 
This result is extremely significant. Many laser display companies are under the 
impression that their scan patterns are safe because they scan at speed. However, many 
of these companies are not able to quantify their scan parameters and generally do not 
have laser irradiance/power measuring equipment which will respond to the scanned 
beams. The results from the thermopile detector demonstrate how the use of an average 
power meter can be misleading. Average power is not the appropriate quantity for 
comparison with the MPE. 
Measurements of the pulse duration, ie the exposure of a theoretical 7 mm diameter 
'eye' was used to determine the applicable MPE, generally the reduced single pulse 
MPE or the MPE".aino and the maximum radiant power permitted through this aperture 
was determined from the pulse duration and number per scan, or frame. In all cases this 
radiant power was less than 10 mW. Where the scan rate was low such that the pulse 
width reached 0.5 ms, the maximum radiant power was 2.5 mW. This should be 
compared with the MPE for a static beam, which would be 1 rnW for a single 
accidental exposure assuming the 0.25 s aversion response. 
The conclusion is that the assessment of scanned beams can be greatly simplified by 
measuring the power of a static beam through a 7 mm diameter aperture. If this is 1 
rnW or less then the MPE will not be exceeded at any position in the scan pattern. This 
can probably be increased to 2 mW for most scan patterns (see table 5.4) but any further 
increase will require significant effort to analyse each scan pattern, including any failure 
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modes. 
Limiting audience scanning beams to 2 mW into a 7 mm aperture can be achieved by 
using a low power laser such that the radiant power of the laser is less than 2 mW. This 
will limit the effectiveness of the beam effect where audience scanning is not required. 
Therefore a more effective control measure will be to increase divergence, and 
therefore, the diameter of a higher power laser beam such that the power entering the 7 
mm diameter aperture is less than 2 mW. This could be achieved by the use of a lens. 
Another advantage of this approach is that the lens could be mounted at an aperture 
used for audience scanning. Other apertures from the optical system could be used for 
other effects, but these would need to be blanked to ensure that the beam could not stray 
into occupied areas. It would also be possible to combine two apertures to produce a 
scan pattern. For example, a cone scan could be generated by the top section projected 
overhead as a well collimated beam through one aperture whilst the lower section, 
which was projected into the audience passes through a different aperture, close to the 
first, but incorporating a lens. 
Diffractive elements are becoming widely available which generate complex images. 
These allow laser effects to be produced, such as flat patterns, cones and cartoon 
characters without scanning the laser beam. Such elements could be rotated and 
selected, for example by mounting into a rotating cassette. Since the beam· is not 
scanned, the peak radiant power is much lower and is truly averaged over the pattern. 
Such effects are currently limited since they need to take account of the size of the 
venue, etc. However, devices are currently being developed which will allow a 
diffractive element to be active and programmable to produce the desired effect. 
In summary: 
1. Audience scanning is currently carried out without adequate quantification of the 
hazard. 
2. Analysis of beam effects is complicated for anything other than simple scan patterns. 
3. Increasing the speed of a scan pattern does not make it safer. 
4. Measurements of scan patterns are not made with appropriate instrumentation. Such 
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· measurements need to determine the duration of exposure for each scan pass the eye, 
the peak irradiance averaged over the 7 mm diameter eye, and the number of 
exposures within a suitable time frame, 0.25 s, say. 
5. The analysis of complex scan patterns demonstrates that the maximum power into a 
7 mm aperture is less than a factor of ten above the MPE for a static beam, and often 
only a factor of two greater. 
6. The analysis can be simplified by assessing static beams only. 
These conclusions are significant for putting the laser radiation hazard into context with 
other hazards which may be present at a laser display. 
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6. Laser Hazard Assessment Model 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous Chapters have outlined the problem for both enforcing officers and those 
involved in the laser entertainment industry. Although there are many aspects to consider 
it is important to appreciate that most are common to both groups of people. The aim was 
to develop a methodology to enable a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks 
associated with the laser display to be carried out. Before the risks can be assessed it is 
necessary to identify the hazards. One of the main issues has been consistency of 
approach to assessing the laser safety issues. The laser companies do not consider safety a 
big issue. They are generally working on tight financial margins and most have not 
experienced major injuries. 
The survey of the enforcing officers and feedback from the training provided suggested 
that few, if any, of them were in a position to assess the safety of laser displays. Where 
training has been provided the skills are not developed due to the small number of 
assessments which may be undertaken by a particular officer. A methodology is needed to 
ensure that the enforcing officers can work through the key elements of the safety issues. 
It may still be that they will not be able to carry out complete assessments but at least they 
should be in a position to appreciate where further assistance is required and where they 
can call on their existing expertise to assess much of the installation. 
It is also ideal to develop a methodology which is helpful to the laser companies. Whilst it 
is easy to conclude that they do not care about the safety issues, it may be that they have 
not been forced to think them through. A successful methodology may also provide 
commercial benefits to laser companies. Demonstrating professional competence, which 
includes assessing the safety issues, is becoming increasingly important in the 
entertainment industry. This information will be useful for venue managers and promoters 
as well as to the enforcing officer. 
This Chapter describes the development of a model which can be used by all parties, and 
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which covers all applications of lasers in the entertainment industry. The methodology 
should provide a structured approach to identifying hazards which can then be input to a 
risk assessment. It will be seen that the development of the formal guidelines, both 
national and international should have provided ideal opportunities for the introduction of 
a suitable risk assessment methodology. However, this was not to be the case. The 
involvement and influence of both the International Laser Display Association and the 
Entertainment Laser Association are described. 
6.2 Development of Initial Assessment Checklist 
One of the main comments from local authority Environmental Health Officers 
concerning laser displays is that they would prefer to work to a prescriptive hazard 
identification checklist. To a certain extent HSE PM19 (HSE 1980) provided this. 
However, the document did not go far enough. The aim through the current research has 
been to produce a methodology which was useful to the enforcing officer but also had 
benefits for the venue management and the laser company. The latter should see an 
improvement in efficiency and management of laser displays. The approach would also 
go some way to remove inconsistencies between enforcing officers which has been a 
justifiable criticism made by many laser companies. 
A generic model for laser hazard assessment has been developed by Tyrer et al (1994). 
This model treats the laser, beam delivery and workpiece as separate parts of any laser 
product. However, for the entertainment and display industry this model can be developed 
further into a checklist. One of the benefits of this approach is to ensure that any hazard 
assessment is carried out in an efficient and systematic manner, thus minimising the 
possibility of any areas being overlooked. 
Apart from considering the laser display as a series of modules it is also necessary to 
consider the modules and hazards as a function of the life cycle of the display. The stages 
of the life cycle can be summarised as follows: 
Planning -liaison with "customer" and deciding format 
. Manufacture - physical manufacture and assembly of componen'.s 
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Testing - make sure everything works 
Transport - move the equipment to the intended site 
Installation - assembly on site 
Alignment - generally optical alignment 
Performance - the laser show 
Maintenance - carried out by the user on a regnlar basis 
Servicing - usually carried out by manufacturer 
Modification (if permanent) - upgrades, etc 
Dismantling - take the system apart 
Disposal (eventually) - when the system is no longer required. 
During the life of the equipment or the show, the different stages of the life cycle will be 
revisited as shown in figure 6.1. Different people may be at risk from the identified 
hazards at different stages of the life cycle. Different parts of the life cycle may also take 
place in different locations with different degrees of control possible. The Pop Guide 
(HMSO 1993) stresses the importance of the planning stage. Generally, many of the 
problems experienced at the other stages of the life cycle should have been addressed, or 
at least foreseen, at the planning stage. It is certainly important that the laser company 
ensures that any enforcing authorities are involved at this stage in order to identify any 
specific requirements including written assessments. 
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Figure 6.1 Life Cycle of a Typical Laser Display 
6.2.1 The Checklist 
All parties involved with laser displays had identified a need for a methodology to permit 
assessments of laser displays to be made. This could be a simple check list but more 
importantly it is considered that the approach to the assessment must be methodical and 
systematic, ensuring that all aspects are covered. 
A typical laser display can be divided into ten modules, each of which may have hazards 
associated with it. The mnemonic from the ten sections is SCALE DOVES after the first 
large outdoor laser display audited by the author, where the laser company projected laser . 
images onto trees in the form of doves to Edvard Grieg's Morning from Peer Gynt. 
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SCALE DOVES is expanded as follows: 
S Staff involved with the event other than those. involved directly 
with the laser 
C Control system for the laser 
A Audience 
L Laser 
E '. Equipment associated with the laser 
D Delivery optics 
0 Operator 
V Venue 
E External factors . 
S .' Support system 
The potential hazards associated with each aspect of the items on the checklist are 
described in the following sections. 
6.2.1.1 Staff 
There will always be a number of staff at a venue who will not be directly involved with 
the operation of the laser. These will include lighting and sound engineers who, if the 
performance is temporary, may be unfamiliar, with the venue, although they may have 
worked with the laser company at other venues. The venue staff may include 
management, engineers, audience control staff and vendors. AIl of these are likely to 
consider that any safety instructions or notices do not apply to them. Indeed, many will 
have "AIl Areas" passes which they will consider will give them access to all areas 
irrespective of the risks of doing so. 
The factors to be considered include the potential for access to the laser, its control system 
and the laser radiation. The latter will be particularly important during the setting-up and 
alignment stages. 
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A further group of staff who should be considered are other third parties, such as first-
aiders and merchandise/food vendors. These may not be employed by the venue but are 
more likely to take notice of safety advice. However, they could be at risk during the 
setting-up and alignment stage. 
The hazards arising from, and to, the staff are summarised as follows: 
Unauthorised access to the laser (eg high temperatures, cables, pipes, high 
voltages, laser radiation) 
Unauthorised access to the beam delivery system (primary and secondary) and 
therefore to the laser radiation and, possibly, moving parts 
Unauthorised access to the laser control system (exposure of other persons to laser 
radiation) 
Accidental or deliberate exposure to the laser radiation (possibly through another's 
actions) 
Unauthorised or accidental exposure to high voltages 
Unauthorised or accidental exposure to cooling system 
Trip hazard arising from various cables and pipes 
Mechanical hazard during laser installation 
6.2.1.2 Control System 
The laser show control system may be sited close to the laser, or one of the lasers if more 
than one is in use. A central control system may be used or there may be distributed 
control with some form of communication between the operating staff. Most modem 
control systems are either personal computer (PC) or microprocessor based. These can 
introduce considerable flexibility for the laser operator. The signals from the control 
system to the laser and its optical system need to be considered. If the laser is remote from 
the control system then the signal cable may pass through the audience. This exposes the 
cable to potential damage and the resulting action of the laser and its optical system needs 
to be considered. There may be a radio link. If this is interrupted or interfered with, will 
the optical system fail to safety? 
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If the control system is software based then it is very difficult to ensure that all conditions 
have been tested. A certain set of conditions may not occur for many years but, when they 
do occur, they may result in a hazardous condition being created. The action of the laser 
and the optical system should be considered if the computer program ·crashes'. 
The integrity of the computer/control system hardware should also be considered. 
Temporary installations should make use of ruggedised equipment, which will survive the 
rigours of transport. Again, the action of the laser and optical system need to be 
considered if the hardware fails. 
The hazards associated with the control system can be summarised as: 
Failure of the control software 
Failure of the control hardware 
Links between the control system and the laser(s) 
Links between the operators if more than one control system is used 
Anyone of these eventualities could result in unintentional exposure of persons to laser 
radiation. 
6.2.1.3 Audience 
If the laser company complies fully with the published guidance (HSE 1980 or HSE 
1996a), the potential for hazardous laser radiation exposure of the audience should be 
restricted to failure conditions. However, as demonstrated in chapter 3, this cannot be 
assumed. The analyses in chapter 5 demonstrate how complex quantification of the 
hazard can be. 
The audience may be exposed to laser radiation, either directly (static or scanned beams) 
or from reflections (intentional or accidental). The pathways for exposure need to be 
considered carefully and methodically. If blanking plates are used to restrict the directions 
of the laser radiation, the potential for audience access to the radiation outside of the 
blanked-off area needs to be considered. 
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The lasers or their control systems may be within the audience, especially during 
temporary events. Measures should be introduced to ensure that the audience cannot 
access any of these. The potential for unruly behaviour should be taken into account: this 
is less likely during a product launch than during a rock concert, for example. 
The audience may have access to items which could be put into the path of the laser 
radiation, such as reflective, helium-fiIled, balloons. Control measures to ensure that such 
items are not for sale at the venue or brought into the venue need to be considered. 
The factors relating to the audience are summarised: 
Access to the laser radiation 
Access to the laser 
Access to the optical systems (primary and secondary) 
Access to the control system 
Audience behaviour 
Audience position and control 
Potential for introducing reflective items into laser beams 
Access to systems associated with the laser, such as high voltages and cooling 
systems 
6.2.1.4 Laser 
The potential for hazards from the laser display will relate fundamentally back to the 
laser. If a class 1 laser product is used, the hazard from laser radiation is considered low. 
However, if the laser is class 4 then the potential for serious injury exists. 
The radiation levels can be compared with the maximum permissible exposure levels. 
The characteristics required are: wavelength, radiated power, duration of exposure, beam 
diameter and beam divergence. For entertainment and display purposes the laser will 
generaIly be emitting visible radiation. However, the potential use of lasers emitting non-
visible radiation, for example in the ultraviolet region, to produce special effects, should 
not be ignored. Some lasers will also potentially generate radiation in addition to visible 
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wavelengths, such as a frequency doubled neodymium: Y AG laser or flashlamp pumped 
lasers. Good engineering design should ensure that the risk of access to such unintentional 
radiations is minimised. 
The hazards associated with the laser itself can be summarised as: 
Laser radiation 
Non-laser radiation (including x-rays and ultraviolet collateral radiation) 
Mass of the laser 
Temperature of the laser housing . 
6.2.1.5 Equipment Associated with the Laser 
The laser requires services to operate. These may include high voltage power supplies and 
cooling systems. There are also a number of other associated pieces of equipment which 
assist the display itself. These should all be identified and any hazards recognised. 
Examples of such equipment are smoke generators used to make the laser radiation 
visible to the audience and the radio communications equipment used for ensuring that a 
multi-operator laser show is co-ordinated. 
The hazards resulting from the associated equipment can be divided into the following 
categories: 
Hazard to the operator (trip hazards, high voltages, water, etc) 
Hazard to other staff (trip hazards, high voltages, water, etc) 
Hazard to the audience (hopefully few, but may include smoke/vapour from 
smoke generators) 
Hazard to the laser (eg, water leakage) 
Hazard to the optical system (eg, water leakage) 
6.2.1.6 Delivery Optics 
Although it is possible to have a laser display with a single beam emitted from the laser, it 
is more likely that there will be an optical system attached to the front of the laser which 
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modifies the direction and/or characteristics of the radiation. In addition, there may be 
other optical components remote from the laser position such as mirrors or mirror balls. 
The primary delivery optics, attached to the laser, are usually controlled remotely. The 
beam direction may be restricted by the use of blanking plates or by software within the 
control system. There is the potential for the blanking plates to move and for the software 
to be programmed incorrectly. There is also the potential for the laser operator to consider 
that irradiating the audience is not a problem (see appendix B). 
The beam direction will probably be controlled by at least two orthogonal mirrors 
attached to galvanometers. The natural rest position of the galvanometers will have to be 
considered and the resultant beam position if any number of the drive circuits fail. Beam 
expanding optics may be used for a beam which is to irradiate a mirror ball. The hazard 
associated with the beam expander failing to engage needs to be considered. A number of 
the components in the optical system may present a mechanical hazard to the operator 
during alignment. 
The secondary optics may include items forming part of the structure of the venue or the 
stage set and may be difficult to predict until the display is performed. 
The hazards associated with the beam delivery system are summarised as follows: 
Laser radiation exposure of the operator 
Laser radiation exposure of the staff 
Laser radiation exposure of the audience 
Mechanical hazard for the operator during alignment 
Fibre optic delivery systems may also be used. There is then the potential for high power 
laser radiation to travel up to tens of metres from the laser to the aperture. The path of 
such fibres should be considered, along with the potential for damage, disconnection, etc. 
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6.2.1.7 Operator 
The laser operators are the critical components in a laser show at a temporary event. The 
safety of the entire laser display system will usually be under their control. The operators 
should have received adequate training to ensure that they are aware of the capabilities 
and limitations of the laser display and are aware of the potential safety issues. In a fixed 
installation, the laser system may have been engineered such that radiation exposure 
above the maximum permissible exposure levels is not possible and therefore it is 
possible to have an operator trained to a lesser degree. 
The operator may be the person responsible for setting up the laser display, perhaps with a 
number of other people from the same company. There may be more than one operator for 
a large installation. 
The operator is capable of introducing a number of hazards. The timetable for setting up 
the display should take into account the requirement to align the optical system before the 
audience arrives. However, other staff, including the operator, are potentially at risk 
during this stage. 
Hazards connected with the operator are concerned with: 
Lack of training 
Laser radiation exposure of the operator 
Laser radiation exposure of staff 
Laser radiation exposure of audience 
Lack of safety procedures and systems 
6.2.1.8 Venue 
Different problems are associated with fixed installations and temporary installations. In 
the former the initial hazard assessment should identify problems which can be rectified. 
For temporary installations, problems associated with the venue may not become apparent 
until the laser display company arrive on site. However, good advanced planning should 
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minimise this. 
Hazards likely to be associated with the venue are: 
Specular reflecting surfaces 
Audience in unexpected places (eg balcony) 
Services not available or inadequate 
6.2.1.9 External Factors 
External factors will include the weather for an outdoor event. Rain will attenuate the 
primary laser radiation beam but may also intrnduce many reflecting surfaces. There is 
also the hazard arising from the high voltages associated with the laser. The weather may 
have an effect on the attitude of the audience and the concentration of the operator. 
Consideration should also be given to other objects or fixtures which may be remote from 
the venue if they can alter any safety assessment. These will include buildings and aircraft. 
6.2.1.10 Support System 
The laser and optical system will usually be mounted on some sort of support system. Any 
secondary optical systems will also be mounted. In a fixed installation, the mountings will 
be semi-permanent and less prone to unplanned movement. In temporary installations the 
laser company will generally erect a temporary structure to mount the laser and primary 
optical system but they may rely on either existing structures or structures erected by other 
parties involved in the display. 
Potential hazards connected with the support system are summarised as: 
Instability of the support system 
Specular reflections from the support system 
Shared access to support systems 
Audience access to support systems 
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6.3 Experience of Using the Checklist in Practice 
The Scale Doves model was trialed at thirteen laser displays, both new permanent 
installations and temporary displays. Although it was possible to identify hazards, the 
following problems were identified: 
The approach to the assessment was not in a logical order 
There was confusion over what was a hazard, and what was at risk, particularly 
with the audience. 
The checklist was accepted by enforcing officers as being better than nothing but 
was not considered useful by laser display operators. 
The laser display companies treated the whole process with suspicion. It was still very 
difficult to obtain a real impression of the problems faced by the industry on installing 
fixed or temporary displays and producing performances to, often very tight, timescales. 
At this stage, contact was made with members of the International Laser Display 
Association in the United States who. it was considered, would have less direct concern 
with someone outside of the industry. This was really the starting point for building 
bridges between the industry and those who have to assess and perhaps regulate their 
practices. 
The UK laser display companies were still producing notifications to enforcing officers 
using appendix 3 of PMI9. However, it was becoming more obvious that such 
notifications had a small number of pedigrees (probably three). The information provided 
did not relate to specific venues and often not even to the type of event. Calculations 
provided were certainly not relevant. In most cases, the calculations had been followed 
through to give an answer for a single scan effect, which was just below the MPE, but 
with unjustified assumptions. Typically, it would be assumed that the beam divergence 
always increased after reflection from a plane mirror, and that the scan rate was hundreds 
of hertz. 
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6.4 Developing an Assessment Methodology 
It was recognised that any methodology had to be useful to the laser display companies to 
ensure that they could demonstrate that a risk assessment could be undertaken and, if 
necessary, presented to enforcing officers. Equally, enforcing officers familiar with the 
same model would be in a better position to assess such risk assessments. 
An important factor which arose during the development of the new methodology was the 
increasing requirement to provide documented safety assessments in other sectors of the 
entertainment industry, particularly relating to temporary structures. A small number of 
laser display companies recognised the benefit in being able to provide similar levels of 
documentation for their section of the industry. Multi-site entertainment companies were 
also requiring paperwork to demonstrate the professionalism of their contractors. 
The original checklist was modified to include a number of additional parameters and 
presented in an order which, for most installations, is logical: For each compartment of 
the model, only the hazards associated with each compartment are considered. However, 
for each compartment it is still necessary to consider the life cycle of the display, as 
presented in figure 6.1, and who may be at risk from the hazards at each point in the life 
cycle. 
The methodology is presented in figure 6.2. It can be seen that there is a logical 
progression from the laser along the optical path and then expanding out from the laser. 
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11 Laser 
t 
Links between Compartments 
t 
Primary Optics 
t 
Beam Paths 1 
t 
Secondary Optics I 
t 
Con trol System 
t 
11 Equipment Associated with the Laser 
t 
11 Support System 
.. 
o perator(s) 
t 
Staff other than Operator(s) I 
. t 
Audience I 
.. 
Other People 
.. 
Venue 
t 
External Factors 
. 
Figure 6.2 Laser Display Hazard Identification Methodology 
Many of the compartments are identical to the earlier checklist. The differences are as 
follows. 
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6.4.1 Laser 
It was recognised that there may be more than one laser and that each would have to be 
considered, although many hazards will be common. 
6.4.2 Links betw.een Compartments 
This section of the model was primarily introduced to recognise that the connections 
between the different sections of the laser display can have hazards associated with 
them. However, it can also be used as a trigger to consider, for example, how the 
operator interacts with the control system. 
The link between the laser head and the primary optics may be by direct mechanical 
coupling, via an air gap or through fibre optic cable. It is important to also consider the 
link between any services and the laser head, and also links between the control system, 
the optics and the laser. 
6.4.3 Primary Optics 
It was recognised that the primary and secondary optics had different hazards associated 
with them at different parts of the life cycle and, in general, would put different people 
at risk. Therefore, it was important that the difference was stressed by creating different 
compartments for these different optical systems. 
The primary optics will generally be constructed on the premises of the laser display 
company, requiring only final alignment on site. It is also prudent to encase the primary 
optics, for safety and to minimise the influence of environmental conditions on the 
optical components. During normal operation, there should only be a single or small 
number of actual or potential apertures from the primary optics. 
The mounting of the optical components within the primary optical system should also 
be considered. 
130 
6.4.4 Beam Paths 
This compartment was introduced into the methodology to ensure that the beam paths 
are specifically considered. Apart from the justification from the assessments carried 
out in chapter 5, this also appeared to be an area where the laser companies exhibited a 
complete lack of understanding of the safety issues. 
The assessment should include the paths between the primary optical system and any 
secondary optics. The previous chapter considered how the hazard from the beam paths 
should be quantified if personnel exposure is intended or reasonably foreseeable. 
However, even if beam paths are kept well away from areas occupied by the audience, 
the exposure of others should also be considered. 
6.4.5 Secondary Optics 
This compartment considers the mounting of the secondary optics, including any actual 
or required blanking. Since, by design, the beam path must be to the secondary optical 
components, the accessibility of both the beam and the optical component should be 
considered, both during alignment and cleaning, and by, for example, members of the 
audience. 
6.4.6 Control System(s) 
This is identical to the earlier checklist as described in 6.2.1.2. 
6.4.7 Equipment Associated with the Laser 
This is identical to the earlier checklist as described in 6.2.1.5. 
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6.5 Experience of Using the Methodology in Practice 
The hazard identification methodology was tested at nine venues, both permanent and 
temporary. It was also tested by other NRPB staff to ensure that the breakdown of the 
problem into the different compartments was logical. The methodology was found to 
work successfully in identifying the hazards. However, it should be recognised that the 
model may need to be modified for specific events. Although all lasers displays 
assessed to date are covered by the model, as technology advances it is likely that the 
model may need to be extended. This should just be the addition of further 
compartments. 
It was useful to apply the model to a laser display company during the development of 
new products and the demonstration of existing products. The persons at risk were well 
defined, and the life cycle and hazard identification methodology are still applicable. 
This proved to be a useful exercise for the laser company concerned in support of their 
risk assessment and health and safety policy statement. 
The methodology was at an advanced stage of development when HS(G)95 was 
launched to the industry at NRPB on 8 January 1997. This was seen to be an 
opportunity to help the industry with a technique to assist with the practical 
implementation of the new guidance. It was also the first opportunity to raise the 
questions over the acceptability of audience scanning to a large number of companies at 
one time. The launch was also attended by managers from venues which use lasers and 
representatives from equipment manufacturers. Twelve of the largest laser display 
companies had the opportunity to comment on the new guidance document and the 
views on audience scanning. The companies felt that HS(G)95 did not meet either their 
requirements nor those of the enforcing officers. Each, as stated before, preferred a 
more prescriptive approach, with clear guidance on what can and cannot be done, and 
therefore little flexibility for interpretation which was considered to be inconsistent 
throughout the UK. 
The result at the end of the seminar was the determination of the industry to form a 
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professional association to look after their interests. Thus the Entertainment Laser 
Association (ELA) was formed, probably more as a pressure group than anything else . 
. That this body should have been formed at all is significant. Most of the member 
companies had been spawned from a small number of pioneering laser display 
companies as the result of disagreements between individuals. They were also operating 
in a fiercely competitive market against a general view that lasers had had their day and 
often were staged in a less than professional manner. 
It is interesting that some of those present at the meeting supported the views presented 
and particularly concerns over insurance issues for intentionally exposing the audience 
to laser radiation levels in excess of internationally agreed MPE levels. These included 
the venue managers and one of the laser display companies who already operated to a 
quality system for their non-laser work, such as lighting and sound installation. 
ELA formed a number of sub-committees, including one covering safety. Presentations 
of the hazard identification methodology were made both to the sub-committee and to 
the ELA Committee. 
6.6 Conclusion 
A methodology has been developed for the identification of the hazards associated with 
the use of lasers for entertainment. This has evolved from a simple checklist to a logical 
methodology which considers the various modules of a laser display (figure 6.2) as a 
function of the life cycle and the persons at risk. 
The involvement of the laser display companies with this research has been initially to 
be suspicious of the rationale behind any attempt to formalise the safety aspects of their 
industry. It was necessary to seek information and comments from non-UK laser 
companies, such as members of the International Laser Display Association, who felt 
less threatened by any involvement in their industry. 
The introduction of revised· guidelines in the UK (HS(G)95) and internationally (lEC 
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60825-3) should have provided the opportunity for clear statements of the safety 
requirements for laser displays and how these should be demonstrated. However, both 
documents failed to achieve this through a more. general goal-setting approach. Neither 
document was developed with any significant input from the industry. However, the 
launch of the UK guidelines in January 1997 did trigger the formation of aUK-based 
professional body for the industry. 
The hazard identification methodology was presented to the industry both formally and 
on an individual basis as work continued alongside a number of laser display companies 
and enforcing officers as displays took place throughout the UK. 
Identifying the hazards is not the end of the story. It is necessary to follow this through 
to an assessment of the risks and finally to management of any residual risks. This, 
again needed to be supported by both the industry and the enforcing officers. The 
process will be explored in the following chapter. 
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7. Risk Assessment 
7.1 Introduction 
The hazard assessment methodology developed in chapter 6 is not the end of the story. It 
is necessary to use this information to assess the risk from the use of lasers, detennine 
control measures to eliminate or reduce the risk, and to manage the residual risk. 
There is a legal requirement in the UK for employers to undertake a suitable and sufficient 
assessment of the risks to which their employees and others are exposed (HMSO 1992). It 
is important to present the conclusions in a form which is meaningful to the employer, ie 
assists with risk management, and to others, such as enforcing officers so that informed 
decisions on the adequacy of control measures and residual risks can be made. There is 
currently only a legal requirement to make a record of the significant findings of the risk . 
assessment under the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (MHSWR) 
(HMSO, 1992) if the employer employs at least five employees. It is recognised that many 
laser display companies could fall below this threshold. However, enforcing officers may 
be able to use powers under entertainment licensing legislation to require a written record 
as a reasonable licence condition. 
This chapter considers an ideal example of a risk assessment for part of the laser display 
and a means of presenting the data. However, it is accepted that the time constraints may 
make such assessments unlikely by the laser companies unless specifically requested by 
the enforcing authorities or the venue management. Therefore, a more critical risk 
assessment methodology is presented whereby a decision can be made on whether the risk 
can be assessed reasonably, or whether further information is required. Such a process 
should allow an enforcing officer to follow a methodology to the limit of their expertise 
and be confident of seeking further advice, which will normally be the analysis of 
informationalready provided where particular expertise is required. This approach should 
provide a means of analysing whether the risk assessment is suitable and sufficient. It is 
strongly considered that it is more important for the laser display company to demonstrate 
an understanding of the risk and to be able to present conclusions based on actual data 
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rather than to be able to present a microscopically detailed assessment. Such an approach 
should also meet the requirements of only needing to present the significant findings of a 
risk assessment. 
7.2 Risk Assessment Methodologies 
Formal risk assessment methodologies have been developed for industries where the risk 
is either actually high, demonstrated by a number of adverse incidents, or perceived to be 
high. Nuclear power plant operators and chemical production companies have developed 
sophisticated models to evaluate the risk to their employees and the public around 
facilities. Most of this work is carried out at the planning stage of new plants (K1etz 
1992). Engineers also use risk assessment techniques to look at failure modes for 
machinery or processes, ie to determine the reliability (Modarres 1993). Here, the risk to 
personnel may be trivial but the commercial risk may be important. 
When developing a manufacturing process or a power plant, the investment and return is 
such that significant effort to determine the risks can be justified. Laser displays are 
generally provided on a very tight budget within a short timescale. The use of formal 
techniques such as HAZAN or component failure analyses may not be justified, except for 
a major permanent installation which is likely to attract large audiences over several 
. months or years. It is also questionable whether the employees of the laser display 
companies will have the expertise to carry out such assessments. Concerns had been 
expressed by employers in other industries who had considered that the MHSWR required 
them to undertake assessments which produced numerical values for risk to different 
critical groups. These concerns were addressed by the Health and Safety Executive 
producing a practical guide to risk assessment at a level which would be reasonable in 
many industries (HSE 1994). Essentially, the guide suggested that there are five steps to 
any risk assessment: identify the hazards, decide who may be harmed, evaluate the risks, 
record the findings, and review and revise the findings. A methodology for completing 
steps one and two has already been presented in chapter 6. The analyses from chapter 5 
will provide input to step 3 for the laser radiation. 
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7.3 Risk Assessment in Practice 
Assessing a complete laser display from the planning stage through to disposal will be a 
time-consuming process. However, much of the assessment will be common between 
installations carried out by a laser display company. This is particularly apparent when the 
life cycle of the laser display is considered (section 6.2). The work carried out at the laser 
company's premises is likely to be similar and, generally, will be under the control of the 
employer. Transport will also be similar. The major difference is between venues and the 
detail of the actual laser display equipment. However, for a touring show, the differences 
are only related to the venue. 
A significant benefit of a company using the same approach for all of its work is that the 
enforcing authorities, promoters and venue managers become familiar with the process 
and the way the information is presented. If a common format can be agreed between 
companies then the net benefits are even greater. 
7.3.1 Who is at Risk? 
The identification of the hazards in chapter 6 demonstrates that many of these hazards 
have a risk of death associated with them, such as high voltages and working at height. 
However, it is important to recognise that the persons at risk from these hazards are 
generally either the employees of the laser company or other employees associated with 
the event. The total number of people at risk from these hazards is therefore small. 
Coming back to the premiss from chapter I, the average family attending an entertainment 
event assumes that their safety is assured. The audience will generally number far more 
people than the employees. What is the risk that a member of the audience, or indeed 
another non-employee, could be injured as a result of the activities associated with the 
laser display? The risk of an individual member of the public being injured or killed will 
depend on the probability that they will be exposed to the respective hazard. 
It is an interesting human characteristic that the number of people injured or killed 
features highly in the tolerability of risk from an activity to the extent that killing one 
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employee of the laser company is generally more acceptable then injuring a large number 
of people in the audience. 
The main hazard that the audience are potentially exposed to is from the laser beam paths, 
ie the laser radiation. If there are secondary optics in the audience area then these may 
have hazards associated with them. It is also possible that there may be links between the 
components of the laser display, such as control cables, passing through the audience. 
However, the laser beam path has the greatest potential to affect the largest number of 
people. The range of outcomes following exposure to laser radiation is from no effect, 
through sub-damage-threshold effects, such as distraction and after-images, to actual 
physical damage. The result of any damage will depend on the damage site, even within 
the target. If the target is the eye then damage of the macula is likely to result in the loss of 
central vision. Even damage outside of the macula may result in vision degradation, or 
. even blindness if the communication pathways to the optic nerve are damaged. Such 
damage obviously effects the quality of life of the exposed individual. However, there are 
also likely to be other implications. A typical insurance payment for the loss of sight in 
one eye is about £30,000 in the UK. An insurance claim is likely to result in a critical 
review of the risks from the industry by the insurance companies, which may have far 
reaching implications for the use of lasers in the entertainment industry. 
Recognition of the key risk issues allows the enforcing officer to identify where effort is 
required to determine if the risk assessment carried out by the laser company is adequate 
and that the hazards have been adequately controlled and the risks are minimised. It 
should be possible to codify this taking account of the hazard identification methodology 
to permit assessments to be made in a reasonable time. However, this should not detract 
from the laser company's duty to carry out a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks 
which cover public, and others', exposure to hazards. 
7.3.2 Example Risk Assessment 
An example of the level of detail that is considered appropriate is presented here for a 
simple primary optical system, as one ccmpartment of the hazard identification 
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methodology (chapter 6). Laser radiation is fed in to one end of the system and the output 
is through an aperture. An outline of the components of the system is in figure 7.1. 
Figure 7.1 Schematic of Example Primary Optical System 
Beam in 
r------, ~----------------------------
Periscope .. Shutter • 
Colour 
Selection 
, IF 
Aperture .- Scanning .. Z-Blanking 
I 
I 
'------- ~----------------------------
Beam out 
, , 
Assume that the input laser beam is from a krypton-argon laser with three wavalengths -
488 nm (blue), 514.5 nm (green) and 647.1 nm (red). If these have been balanced for the 
photopic response of the eye (section 3.1.1) then the input beam will be perceived as 
white light. The periscope is used to adjust the beam height between the laser and the 
optics of the primary optical system. This consists of two planar, front surface reflection, 
mirrors. Adjustment of height and angle of each mirror is possible. All of the remaining 
optical components are at a fixed height. All components are mounted on a solid metal 
base using at least two boIts screwed into tapped holes in the base. 
The shutter consists of a solenoid with a black beam stop mounted in the end of the shaft. 
The default position is down with the beam stop in the beam path: a drive voltage is 
needed to pull the beam stop up out of the beam path. The colour selection consists of 
three rotary actuators with dichroic mirrors which are matched to the three wavelengths, 
ie the 488 nm dichroic will reflect the 488 nm wavelength but transmit the other two 
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wavelengths. 
The z-blanking consists of a lens which focuses the nearly parallel beam from the 
periscope into the mirror of a galvanometer. The galvanometer and mirror position is set 
so that the beam is reflected or transmitted, ie the edge of the mirror interrupts the beam 
under program control. A second lens recollimates the beam after the galvanometer. The 
transmitted beam is positioned in the centre of the mirror of the first scanning 
galvanometer. The reflected beam from this mirror is then incident on the mirror of the 
second galvanometer. The beam from this mirror is then output from the primary optical 
system via an exit aperture. 
It is necessary to identify which parts of the life cycle are relevant to the primary optical 
system and the persons likely to be at risk at each stage of the life cycle. An example of 
such an assessment is presented in figure 7.1, below. 
STAGE OF LIFE HAZARDS PERSONS AT RISK 
CYCLE 
Planning None No-one at this stage but 
consideration of the remainder of 
the life cycle should reduce the risk 
Manufacture Mechanical (tools, sharp Employees, visitors (perhaps 
edges, weight of items), including client) 
electrical, heat (soldering 
iron), chemical (cleaning 
fluids) . 
Testing Mechanical (moving parts), Employees, visitors (perhaps 
electrical, water,laser 
, 
including client) 
radiation 
Transport Mechanical (weight, sharp Employees 
edges) . 
Installation Mechanical (weight, sharp Employees, others in the vicinity 
edges), electrical but generally employees of other 
emnlovers 
Alignment Mechanical (moving parts, Employees, others in the vicinity . 
weight, tools), electrical, but generally employees of other 
water, laser radiation employers. Public, including the 
audience. 
Performance Mechanical (moving parts), Employees, performers, audience, 
electrical, water, laser other staff 
radiation 
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.. 
STAGE OF LIFE HAZARDS PERSONS AT RISK 
CYCLE 
Maintenance Mechanical (moving parts, Employees, others in the vicinity 
weight, tools), electrical, laser but generally employees of other 
radiation, heat (soldering employers 
iron), chemical (cleaning 
fluids) 
Servicing Mechanical (moving parts, Employees, others in the vicinity 
weight, tools), electrical, laser but generally employees of other 
radiation, heat (soldering employers 
iron), chemical (cleaning 
fluids), water 
Modification Mechanical (moving parts, Employees, others in the vicinity 
weight, tools), electrical, laser but generally employees of other 
radiation, heat (soldering employers 
iron), chemical (cleaning 
fluids) .. 
Dismantle Mechanical (weight, shrup Employees, others in the vicinity 
edges), electrical but generally employees of other 
employers . 
Disposal Mechanical (weight, shrup Employees, any other person 
edges) 
Table 7.1 Hazards and Persons at Risk from Primary Optical System 
It is now necessary to evaluate the control measures in place to ensure that personnel are 
not exposed to the hazards. Again, these are likely to be different at different stages of the 
life cycle. 
The hierarchy of control measures should be as follows: prevent exposure to the hazard by 
eliminating the hazard; substitute the activity for one that presents a reduced hazard; 
en~lose the hazard; reduce the number of people potentially or actually exposed to the 
hazard; or provide personal protective equipment. Training will also be an important 
control measure. However, this may only be effective for employees of the laser display 
company and, exceptionally, perfonners. Certainly an audience cannot be expected to be 
trained or to take notice of safety instructions. 
7.3.2.1 Manufacture 
One of the primary control measures during manufacture is the training of the employee 
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undertaking the work. However, many of the hazards identified at this stage of the life 
cycle in table 7.1 can be controlled at source. The use of good quality components, 
including fixings, with the correct tools should reduce the risk of injury. Consideration 
should be given to appropriate connection techniques, ie whether to solder components or 
dry mount, and whether to crimp or solder leads. If a soldering iron is used, it should be 
used with extraction and be stored in an appropriate base unit. Where cleaning, or other 
. chemicals are used, the COSHH assessments (HMSO 1994c) should be undertaken prior 
to the chemicals being used. If possible, chemicals with a trivial or low risk of ill health 
should be used. 
7.3.2.2 Testing 
At the testing stage the primary optical system is likely to be connected to a control 
system and probably a laser. A number of the components move, or will need adjustment. 
The minimum laser power necessary to undertake the alignment and testing should be 
used. It should be recognised that eye exposures at levels below the maximum permissible 
exposure level may cause dazzle, especially when working in reduced ambient light 
conditions. With the laser on, and covers removed from the primary optical system, the 
risk of exposing other people to the laser beam also needs to be recognised. The simplest 
control measure is to restrict access to the area where the work is carried out. However, 
this should be balanced against the risk to the engineer working alone. 
There may be mains voltages within the chassis of the optical system, although most units 
will operate at 24, 12 or 5 V DC maximum. Where there are mains voltages, it would be 
reasonable to enclose these locally to minimise the risk of accidental contact with live 
conductors. 
At some stage, the primary optical system is likely to be tested with the full power from 
the laser to be used in the display. This could identify stray reflections which were not 
apparent at the lower power. Again, it will be important to reduce the number of people at 
risk and to ramp the power up, where possible, so that unintended beam paths can be 
eliminated as soon as they have been identified. 
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7.3 .2.3 Transport 
A well engineered system should not have sharp edges. However, there is still the risk of 
trapped fingers and manual handling considerations both when the optical system is 
loaded into the transport case, and when the case is loaded into the vehicle. Simple control 
measures include wheels (which can be locked) on the flight case and a case design which 
does not require bending over and lowering the optical system into a case. A flat base unit 
with a lid integral with the sides may be a suitable solution. 
7.3.2.4 Installation 
The first part of the installation is to unpack the equipment. It then has to be located in 
position. These both have manual handling implications. It is also possible that the 
installation is at height or in restricted spaces. Planning should have identified any 
particular issues here and appropriate control measures implemented. 
The weather, which may be too hot, cold or wet, may have an impact on the risk to 
persons. at the installation stage. Appropriate clothing, including footwear, hats and 
gloves, may be required. However, any risk of using such measures should also be 
considered. 
The services to the optical system may present a risk to the installer and others. These will 
include power and signal connection cables. 
7.3.2.5 Alignment 
Most of the alignment of the optical system should have been carried out before the unit 
was transported. However, there will still be a degree of final alignment. Many of the 
risks and control measures will be similar to the testing carried out before installation. 
However, there may be the risk of exposing more people, including non-employees. The 
hazard likely to present a risk over the greatest distance is the laser radiation. The risk of 
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accidental exposure can be reduced by the use the minimum power necessary to do the 
alignment and local shielding. The latter may include a beam stop placed at some distance 
in front of the beam aperture. This beam stop also assists with the alignment process. The 
minimum power necessary to undertake the alignment will depend on ambient light 
conditions. Under extremely bright conditions the input power from the laser may need to 
be of the order of 1 W, especially out of doors when the beam needs to be aligned with 
secondary optical components. Under these circumstances it may be necessary to remove 
all unnecessary people from the area while the alignment takes place. This eventuality 
should be considered at the planning stage, especially for events out of doors. 
7.3.2.6 Performance 
In order to minimise the risk of exposure to any of the hazards associated with the primary 
optical system during the performance local shielding should be used. This will include 
shielding over some optical components, such as the dichroic mirrors to ensure that the 
reflected beams are suitably dumped. A cover should be placed over the complete optical 
system so that the only apertures are the input aperture for the laser and the intended exit 
apertures. 
It should not be possible for non-employees to get access to the primary optical system, 
and certainly not to the exit apertures. 
The emergent laser beam is a residual hazard which should be controlled by its position in 
relation to accessible areas. Engineering controls such as blanking plates should ensure 
that, even in the event of a component or control system failure, the beam cannot access 
audience areas. It is recognised that some operators wish to undertake audience scanning 
and that the blanking would not permit this. However, with reference to the arguments in 
chapter 5, it WOUld. be reasonable to undertake audience scanning only with further 
consideration of control measures. For example, the beam used for audience scanning 
passes through a separate beam path, ie through a diverging lens, and exits from the 
primary optical system through a dedicated aperture. 
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7.3.2.7 Maintenance, Servicing and Modification 
The control measures for the hazards associated with maintenance, servicing and 
modification are similar to those for testing, installation and alignment with due 
consideration to the location where the work is carried out and the persons likely to be at 
risk. 
7.3.2.8 Dismantle 
Dismantling the equipment is essentially the reverse of the installation with two possibly 
significant factors: the crew are likely to be tired and, if out of doors, it may now be dark, 
7.3.2.9 Disposal 
The disposal of the optical system should present no more risks than the disposal of any 
other engineering components. The most appropriate route of disposal will generally be 
recycling with the components re-used on other systems. However, as the components 
become obsolete they will be disposed of through normal disposal routes. 
7.4 Presenting the Risk Assessment Conclusions 
As has already been identified, there are different audiences for the conclusions from the 
risk assessment. The company will have a legal requirement to record the significant 
findings from its risk assessments if it has more than five employees (HMSO 1992). 
However, the laser display company may wish to present its assessment in a written form 
for any or all of the following reasons: 
• compliance with health and safety legislation 
• compliance with licensing legislation 
• staff relations 
• customer relations, including the presentation of a professional image 
• improved efficiency and effectiveness 
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The Health and Safety Executive's (HSE's) fonner guidance (HSE 1980) provided a 
suggested profonna for the presentation of the basic infonnation in support of a laser 
display notification to the enforcing authorities. As has already been described in Chapter 
3, although these were used by some laser companies, the infonnation was generally not 
adequate to allow a third party to assess the safety of the display. 
The Australian code of practice (NHMRC 1995) provides a display safety record 
profonna which was developed during the course of this research. The profonna has the 
following sections: 
• Responsible persons 
• Training 
• Laser System 
• Venue 
• Display Plan 
• Hazard Assessment 
• Protective Equipment 
• Display Maintenance and Routine Checks 
• Statutory Authority Approvals and Restrictions 
Although a good starting point, there is little advice on how this infonnation should be 
presented. 
The revised HSE guidance (HSE 1996a), which the author contributed to, refers to hand-
over documentation. This is recognised as being "good practice" rather than to meet a 
specific requirement. A list of what the hand-over documentation should include is: 
• calculations and supporting measurements of exposure levels at defined positions 
within the display area, in keeping with HS(G)95, or otherwise demonstrating the 
overall safety of the installation; 
• clear instructions on the use and effect of display controls; 
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• details of all pemrissible display effects, their safety implications and the constraints on 
their use; 
• infonnation on manual shutdown and surveillance requirements; 
• infonnation on automatic emergency shutdown systems, their mode of operation, 
maintenance requirements and function verification; 
• details of routine servicing and maintenance procedures, their frequency, who should 
carry them out, and details of protective eyewear and/or clothing required; 
• details of routine adjustment and alignment checks to be carried out by the user, to 
include frequency, record keeping and corrective action requirements: external optical 
component checks are especially important; 
• operator experience and training requirements; 
• the supplier's address and telephone number or those of its LSO; and 
• any special conditions to be observed. 
The guidance also recognises the value of scale diagrams and/or photographs and that the 
infonnation should be presented in a fonn which is adequate for independent verification 
of emission safety by the enforcing authority. 
There is no requirement to provide hand-over documentation under this guidance if the 
installer is also the user. 
The international guidance (IEC 1995), which the author contributed to, refers to a display 
safety record which should include: 
.• all relevant safety infonnation relating to the design, installation, alignment and 
operation of the display; 
• the names and addresses of designers, installers, modifiers, operators and owner of the 
laser display equipment; 
• any operation and display approvals and restrictions issued by regulatory authorities 
(both local and national); and 
• laser equipment manuals confomring to 6.1 and 6.2 of IEC 60825-1. 
147 
It was recognised that the laser display companies would only draft documentation if 
either there was a specific legal requirement to do so, or if there was a commercial benefit 
to them. Therefore, the proposed Laser Display Safety Record tries to address this latter 
issue while also addressing the general requirements to record a risk assessment, meet the 
requirement of national guidance and comply with licensing legislation. 
7.4.1 Laser Display Safety Record 
The format of the Laser Display Safety Record has evolved from a need to provide a 
document which can be assessed, and be useful, to persons other than those who draft it. 
The final format uses a modular approach and is ideally suited to filing in a ring binder. 
As will be discussed later, this format also supports sub-sets of the Record, which can be 
used for specific purposes. 
The laser display company should have a safety policy statement as required under 
Section 2(6) of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (IDvlSO 1974). The Laser 
Display Safety Record could also be considered part of that statement. 
The outline Laser Display Safety Record presented here only covers the laser display from 
the time it leaves the laser company's premises until it returns after a temporary 
installation. However, it can be seen that the format can be modified to cover permanent 
installations or, indeed, operations at other stages of the life cycle, including manufacture 
and testing at the company's premises. In particular, such a Record should exist for any 
installed demonstration facilities at the company's premises. 
Suggested section headings for the Laser Display Safety Record are presented in appendix 
E. 
7.4.2 The Laser Display Safety Record in Practice 
The Laser Display Safety Record has been used by one of the major UK laser display 
companies for a ntllT,ber of events. A number of benefits were identified: 
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• the fonnat was useful for event managers and enforcing officers 
• the laser display company manager was able to identify a number of shortcomings with 
his own operations and introduced a number of additional control measures to reduce 
the risks to his staff and others 
• the process of drafting the Record gave the management of the laser display company a 
better understanding of the problems faced by enforcing officers, who have to assess 
such displays 
• the Record provided a metric against which to carry out internal audits. 
The fonnat of the Laser Display Safety Record was not without criticism. Each Record 
could fill an A4 ring-binder file. Preparation of the file also took significant effort. 
However, the investment in developing the file should mean that subsequent files can be 
built up from a series of modules. Many parts of each operation are common. An example 
file is presented as Appendix F. 
It is also recognised that many enforcing officers will not welcome a large quantity of 
paperwork to assess. However, this is not the main reason for drafting the file. The value 
of the effort required to draft the file must rest primarily with the laser display company. 
They have the responsibility to ensure that the risks are either eliminated or reduced to an 
acceptable level. 
It is possible to use a sub-set of the Laser Display Safety Record to provide an indication 
of the risk assessment carried out for a particular display. Fundamentally, the enforcing 
officer will want to know what will happen, where it will happen and when. They will 
also want to know the significant findings from the risk assessment. This is essentially 
Section 1 and Section 5.7 of the file. 
The Laser Display Safety Record (IDSR) represents an ideal situation where time and 
effort are of no object. However, most decisions which need to be made by enforcing 
officers are made under less than ideal conditions with time being the main problem. It 
was also recognised that they still needed to be reviewed by someone with significant 
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knowledge of the subject to make a decision on the bottom line, ie whether the risk is 
acceptable and the laser display should be permitted to proceed. 
The LDSR was adopted in a modified form by the Entertainment Laser Association and 
used by their members for providing information in compliance with the requirements of 
HS(G)95. This should be seen against a background of a view that notifications were not 
required under HS(G)95, compounded by some animosity due to the industry not taking 
an active part in drafting the guidance. If the methodology was working perfectly then it 
should be possible to assess the laser display from the information provided. 
Assessments provided by various companies suggested that they were happy to complete 
the non-contentious sections, ie details of where and when the laser event was taking 
place. It appeared that the old PM19 appendix 3 information was being re-worked to fit 
the LDSR format. Even information on the laser equipment was not complete. Risk 
assessments were included as far as the example presented in appendix F, even if not 
relevant. This had always been a concern with presenting a worked example since, as 
stated in chapter 3, the number of PM 19 appendix 35 appeared to be small, giving the 
impression that many enforcing officers were happy to receive some paperwork 
irrespective of the quality and relevance to the specific event. 
The problems with using the LDSR suggested that the whole risk management 
methodology was not yet mature. 
7.5 Assessing the Significant Risks 
At the International Laser Display Association annual meeting in Lincoln, Nebraska, in 
November 1997, the author presented the hazard identification methodology and the Laser 
Display Safety Record to an international audience. This was significant because most of 
those present were from the USA, where audience scanning is very restricted and very 
much the exception. Risk assessment is not generally used in US legislation but a number 
of those present could see the benefit of having a methodology for assessing the risks and 
presenting the significant findings to regulators.,They saw this as a means to being able to 
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demonstrate that, under certain well-controlled conditions, it would be acceptable to carry 
out audience scanning. This, of course, was in marked contrast to UK and European 
countries where the practice was widespread and it was considered that attempts were 
being made to restrict an accepted part of most laser displays. At the end of the ILDA 
meeting, the President stated that he wished to see the industry develop an international 
laser safety guide. Subsequent to the meeting, an international laser safety forum was 
formed from the interested parties. 
Despite an agreement internationally that the safety issues had to be addressed, there were 
many views on the levels of risk to which the audience in particular was exposed. It was 
considered that different standards existed in different countries and many of the 
misunderstandings regarding audience scanning exposure conditions prevailed. This 
provided extra justification for a risk assessment methodology which could get to the 
heart of the real risk issues and be interpreted throughout the world. In short, the negative 
attitude of many ELA members had been replaced by an international desire to address 
the real safety issues to be able to demonstrate that the industry could operate in a safe 
manner without risk to the audience. 
7.5.1 Who is at Risk? 
The hazard identification methodology recognises that there are different people at risk 
from exposure to the hazards. This can be summarised into zones of people: 
• Laser company employees 
• Other employees 
• Performers 
• Audience 
• Other people 
Not all laser display events will have people from all categories and, indeed, the life cycle 
will also be important. Using these categories of people, who will generally be in certain 
specific positions in the venue as a function of time, it is possible to identify where the 
real risks exist as a function of the hazard identification methodology, life cycle and zone. 
Folded into this the number of people at risk and the outcome will need to be considered. 
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A three dimensional representation of the risk assessment methodology is shown in figure 
7.2. 
There are a number of ways of expressing the probability of persons being exposed to a 
risk, the outcome and the number of people at risk. For this analysis, a numerical system 
is used whereby a larger number represents a greater problem. A risk factor can be 
calculated by multiplying the three parameters. It is likely that different outcomes will 
have different risk factors. For this analysis the largest numerical risk factor is used. The 
parameters are assigned numerical values as follows: 
Probability: 1 - Improbable 
2 - Possible 
Outcome: 
Numbers: 
7.5.2 Results 
3 - Likely 
4 - Very likely 
1 - No injury 
2 - Minor injury 
3 - Major injury 
4 -Death 
O-None 
1 - 1 Person 
2 - 2 to 5 People 
3 - 6 to 20 People 
4 - Greater than 20 People 
An analysis is presented as a function of the life cycle and the compartments of the hazard 
identification model, for each of the zones of people considered at risk, for a temporary 
outdoor display (figures 7.3 to 7.7) and for a permanent indoor installation (figures 7.8 to 
7.10). For comparison, the z-scales are identical for each zone within each event. The 
number of zones for the permanent installation is less than the temporary display. It is also 
assumed that intentional audience scanning forms part of the outdoor display, but not the 
indoor display. The public are also admitted during the alignment of the o~ltdoor display, 
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as was experienced at event B in appendix B. 
Figure 7.2 - Three Dimensional Representation of Risk Model 
Compartments 
Cycle 
People at Risk 
~ for example. risks to perfonners from the support system during alignment 
The analysis of the risks in the manner presented in figures 7.3 to 7.10 gives a rationale 
for focusing the management of the risks. It is significant that the public are rarely at risk 
of death from a laser display, whereas the activities of the laser company may put 
themselves and other employees in the vicinity at such risk. Once the laser display reaches 
the performance part of the life cycle the analysis of the risks is simplified and, as 
suggested from figures 7.3 to 7.10, the main issues are the exposure to the laser radiation 
and in particular whether such exposures are intended or reasonably foreseeable. Taking 
the three-dimensional presentation of the risk assessment issues from figure 7.2, this can 
be redrawn with the key issues as presented in figure 7.1 1. In essence there is a bottom 
line - are the audience at risk from the beam paths either through intentional or accidental 
exposure. 
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Figure 7.3 Risk Matrix - Laser Company Employees 
Temporary Outdoor Display 
_ Figure 7.4 Risk Matrix - Other Employees 
Temporary Outdoor Display 
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Figure 7.5 Risk Matrix - Performers 
Temporary Outdoor Display 
Figure 7.6 Risk Matrix - Audience 
Temporary Outdoor Display 
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Figure 7.7 Risk Matrix - Other Members of Public 
Temporary Outdoor Display 
Figure 7.8 Risk Matrix - Laser Company Employees 
Permanent Installation 
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Figure 7.9 Risk Matrix - Other Employees 
Permanent Insta"ation 
Figure 7.10 Risk Matrix - Audience 
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Figure 7.11 Key Risk Assessment Issues 
Hazard dentification Compartments 
Other 
people 
- Audience 
Operator 
Control 
system 
Support 
system 
Beam 
paths 
Life Cycle 
Persons at 
Risk 
Audience Other members of public 
7.5.3 Codifying the Risk Assessment 
The former HSE guidance on the safety of laser displays (HSE 1980) attempted to provide 
a proforma, specifically aimed at the enforcing officer for demonstrating compliance with 
health and safety requirements. The goal-setting approach of the revised guidance (HSE 
1996) requires a risk assessment to be carried out. The feedback from chapter 4 has 
shown that the enforcing officers were not able to apply formal training on assessing laser 
displays but were still seeking advice and reassurance each time a laser display took place. 
Codifying the assessment process should assist the enforcing officer to carry out most, if 
not all, of the assessment of risk management for a given event, This could be 
programmed into a decision support software package. Building on the experience gained 
with applying the risk assessment methodology developed here, the key issues can be 
distilled. Generally, the enforcing officer will only be concerned with the stages of the life 
cycle which put the public at risk, although it should be appreciated that activities and 
decisions made at the other stages of the life cycle may impact on public safety. 
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The primary question will be "does audience scanning fOIm part of the laser display?". If 
the answer to this is yes, then the risk assessment needs to concentrate on this issue. If 
intentional exposure does not fOIm part of the display then the failure modes which could 
result in audience exposure need to be considered. The key issues for a decision support 
system simplify to the following. 
• Whether intentional personnel exposure to laser beams takes place 
• The reasonably foreseeable incidents which could expose personnel to the laser beams 
• The integrity of any safety control systems, such as beam blanking 
• Training and competence of the operator (can be assessed by demonstration of 
understanding laser display operation and safety issues) 
• Whether persons (and particularly the public) are at risk during installation and 
alignment 
• The stability of the optical systems which launch both the primary and secondary 
beams. 
It can be seen that the hazards presenting the severest outcome are not necessarily the 
areas focused on here. If intentional exposure of people is not planned then the whole 
assessment simplifies further into general safety issues with which the enforcing officer is 
likely to be familiar. However, if intentional exposure, such as audience scanning, is 
planned then a full assessment is required, as outlined in chapter 5. 
The simplified approach was tested for a number of laser displays both with enforcing 
officers who had attended the training courses and with those who had not. Generally, the 
methodology was applied over the telephone to minimise the cost to the local authority. 
Essentially, a series of questions were presented to the enforcing officer to answer each of 
the bullet points above. A key issue for the enforcing officer asking the questions of the 
laser display company was the requirement to not appear foolish in the quality of the 
questions asked. This was not as much of an issue for the officers who had attended the 
training courses. However, for the others it was necessary to present an outline of a laser 
display. The hazard identification methodology provided an excellent basis for this. 
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The simplified methodology was also applied to a number of overseas laser displays to 
assist local safety officers and included the assessment of the laser displays forming part 
of the first annual meeting of the International Laser Display Association outside of the 
United States (in Canada), where audience scanning was less restrictive than in the United 
States. The methodology was codified as presented in figure 7.12. This recognises the 
importance of the assessment being carried out, at least initially, at the planning stage. 
Some of the changes resulting from the risk assessment may be fundamental. For 
example, if the venue manager wants audience scanning and the assessment shows that 
this is not possible with the type of laser installation, it is too late to find this out once 
everything has been installed. The author was involved with such a problem. 
The key issue is certainly audience scanning. As has already been stressed, the assessment 
is not straightforward and an enforcing officer will probably need to seek further advice at 
this stage. If the scanning is not intended then the beam paths should be reviewed 
throughout the whole performance. If the display is out of doors there is the potential for 
persons to be exposed to the laser beams outside of the venue. Again it has been stressed 
that the operator competence is a major risk control measure. Careful questioning rather 
than formal assessment may be the only way to judge the competency of an operator. The 
hazard identification methodology can form a basis for a range of questions. 
The control of the risk of accidental exposure, or intended exposure with un-assessed 
parameters, may be affected by the control system. For example, a fully automated 
playback system is less likely to present a risk of unplanned exposure than a fully 
computerised system operated manually. 
A small movement in the laser display support system can result in beams moving into 
occupied areas, even though blanking may be used. The mechanical stability assessment 
should be within the capability of the enforcing officer. The stability will be an issue with 
temporary installations, as described in chapter 3, and also with new venues where the 
venue structure may be still settling. This latter point is. a particular issue with some 
entertainment venues which use a floating construction to insulate night clubs, for 
example, from cinemas in multi-entertainment complexes. 
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The hazard assessment methodology provides a final check through all of the safety 
issues, to ensure that these have, at least, been considered. An acceptable conclusion from 
all of this would result in the risks being adequately managed and therefore the event may 
proceed. However, if changes are required then there will need to an element of 
judgement on how far back through the decision tree the assessment should re-start. 
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Show Not 
Permitted to 
Proceed 
Yes 
Figure 7.12 Codified Assessment Process 
Requirement to Assess 
Laser Display 
Changes may 
be difficult to 
implement 
Yes Seek further 
advice 
Yes ~ 
Review Operator Not OK,or ? 
Corn etence 
OK 
Review Control Not OK, or? 
System 
OK 
Review Support NotOK,or? 
System & Blanking 
OK 
Run Through Hazard Not OK, or? 
Methodology 
Show Proceeds 
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In all cases the methodology was found to be effective at quickly getting to the key risk 
management issues. It avoided wasting time on some of the detail if it was obvious that 
some of the key issues would prevent the show proceeding. 
7.5.4 Audience Scanning Control Measures 
The UK laser display industry continues to insist that audience scanning is both without 
risk and that is an aspect of laser displays most attractive to the customer. As such, they 
continue to consider methods to maintain this practice in spite of various demonstrations 
that they cannot provide a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks from this 
practice. 
Fuelled by the belief that scanning laser beams faster makes them safer, there has been 
some investment in audience scanning control measures which terminate the laser scan in 
the event of a scan-fail condition. There is also a requirement in the German draft 
standard for laser displays to have an automatic shut-down mechanism operating within 
lOOms (DIN 1995) if audience scanning is intended. 
Since the laser display companies are starting to use scan-fail control systems as a 
demonstration that audience scanning can be carried out safely, it is worth considering the 
practical implications for such devices and whether they do indeed reduce or manage the 
risk. 
A number of scan-fail devices are commercially available and they all tend to operate with 
a response time from 50 to a few hundred ms. Do such products reduce the risk of 
intentional audience scanning? The analysis presented in chapter 5 demonstrates that the 
risk is not reduced by scanning the laser beam faster. Therefore, any control measure 
which is designed only to consider the scan speed will not be an effective control measure 
except to control a static beam. However, since the maximum irradiance at the audience 
should already be below the MPE, failure of the scanning system will mean that the MPE 
will only be exceeded by an order of magnitude, at most, if the beam is static. 
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Assuming that the scan-fail system was designed to protect from accidental entry of the 
laser radiation into the audience area then it is possible to calculate the time within which 
it would have to be effective to prevent exposure above the MPE. Since this would be an 
accident situation, the maximum exposure duration would be 0.25 s. The MPE for 0.25 s 
gives a maximum power into a 7 mm diameter aperture of 1 mW (see chapter 5). 
Assuming a power into a 7 mm aperture (which may be greater than the radiant power of 
the laser), then the time to exceed the MPE can be determined from the following. The 
area of a 7 mm diameter aperture is 3.85 x lO.s m2• The relevant MPE values are 5 x 10.3 
J m·2 fort from 1 ns to18 lis and 18 to.75 J m-2 from 18 lis to 10 s. Converting these into 
irradiances by dividing by t and into radiant power through a 7 mm aperture by 
multiplying by 3.85 x 10.5 m2, this gives 1.925 x 1O-7/t and 6.93 x 10-4 (0.25 W, 
respectively. This data is plotted in figure 5.1 and tabulated in table 7.2. 
Table 7.2 Time Exceed MPE as a Function of Power into a 7 mm Aperture 
Power into 7 mm Aperture (VV) Time to Exceed MPE (s) 
0.001 2.33 x 10-' 
0.002 1.46 x 10-· 
0.005 3.73 x 10 
0.01 2.33 x 10·' 
0 
0.02 0 9.63 x 10-0 
0 
0.05 3.85 x 10-0 
0.1 1.93 x 10-0 
0.2 9.63 x 10-/ 
0.5 3.85 x 10·/ 
1 1.93 X 10-/ 
2 9.63 x 10·' 
~ 5 3.85 x 10-' 
0 
10 1.93 x 10-' 
20 9.63 x 10-' 
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It can be seen that using a control measure which acts within lOOms limits the radiant 
power into the 7 mm aperture to about 1.24 mW. At the powers likely to be used in the 
entertainment industry the control measure would need to be effective in a few tens of 
nanoseconds. It is also important to consider what has to happen in order to control the 
exposure as a function of time. First the fault condition has to occur. It then has to be 
detected, a control measure implemented and then be effective. All of this will have to 
occur within the time given in table 7.2 if the beam is likely to enter areas occupied by 
people. 
The argument above assumes that the beam is not in the occupied area when the fault 
condition occurs. If the fault condition occurs during intentional audience scanning then 
the control measure needs to be effective in an even shorter time period. Assuming that 
the MPE was not being exceeded during the audience scanning then the starting point for 
the exposure condition will not be at zero, ie the pre-existing exposure is already a 
percentage of the MPE. 
Control systems may be used to limit the extent of the scan area, to reduce the radiant 
power within specific areas, or to limit the size of scan patterns. The last should also 
control the use of static beams in occupied areas. However, there are two main factors to 
consider here. The first is that the system must be set up correctly for each laser 
installation taking account of the layout of the venue and the laser equipment used. The 
second comes back to response time and table 7.2 is again important. If the control system 
uses software then it becomes safety critical software and should be subject to the 
appropriate quality assurance. The data presented in table 5.3 demonstrates the 
importance of using beam divergence rather than scan size to decrease the NOHD. 
The conclusion from this assessment of scan-fail control measures is that they do not add 
significantly to the protection of persons who may be exposed to laser radiation during 
laser displays because the response time is not adequate using current technology. This 
adds weight to the argument, presented in chapter 5, that intentional exposures of 
personnel to laser beams can only be carried out if the static beam is below the MPE. 
Under these circumstances the response time of any control measure will be adequate at 
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lOOms. This must be achieved by increasing the divergence of the beams, or by other 
means, to ensure that the power entering a 7 mm diameter aperture is about 1 mW, in the 
absence of a detailed assessment of all of the scan patterns. 
7.5.5 The Risk from Audience Scanning 
The foregoing sections have highlighted that it is possible to use a simple methodology to 
assess a laser display if audience scanning does not take place and control measures are 
implemented to ensure that accidental exposures to laser radiation are unlikely. If 
audience scanning does take place then it is unlikely that the enforcing officers will have 
the necessary expertise to assess the risk directly or from information supplied by the laser 
company. Indeed, as has been demonstrated from this research it is also unlikely that the 
laser company will be able to carry out the assessment themselves. 
The analyses presented in chapter 5 showed that the MPE was likely to be exceeded for 
most laser installations undertaking audience scanning. However, how does this translate 
into risk? The number of reported eye injuries is extremely low considering the number of 
people who have been exposed to audience scanning over the last 25 years. The survey 
carried out by Murphy (1995) supported the argument that the injuries are not occuning. 
This raises a number of issues: 
• the MPE values may be wrong; 
• the application of the MPE values to the exposure situation is not appropriate; 
• the injuries are occuning but are not being reported, but are being attributed to 
something else; or 
• the injuries are occuring but are not affecting the quality of vision. 
The MPE values have been verified over a number of years. As shown in table 2.1, the 
MPE values· for the visible part of the spectrum have remained constant since at least 
1983. There is approximately a factor of ten between the MPE value and the EDso values, 
where the EDso is the radiant exposure required to cause an ophthalmologically significant 
lesion in 50% of cases (Sliney and Wolbarsht 1980). Therefore, based on this it would be 
reasonable to expect lesions in 50% of persons exposed at ten times the MPE. The ability 
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of laser radiation at this order of radiant exposure to damage the retina is supported by the 
radiant exposure levels used in medical treatment of retinal conditions. The conclusion 
therefore is that the MPE values are probably correct, at least within a factor of ten. It 
should also be appreciated that the experimental data suggested that, even at the MPE, 
there was a 3% risk of a lesion. 
The quantification of the laser radiation hazard in chapter 5 does make a number of 
assumptions, but all of these are considered to be valid for the exposure situation in the 
entertainment industry. If anything there are other factors which may need to be taken into 
account, such as compromised aversion response under the influence of drink or drugs. It 
could be argued that the scanned effects used in audience scanning are never stationary 
and even the assumption of a 0.25 s exposure is very restrictive. However, from figure 5.1 
and table 7.2, it can be seen that even a single pass of a laser scan pattern is likely to 
exceed the MPE unless the power entering the 7 mm aperture is low. For example, the 
maximum power for a single 23.2 liS exposure is 10 mW. Although eye movement may 
be a factor for longer exposures, it is unlikely to be significant for the situation considered 
here. 
Many laser light shows are accompanied by smoke (to make the beams visible) and 
possibly narcotic substances in the environment. A direct laser strike on the macula at a 
radiant exposure significantly in excess of the MPE is likely to result in a lesion, which is 
likely to result in complete loss of central, detailed vision. For this to happen, the recipient 
has to be looking directly at the actual or apparent source of the laser radiation. If the 
target site is away from the macula then the damage will be to the peripheral vision. The 
retina does not contain pain receptor ceIls· and therefore any lesion. is unlikely to be 
accompanied by pain. However, recent reports of laser pointer injuries have included 
references to pain. Medical assessments have suggested that the pain has come from 
bruising or abrading of the corneal surface by repeated rubbing of the eye with the back of 
the hand. Pain in the eyes may follow extended exposure to the smoke haze or other 
agents. 
Marshall (1989) has shown that repeated lesions can be placed in the peripheral vision 
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without the recipient being aware of them and he suggests that thousands of such lesions 
will not be perceived, since such damage is routinely carried out during laser treatment for 
some retinal conditions (Marshall 1997). This would seem to be the best argument for 
why more laser injuries have not been reported. This then raises a fundamental question. 
Is it acceptable to cause permanent damage to members of the audience, even though it 
does not affect their quality of life? The author's view is that it is not acceptable. Without 
a reasonable assessment of the irradiance levels to which persons are exposed, it is likely 
that higher and higher exposure levels wiIl be used, greatly increasing the risk of more 
recipient observable lesions. It is also recognised that a few highly publicised incidents 
could trigger significant requests for eye examinations and potential litigation. This would 
be a global issue and not restricted to the UK. 
To date, the number of reported incidents is small with 28 outdoor eye-related reports 
(Rockwell, 1997). The most recent injury report resulted from the use of a laser in a 
nightclub in Germany (Sachs et al, 1998). This followed a satisfactory safety inspection, 
but it is believed that the laser was replaced with one of a higher radiant power after the 
inspection. 
7.6 Summary 
This Chapter has shown how the hazard identification model can be used as input to a risk 
assessment for any laser display operation. It was recognised that detailed system failure 
assessments were generally not necessary. The process had to be reasonable and, mainly, 
relies on common sense. 
Carrying out the risk assessment is only part of the task. The laser display industry has to 
prove to others, including enforcing officers, that the work it carries out is without risk to 
the public. A Laser Display Safety Record has been developed as a means of presenting 
all of the relevant information about the laser display. It is encouraging that the managers 
from laser display companies who have tried the format have found it useful to 
themselves, in addition to providing a means of informing others. 
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The complete Laser Display Safety Record is likely to have more information than an 
enforcing officer will require initially. However, a sub-set of the. file can easily be 
provided. Such assessments should reasonably be provided for all permanent installations. 
The time available to assess a laser display may be limited. Therefore, a more focused risk 
assessment methodology was developed to cover the key issues from any laser display by 
treating the display in three dimensions: compartments of the hazard identification model; 
persons at risk; and the life cycle. It is found that the significant risks relate to the laser 
radiation, although the radiation may not result in the most serious outcome. This is 
because, in many cases the public may be at risk and represent a large number of people at 
risk. The important sections of the life cycle tend to be the alignment of the laser beams 
and the actual performance. By following a simple methodology it is possible to identify 
the key issues which need to be addressed by the laser company in order to satisfy the 
legal requirement to undertake a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks and to 
demonstrate this to an enforcing officer.· If intentional exposure of people to laser 
radiation is not included within the show then the assessment can be straightforward and 
generally covers agents which are either familiar to the enforcing officer or can be easily 
audited such as mechanical stability, beam blanking and electrical safety. If audience 
scanning, for example, is an intended part of the laser display then it is either necessary to 
analyse each scanned effect, considering the failure conditions, or, simply, to limit the 
radiant power through a 7 mm aperture at the closest point of access to 1 mW. If this is 
measured, due account will have to be taken of the non-uniformity of many entertainment 
laser beam profiles: the maximum power through a 7 mm aperture will have to be 
determined. 
Recurrent exposure of people at 1 m W is not without risk. People within the venue may 
be seated or at least, will not be carrying out safety critical operations. Persons outside of 
the venue, or who may be working within the venue, may be subject to distraction, dazzle 
and afterimages at exposure levels considerably below the MPE, depending on the 
ambient light level. If such recipients are driving or piloting vehicles then the risk could 
be of death and affect considerable numbers of people. For this reason, any beams which 
may leave the venue should also be carefully considered. 
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The assessment has shown that many laser shows are routinely exposing people at 
irradiance levels considerably in excess of the MPE values. A survey of the number of 
reported incidents would suggest that the practice results in a very small risk, ie a handful 
of incidents have been reported in the last 25 years. The small number of incident reported 
does not necessarily mean that injuries are not occurring: they may be in the peripheral 
regions of the retina where the recipient may not be aware of any degradation of vision. 
However, such injuries are still considered unacceptable. Quantification of the laser 
radiation hazard must be carried out to determine the risk from audience scanning. If the 
exposure levels cannot be assessed then the practice should not be permitted . 
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8. Relevance of the Risk Assessment Methodology to Other Laser Industries 
8.1 Introduction 
The research work has concentrated on developing a risk assessment methodology for 
the use of lasers in the entertainment industry. However, lasers are used in many other 
applications. Consideration is given in this chapter to how the methodology could be 
adapted to a number of other laser industries. 
It has already been recognised (Tyrer et al 1994) that the generic three-component 
hazard identification model consisting of the laser application, delivery system and 
laser, could be applied to any application of laser technology. However, the detail of the 
hazard identification model used here, the consideration of the risks, and the 
presentation of the conclusions have been specific to the entertainment industry. 
Research, medical and industrial applications will be considered in this chapter. 
There are many parallels in other industries. Each will have a life cycle, compartments 
of the application and zones of people at risk. The entertainment industry issues focused 
down on to whether the audience were exposed to the laser radiation, either by design 
or under reasonably foreseeable conditions. A similar methodical approach can be used 
to identify where the key risk issues lie in any laser application. However, a major 
difference is likely to be the lack of external audit and a much smaller number of people 
at risk. 
8.2 Research 
Research, by its nature, often involves the development of laser products which may not 
have the same level of engineered safety systems as a commercial product. However, 
the safety of those carrying out the work, and others who may be in the vicinity, should 
not be compromised. 
If the research work is undertaken in an academic environment then the value of 
instilling a laser safety culture in students who then move on to industry should not be 
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underestimated. However, it must also be recognised that a methodology which restricts 
the flexibility and effectiveness of a research programme is unlikely to be adopted at the 
local level. 
This assessment assumes that the development of the laser product is an integral part of 
the research. The use of an established commercial laser product as part of a research 
project can be considered similarly, but the assessment will hopefully determine that the 
risks have been addressed by the manufacturer of the laser product. 
Health and safety in research establishments in the UK, including universities, is likely 
to be enforced by the Health and Safety Executive. Specific laser safety guidance is 
available for higher education establishments (CVCP 1992) but this document is now 
dated and does not adequately address risk assessment issues. 
8.2.1 Life Cycle 
A research project will have a life cycle similar to the laser display (figure 6.1), but is 
more likely to have progressive developmental changes. A modified life cycle is 
proposed as shown in figure 8.1. 
I Planning 1 
+ 
I Manufacture I 
t 
I Alignment I I Modification I 
+ I Experiment r 
I Production/Disposal l 
Figure 8.1 Life Cycle for a Research Project Involving an Laser 
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8.2.2 Hazard Identification Methodology 
All of the hazard identification methodology for the display lasers (figure 6.2) is 
applicable, or at least should be considered. The audience could be the supervisor, or 
other interested parties. 
The number of people at risk will generally be smaller than in laser display 
applications. However, special consideration should be given to staff and other people 
who may be in the vicinity of the research work, but not involved with it. This is 
particularly an issue with shared laboratories. 
If the research work involves the use of a laser out-of-doors, the assessment will be 
even closer to the entertainment laser situation. However, it should be recognised that 
there is no specific requirement to involve the local authority. Special consideration 
should be given to the laser beam path if this is likely to present a risk to drivers of 
vehicles or pilots. 
8.2.3 Risk Assessment 
The assessment of the risks should be a systematic process making use of the hazard 
identification methodology, the life cycle and considering the persons at risk. 
Presentation of the risk assessment in a similar format to the Laser Display Safety 
Record would assist safety professionals within the research establishment, local 
managers and the person(s) undertaking the research. As the research develops, it is 
important to reassess the risks. 
A research piece of equipment will either develop to maturity, where it is suitable for 
production or be dismantled at the end of the research work. Some equipment reaches 
maturity but remains essentially a piece of research equipment. This can mean that the 
risk assessment is no longer valid because the person(s) using the equipment are 
differen: to those who developed it. Their level of knowledge of laser safety issues may 
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be much lower than the original researchers. Indeed, the equipment may be used as part 
of a routine process requiring little skill. Control measures, which may be tolerable 
during the development stage, may no longer be adequate. 
8.3 Medical Laser Applications 
Lasers are used in a large number of applications for diagnosis or treatment. The laser 
radiation is intended to irradiate people and, in many applications, cause intentional 
damage to human tissue. 
In the UK, the only specific legal control of the use of medical lasers is in certain 
private practices under the Nursing Homes and Mental Nursing Homes Regulations 
1984 (HMSO 1984a) which were made under the Registered Homes Act 1984 (HMSO 
1984b). Regulation 3 of the Regulations specifies class 3B and class 4 lasers as being 
subject to control for the purposes of the Act. Generally, it will be staff from the local 
health authority who will be required to assess the laser safety in the private practice. 
Therefore, the methodology developed for laser safety in the entertainment industry is 
likely to be particularly relevant to this application. 
The use of lasers in hospitals forming part of the National Health Service is subject to 
the general requirements of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HMSO 1974) and 
the Regulations made under that Act. Auditing of laser safety in healthcare facilities is 
likely to be a function of an in-house radiation protection professional who has some 
expertise in laser safety. Enforcement of the safety legislation will be the responsibility 
of the Health and Safety Executive with the Department of Health overseeing medical 
practice. The Medical Devices Agency (MDA) have a role in the safety of equipment 
used in medical practice, including medical lasers. The MDA have produced guidance 
on the safe use of lasers in medical and dental practice (MDA 1995). This guidance 
provides little practical advice on assessing risks in compliance with general safety 
legislation but it does address a number of practical laser safety issues. 
One area of laser treatment that appears to fall outside of the scope of either being a 
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private medical practice or a National Health Service facility is beauty treatment. In 
particular, lasers are being used for the removal of body hair. The general laser safety 
can be addressed, and enforced, by local authority environmental health officers, but the 
clinical direction of the treatment, including assessment of competence is not clear. The 
practical application of the risk assessment methodology presented here should ensure 
that the safety issues are addressed irrespective of who enforces health and safety, and 
other, legislation. 
8.3.1 Life Cycle 
The life cycle considered here is that which effects the healthcare facility. The 
development of the laser, its manufacture and transport to the healthcare facility are not 
considered. 
The life cycle within a healthcare facility is different from an entertainment laser 
because it also has to take account of different users and different applications of the 
same equipment. An outline of a suggested life cycle is presented in figure 8.2. 
I Arrival at Site J , 
I Deliverv to Facil~ J 
, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I Decommissioning J , 
I Removal from Facility J 
Figure 8.2 Life Cycle for a Medical Laser 
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8.3.2 Hazard Identification Methodology 
The hazard identification methodology for entertainment lasers can be modified for 
medical laser applications. The audience can now be replace by the patient. The 
operator may be one person or it may be two. In many surgical operations, the surgeon 
will be termed the laser user, ie the person who presses the pedal that fires the laser at 
the target. The person who sets the laser parameters may be a support nurse operating 
under the instruction of the surgeon. This nurse will put the laser into the "ready" mode, 
essentially giving the surgeon the ability to fire the laser. 
As part of the consideration of the beam paths, the laser process will have to be 
considered, bringing the model in line with the original model developed by Tyrer et al 
(1994). Since surgical applications cause damage to human tissue, which may be 
diseased, it is important to consider the resultant fume. 
Hazards may be accessible during some parts of the life cycle and not others. For 
example, work carried out during commissioning, servicing and modification may 
involve the side panels of the laser being removed and the laser operated with interlocks 
overridden. Apart from the laser radiation hazard, collateral radiation and high voltages 
may be accessible. 
8.3.3 Risk Assessment 
There are several reasons why the risk assessment is important in a healthcare facility. 
Many such facilities have a number of risks and are generally operating under strict 
financial constraints. The risk assessments provides input to a cost-benefit exercise 
which balances all of the risks associated with the work in the healthcare facility. 
The control measures in place during different parts of the life cycle may not be 
adequate for all persons potentially at risk. For example, during servicing operations the 
engineer, who may be a contractor from the laser supplier, may use adequate control 
measures to protect themselves (wear laser safety goggles) but not consider other 
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people in the vicinity. The risk assessment from the laser supplier should address this, 
or the issue should be addressed by the healthcare facility. 
Many healthcare facilities are large with multiple laser applications. Presentation of the 
risk assessment and other information in a formal record similar to the Laser Display 
Safety Record summarises the status of laser safety. Unlike many laser display 
installations, the record will be relatively static, although it is important that it is 
reviewed periodically and when circumstances change. This can include the purchase of 
new equipment, re-siting of existing equipment, new medical procedures or the transfer 
of physical direction of the process to another group of staff. An example of the latter is 
where a nurse undertakes tattoo removal or the treatment of benign vascular lesions 
under the clinical direction of a physician. 
The use of a formal Record is also useful for demonstration of regulatory compliance, 
including compliance with the Registered Homes Act (HMSO 1984b). The officer 
assessing a private healthcare facility for registration under the Act will be able to judge 
the laser safety infrastructure and risk assessments on the basis of information already 
recorded rather than having to seek the information by interview. 
The risk assessment methodology described here, and written by the author, has been 
incorporated in Annex C of a draft International Electrotechnical Commission report on 
medical laser safety to be published as part 8 in the IEC 60825-X series (IEC 1998). 
8.4 Industry 
The use of lasers in industry is widespread with applications varying from manufacture 
to quality assurance. The objective should be to ensure that personnel are not exposed 
to the laser radiation and other hazards associated with the use of the laser. Lasers in 
industry may be used by people who have no awareness of laser safety issues, and 
ideally, should have no need to understand the laser safety issues if these are addressed 
satisfactorily during the design and manufacture stages. 
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8.4.1 Life Cycle 
The life cycle for a laser product used in industry may include the life cycle for a 
research application. However, it is assumed here that the life cycle commences with 
the customer identifying a need for a piece of equipment. The manufacture and supply 
of the equipment is not considered. 
The life cycle is identical to that for the medical laser (figure 8.2). In some applications, 
such as materials processing, the different tasks undertaken by the laser product may 
present different safety issues. 
8.4.2 Hazard Identification Methodology 
Ideally, laser radiation will be less of a safety issue with industrial laser products. 
However, the hazard identification methodology for entertainment lasers can still be 
adapted for these applications. As with the medical lasers, the laser process may be 
more important than the beam path. A suggested hazard identification methodology is 
presented in figure 8.3. 
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Laser 
Beam Paths 
Laser Process 
Control S stems 
ui ment Associated with the Laser 
External Factors 
Figure 8.3 Industrial Laser Hazard Methodology 
The number of people at risk from industrial applications is generally small and will 
usually be restricted to employees or contractors working on the laser product. 
However, consideration should also be given to visitors and to employees who may be 
at particular risk through ignorance, such as recent recruits and cleaning staff. 
8.4.3 Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment should be a routine activity for many companies using lasers in 
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industry. The use of the hazard identification methodology and following this through 
to the risk assessment for the laser application should form part of the company's 
overall risk assessment. 
The risk assessment, and the other information relating to laser safety, could be 
presented in a ring binder file similar to the Laser Display Safety Record, although it is 
more appropriate to call this a Laser Safety Operational File. This format has been used 
by the author for a number of industrial applications. 
8.5 Summary 
The hazard identification and risk assessment methodology were developed initially for 
the entertainment industry. However, the methodology can be adapted to a number of 
different laser applications. Indeed, the structured approach can be applied to any 
application. 
It is recognised that some applications will require a more formal approach to failure 
analysis and risk assessment but these generally apply at the design and manufacture 
stage. By the time a product reaches the user, most of the safety issues should have been 
considered and addressed. The requirement to undertake a risk assessment remains 
under UK law. It is compliance with this requirement that the methodology described in 
this chapter should help to address. 
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9. Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Work 
9.1 Introduction 
The analysis of available guidance and text books relating to laser safety suggested that 
laser radiation issues were well understood (chapter 2). Therefore, the main issues 
initially covered by this research work were the non-radiation safety concerns. 
However, an analysis of several laser display events (chapter 3) suggested that laser 
radiation was still an issue. There was also a gulf between laser display companies and 
enforcing officers. This was believed to be due to a lack of understanding of each 
other's standpoint. The author's experience of dealing with enforcement officers, and 
the acceptance of NRPB by these organisations meant that liaison would be 
straightforward. Such collaboration with the laser display companies would have to be 
earned through mutual respect and understanding. 
A survey of the understanding of laser safety within local authorities was well 
supported (chapter 4) and reinforced the impression that local authorities did not 
necessarily have specific expertise for assessing the safety of laser displays. Similar 
surveys of the laser community produced a disappointing response, suggesting 
suspicion of ·officialdom'. However some data was acquired from the laser display 
companies during a seminar held at NRPB. 
It was necessary to gain a thorough understanding of the technology, techniques and . 
day-to-day problems of putting on a laser display event. This required co-operation 
from a number of laser display companies who were prepared to spare time to be 
questioned and observed. 
It was recognised that training and information were important to ensure that all parties 
understood each other's points of view and specific problems. To meet this need a 
number of joint NRPBlLoughborough University training courses were run specifically 
aimed at laser safety in the entertainment industry. These courses also helped to provide 
feedback on the main issues. However, they also demonstrated that the techniques 
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developed at that stage were not giving the enforcement officers the confidence they 
needed to assess laser displays without further assistance. This was despite many of the 
safety issues being within their expertise. Therefore, it was necessary to modify the 
techniques developed into a risk assessment methodology which focused on the key risk 
issues and the people at greatest risk. 
Audience scanning remained a key issue and one which, by measurement and 
theoretical assessment, appears to put the public at considerable risk of eye injury. 
However, this risk is not supported by reported incidents suggesting that the practice 
may not present as great a risk as predicted or that the number of eye lesions is 
significantly under-reported. The latter is thought to be the case. 
9.2 Conclusions 
A number of key issues have been resolved as a result of this research and it is strongly 
believed that the risk from the use of lasers in the entertainment industry can be 
managed successfully at least in part, by implementing the risk assessment 
methodology developed. The approach has been to solve a practical risk assessment 
issue, rather than a strict theoretical determination of the risks from the use of lasers in 
this industry. 
The situation at the start of the research was as follows: 
• laser display companies were not routinely assessing the risks from their work 
activities; 
• laser display companies complained about· inconsistent enforcement between 
enforcement officers; 
• the enforcing officers found the laser display companies less than helpful and unable 
to convince them of any risk management considerations; 
• the enforcing officers. believed they had little understanding of the technology, 
methods of generating laser effects, or the safety issues; 
• the current practice by the laser display companies was less than professional, even 
when viewed from within the entertainment industry; 
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• audience scanning with laser beams was routinely taking place with no 
quantification of the hazard; 
• there was a lot of folk lore about the safety of laser beams, such as beams being safe 
after reflection from a mirror, irrespective of incident power, and audience scanning 
is safe provided the beams are scanned fast; 
• the laser display companies did not have a complete understanding of the technology 
they were using, including the scan speeds used; 
• consultants were providing advice with little understanding of the key laser safety 
issues, adding to the impression that there were few safety issues. 
Laser displays were routinely being assessed based on limited information provided on 
a proforma included as appendix 3 to the then UK laser display guidance, PM19 (HSE 
1980). These proformas rarely related to the venue or the laser display equipment used 
and most enforcing officer either accepted them at face value or admitted they did not 
understand them. A major factor in the problem developing as far as it did was that the 
laser display companies and the enforcing officers did not communicate with each other 
and, probably did not trust each other. 
The development of assessment tools has relied on breaking down the barriers between 
the laser display companies and the enforcing officers and attempting to build a bridge 
between the two. Therefore, the tools have needed to be useful to both parties and, as a 
result of this should also be useful to others, such as the venue management and event 
promoters. 
In parallel with the development of the assessment tools has been the need to 
understand the technology used, the artistic techniques for producing laser shows, the 
problems of physically staging a laser show and the enforcement issues. In essence, it 
was necessary to work alongside laser display companies and see the world from their 
viewpoint, and also to work with the enforcing officers. 
The development of the assessment tools has been an iterative process which has 
involved a number of hypotheses, testing those hypotheses and feeding the results back 
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to new, further developed hypotheses. Existing guidance from the literature and laser 
safety standards suggested that laser radiation issues were well understood, but little 
practical guidance was available for identifying the non-laser-radiation issues. 
Therefore, the first tool developed was a checklist, termed SCALE DOVES. This was 
an attempt to structure the areas where the hazards may exist. The major success of this 
initial checklist was the identification of the problem of assessing laser radiation since 
intended audience scanning with laser beams was widespread. There was also some 
confusion with the checklist about what was a hazard and who was at risk from the 
hazard. 
A hazard identification methodology was developed which used a logical path from the 
laser to the audience, the venue and outside. Hazards could be identified for each of a 
series of compartments of the laser display. The life cycle of the display was also 
identified as important. Planning, the first stage, was critical, but there were a number 
of stages and the hazards for each of the compartments could be different at each stage 
of the life cycle. It was also recognised that different people could be at risk from the 
different hazards in the different compartments at different stages of the life cycle. 
The information that could now be collected for a laser display event was significant, or 
at least guidance was structured on the questions to ask. Presenting the information to 
the enforcing officer was now an issue. A Laser Display Safety Record was developed 
as a structured means of presenting the information and this approach was tested by a 
number of laser display companies for a number of events. Two key issues arose: the 
volume of paperwork required (with the amount of time and effort required to produce 
it); and the time necessary to assess it. On the positive side, the promoters and venue 
managers were very keen on the approach since it was a means of demonstrating a 
professional approach to the laser performance. Safety, they assumed would follow 
from that. 
When considering the three variables for the risk assessment methodology: the 
compartments of the laser display; the life cycle; and the people at risk, it was apparent 
that the key risk issues occurred at specific regions of combination of the three 
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variables. Although the laser display company staff and others in the immediate vicinity 
of their work may be at risk of death from their work, the audience generally were not. 
However, the number of people in the audience is generally much greater than the 
number of employees at an entertainment event. To maximise the effectiveness of a risk 
assessment, ie to implement effective risk management, it was important to consider the 
greatest number of people at risk, especially as a reasonably foreseeable outcome could 
be a serious eye injury. Such an outcome has the potential to significantly effect the 
quality of life of the persons at risk. Quantification of the laser radiation hazard during 
intended audience scanning suggested that the maximum permissible exposure (MPE) 
levels were being exceeded for situations where the power through a 7 mm diameter 
was more than about a factor often greater than the MPE for a static beam, ie 10 mW. 
The risk assessment methodology was focused to take account of the key risk issues 
since time was generally a major issue, certainly for any enforcing officer required to 
review the risk assessment provided by a laser display company. Specific sections of 
the three-dimensional risk assessment methodology were taken which primarily 
considered the public: the alignment and performance stages of the life cycle; the laser 
beam paths, operator competence, control system and support system compartments; 
and the audience and other members of the public persons-at-risk zones. 
The methodology could now be condensed into a flow chart for the enforcing officer to 
decide whether they have the necessary expertise to assess the safety of the laser 
display. The key issue will be whether audience scanning is an intended or reasonably 
foreseeable part of the laser show. If it is not, the assessment simplifies to a number of 
issues which the enforcing officer is likely to have experience of, such as the risk from 
mechanical and electrical hazards. If laser beams are an issue, or satisfactory 
conclusions cannot be drawn from the management of the risks from the identified 
hazards then the enforcing officer has a number of options: seek further advice on 
assessment of the risks; request further information to be able to make a judgment; or 
prohibit all or part of the performance. 
Although the condensed methodology permits a reasonable assessment of the key risk 
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issues, it will still be necessary to consider the remaining elements of the hazard 
identification methodology, even if these are not considered in detail. 
One of the main control measures for many of the risks associated with the use of lasers 
in the entertainment industry is the competence of the operator(s). There is no 
nationally recognised training programme for laser display operators, although there is 
an initiative to develop such training generally for the entertainment industry by 
Loughborough College in the UK. This is intended to include laser display operators. 
There is one remaining problem with the application of the methodology. It should 
certainly assist enforcing officers. A small number of laser display companies have also 
seen the benefits, including a number from outside the UK. However, the whole 
methodology is based on a requirement to convince someone else that the risks from the 
laser display have been adequately managed - the driving force for preparing the 
assessment is that the show may not take place if the assessment is not undertaken. 
However, many laser displays taking place in the UK will not be subject to 
entertainment licensing. As such, unless there is a culture change within the industry, or 
promoters and venue manager insist on reviewing risk assessments, these are unlikely 
to be completed for these other events. Adoption of the methodology resulting from this 
research should go a significant way towards ensuring that a consistent approach to 
determining the risks and how the assessment should be audited exists throughout the 
UK, if not the world. 
There was a great deal of confusion amongst the laser display companies on the 
legislation that applied to the use of lasers in the entertainment industry and the status 
of published guidelines. These issues have been addressed in chapter 2. It will always 
be better for the laser company to approach the local authority to determine if they 
wished to be involved with an assessment of the laser safety issues than to find out that 
the enforcing officer stops the laser show on the night because they were not informed 
and should have been. 
It had been hoped that the formation of the Entertainment Laser Association would 
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provide an impetus for the industry to dispel its image of being less than professional 
and work towards self-regulation. This has not proved to be the case. The industry in 
the UK hangs on to the belief that their industry is safe and that audience scanning is 
necessary and without risk. This is based purely on the lack of reported injuries and not 
on any practical assessments. This attitude is in marked contrast to the international 
situation. The International Laser Display Association (ILDA) has taken this research 
very seriously and joint measurements have been carried out to confirm some of the 
basic premisses, such as the maximum irradiance that can be put into an audience, and 
that higher scan speeds do not make beams safer. It is also the intention of the ILDA 
Board of Directors to produce an international safety guide produced by the industry, 
which takes account of the methodologies and conclusions of this research. 
Many of the UK laser display companies seem to consider that audience scanning is the 
most important part of the show. However, this view is generally not shared by the 
audience. Certainly, close proximity to laser beams is exciting and impressive but 
repeated scanning across the eyes, even at irradiance levels close to the MPE triggers 
the blink reflex. Whilst this may be acceptable a couple of times during a performance, 
it is annoying if it happens persistently. Observations of audiences during audience 
scanning clearly shows how they anticipate the scan approaching them and take evasive 
action after a while. One of the performances assessed during this research consisted of 
multiple diffraction beams passing through the audience area. The effect was generated 
by passing the primary beam through one rotating diffraction grating and then passing 
the diffracted pattern through a second diffraction grating rotating in the opposite 
direction. The zero order was dumped in an inaccessible area. The accessible diffracted 
beams were measured by the laser display company with the power to the motor drives 
disconnected and the maximum power into a 7 mm aperture was confirmed as about 
0.07 rnW from an input power of 5 W. The beams were visibly bright enough to 
produce a very impressive effect - the audience were essentially bathed in a mass of 
light rays of different colours. However, the visual stimulus was such that the beams 
could be viewed without blinking. This demonstrated that audience scanning effects 
could be used below the MPE, and indeed at a level which would not trigger the eye's 
aversion response, and still remain impressive. 
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For laser display companies who have built up their experience with audience scanning 
effects it is difficult to move away from such effects. This is likely to be due to the 
greater artistic input required to generate impressive effects without the "easy" option 
of scanning high power beams through the audience. It is interesting that the US laser 
companies have developed far more impressive graphical shows since audience 
scanning has generally not been an option for them. There wiII need to be an investment 
in the capabilities of the laser radiation. as an artistic medium. Some companies are 
combining laser radiation with other media, such as video projection (Ward 1998). 
The development of the risk assessment methodology has identified the benefit of a 
structured approach. The methodology, taking account of the three dimensions of the 
input parameters can be applied to other laser applications. As has been demonstrated in 
chapter 8, the methodology is equally applicable to applications where there are open 
beams, such as medical applications, and possibly research, and to industrial 
applications where the laser product is used as a tool, by employees who may need to 
know nothing about the laser inside the product. In these applications, the culture of 
health and safety is likely to be further developed than in the laser display industry. 
However, it is still likely that the laser application will be seen as something different 
and very complicated to assess. The actual risks may be difficult to quantify in some 
applications where the technology is still being developed, such as fumes from 
materials processing. 
In summary, the situation at the conclusion of this research work is as follows: 
• many laser display companies have accepted the need to assess the risks from their 
work; 
• laser display companies have started to appreciate the views and responsibilities of 
enforcing officers; 
• enforcing officers have developed a greater understanding of the issues associated 
with staging laser displays; 
• the legal situation concerning laser displays has been clarified, mainly for the laser 
companies, promoters and venue managers; 
• all parties have gained a greater understanding of the technology used in laser 
188 
displays and means of assessing actual performances; 
• a methodology has been developed which guides laser companies through the risk 
assessment process and a means of presenting the conclusions has been 
demonstrated; 
• taking due account of the time taken to undertake a full risk assessment, criteria 
have been developed to focus the effort on the key risk issues; 
• the problems of pre-existing measurement methods for quantifying the laser 
radiation hazard have been highlighted; 
• new measurement methods have been developed for quantifying the laser radiation 
hazard, especially during the intentional scanning of the audience; 
• audience scanning does not take place at venues where the author is involved with 
laser safety, except under well defined conditions of operation; 
• the complete quantification assessment of a show which includes intentional 
audience scanning is very time consuming and is generally stilI beyond the 
capability of the laser display companies; 
• in general, a measurement of the static laser beam at the closest position of the 
audience, and comparison of the measured value with the maximum permissible 
exposure, gives a good indication of the acceptability of such a beam scanned across 
the audience; 
• a flow chart to assist enforcing officers with assessing laser displays has been 
introduced; 
• where audience scanning does not take place, the safety assessment is well within 
the capability of most enforcing officers; 
• the results of the research have been accepted by the International Laser Display 
Association and are being taken into account in proposed industry-prepared 
international guidance; 
• much of the methodology for assessing laser displays is applicable to other laser 
applications. 
9.3 Suggestions for Further Work 
The risk assessment methodology is mature and has been used' on a number of 
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occasions by a number of different people. As stated above, it will only become adopted 
by the laser display industry if they can see the benefits to them, and these will normally 
be commercial benefits. Adoption by enforcing officers should ensure a consistent 
approach across the UK. The methodology could be programmed into a decision 
support system which would be of value to the laser display company, the enforcing 
officers, venue managers and the promoters. It is important that the methodology does 
not become a "worked example", which is copied for different performances without 
consideration of the performance and/or venue specific issues. 
The software developed for this application could be tailored to specific industries or 
could be generic. Such an approach may be able to attract financial support from 
government departments or regulators . 
• 
The existing guidance for the safe use of lasers in the entertainment industry throughout 
the world has generally been written by enforcing bodies and not by persons within the 
industry. The initiative by the International Laser Display Association to develop its 
own international guidance is to be welcomed. The research undertaken here will 
hopefully be taken forward by the industry under the ILDA banner to provide detailed 
practical guidance on how to undertake safe laser shows, the technology required to 
ensure that they remain safe, and that the residual risks can be assessed. 
The development of engineering solutions to the control of audience scanning will be 
welcomed. There should be commercial advantages to such developments but they 
must take account of the actual exposure situations likely to be encountered. If the 
judgment of the operator can be removed then the performance should be more 
controlled. However, as has been seen in chapter 7 with some scan-fail detection 
products, the philosophy behind any control measure must be sound. 
There needs to be a major investment by the industry either as individual companies or 
collectively to consider what makes an impressive laser show. The ability to arbitrarily 
scan laser beams in to audience areas for effect has stifled the development of more 
impressive beam effects. Audience scanning generally appears effective to a small 
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proportion of the audience at a time, and these people are spending a significant amount 
of time recovering from eye exposures, even at irradiance levels below the MPE. 
Beams projected just out of reach above the audience should present the same impact to 
a much larger proportion of the audience at a time. Laser show can be impressive and 
the risks can be effectively managed. Hopefully, future research will not include studies 
of eye injuries resulting from the use of lasers in this industry. 
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The following papers and articles have been published during the course of this 
research work. 
Non-ionising Radiation - Lasers 
JB O'Hagan 
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J B O'Hagan and R Hill 
Radiological Protection Bulletin, No. 199, pp15-20, March 1998 
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J B O'Hagan and R Hill 
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Lasers. Chapter in Croner Laboratory Safety Manager. 
JB O'Hagan 
Approved and Submitted January 1998 
Reply to Letter to the Editor 
Lasers in Places of Public Entertainment 
J B O'Hagan, D A Corder and J R Tyrer 
Journal of Radiological Protection,.lli, 2,139-140,1998 
Safety Assessments of Visible Scanned Laser Beams 
D Corder, J B O'Hagan and J R Tyrer 
Journal of Radiological Protection, 17,4,231-238,1997 
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JB O'Hagan 
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Appendix A 
Details of Laser Display Systems 
A,1 Introduction 
This appendix reviews some of the laser display systems used in more detail than chapter 
3 and is based on discussions with a number of laser companies. Although there was a 
belief that they all had unique systems, they were all very similar in concept, if not in 
detail. The appendix starts with the types of lasers known to have been used in laser 
displays. Then the optical systems are introduced, both in terms of the processing close to 
the laser and in the display environment. Finally, the control systems are introduced. 
A,2 Lasers 
There are a great many types of lasers commercially available. This section describes only 
those lasers known to have been used for mainstream entertainment applications. It is 
possible that other lasers have been used, especially in research environments. 
A,2.1 Helium-neon Laser 
The helium-neon (He-Ne) is the most popular of the so-called gas lasers, representing 
64% of the units sold in the UK in the early 1990s (Vassie et alI993). The most common 
wavelength is 632.8 nm which is red. However, units are also available which emit at 
other visible wavelengths - 543.5 nm (green); 594.1 nm (yellow); 604 nm (orange); 611.9 
nm (orange) and 640.1 nm (red). 
The 632.8 nm laser is available at radiant powers up to about 75 m W. Radiation at other 
wavelengths is produced less efficiently and therefore the maximum radiant powers may 
be only a few milliwatts. However, the response of the eye at each wavelength also needs 
to be taken into account. This response depends on the level of light as well as 
wavelength: at high light levels this is the photopic response (peak at 555 nm - see figure 
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3.2); at Iow light levels this is the scotopic response (peak at 510 nm). The shift in the 
peak response wavelength is the Purkinje Effect (Longhurst 1973). The reason for the 
shift is the different receptors in the eye. Cones, are most densely located in the central 
fovea, a small depression in the centre of the macula lutea. These cones are responsible 
for colour vision and the sharpness of vision in bright light. It is thought that there are 
three different types of cones which each have their own relative response as a function of 
wavelength, peaking in the red, green and blue parts of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
Colour is detennined from the differential output of the three types of cone (Tortora and 
Anagnostakos 1990). The rods are located away from the macula lutea in the remainder of 
the nervous retina. These respond to low light levels and produce an essentially black and 
white image. The rods are good for identifying shapes, shades of light and dark, and . 
movement. 
The relative photopic and scotopic responses for the He-Ne visible wavelengths are 
presented in table A.l along with the radiant power required to produce the same 
perceived brightness as from a 1 mW 632.8 nm He-Ne laser. In most situations the 
photopic response will dominate, even though the ambient light levels may be Iow. As 
explained in chapter 5, the damage response of the eye is taken to be independent of 
wavelength from 400 nm to 700 nm for exposure times up to 10 s. Therefore, if the colour 
of the radiation is not important a green He-Ne is preferable to, for example, a red He-Ne. 
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TableA.l 
Wavelength 
(nm) 
543.5 
594.1 
604 
611.9 
632.8 
640.1 
Comparison of Photopic and Scotopic Eye Responses to He-Ne visible 
laser wavelengths 
Photopic Response Radiant Power (m W) Scotopic Response 
(Relative to Peak to Stimulate the Same (Relative to Peak 
Response at 555 nm) 'Brightness' as 1 mW Response at 510 nm) 
at 632.8 nm Assuming 
Photopic Response 
0.95 0.25 0.67 
0.75 0.32 0.08 
. 
0.60 0.40 0.05 
0.48 0.50 0.04 
0.24 1.00 <0.01 
0.17 1.41 <0.01 
The divergence of the He-Ne laser will depend on the cavity length and can range from 8 
miJIiradians for a short laser down to about 0.5 milIiradians for a long, high powered 
model (Hecht 1992). Exit beam diameters are of the order of 1 to 2 mm. 
He-Ne lasers are available as single units or as separate laser heads and power supplies. 
The laser pumping is produced by a discharge in the laser tube, which contains a mixture 
of helium and neon gas (usually in the ratio 5 - 12 to I). An initial ignition voltage of 10 
kV is required and thereafter 1 - 2 kV at a few miJIiamperes. Although it is possible to 
purchase Iow power (about a milIiwatt) lasers which are battery powered, most require a 
standard mains supply (230 V). 
Cooling is provided by passive air cooling although forced air cooling may be used for 
higher radiant power devices. The efficiency is in the range of 0.01 to 0.1 percent. 
Therefore, a 75 mW laser would be expected to produce from 75 to 750 W of heat. 
The main hazard from a He-Ne laser is the laser radiation. However, the high voltage 
presents an electric shock hazard if the casing is open; It is also,possible to receive a shock 
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from the connector to the laser tube in separate units if the connector is removed before 
the charge on the laser tube has decayed. 
He-Ne lasers are generally used for small venues, where the complete laser display system 
is enclosed in a single cabinet. However, they can also be used, for example, in 
pantomimes as a dancing light such as TinkerbeII in Peter Pan. Here colour is important. 
Although green light would be ideal from the perspective of maximum brightness for a 
given power, this colour represents bad or evil. Therefore, a compromise of orange has 
been used. 
A.2.2 Argon-ion laser 
The argon-ion (Ar-ion) laser comes from a family of noble gas ion lasers. It has been the 
mainstay of the medium-to-Iarge laser display systems since the beginning. The principal 
wavelength depends on the construction of the laser. Low radiant power air-cooled Ar-ion 
lasers tend to have a predominant emission at 488.0 nm (blue) with an additional emission 
at 5 14.5 nm (green). However, the larger water-cooled lasers tend to predominate at 5 I 4.5 
nm. Most Ar-ion lasers used in display applications make use of both the 488.0 nm and 
the 514.5 nm emissions. The quoted radiant power of commercial Ar-ion lasers generally 
includes the total radiant power at both wavelengths. There are also a number of minor 
wavelengths from the Ar-ion laser. The two of interest for display purposes are 476.5 nm 
and 457.9 nm, both in the blue part of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
Ar-ion lasers can range in radiant power from a few milliwatts to about 50 W. Air cooled 
lasers up to about 100 mW are used in indoor venues. Water-cooled lasers up to 20 W 
have been used for outdoor events although the typical unit is 3 -·5 W. The beam 
divergence is typically in the range 0.4 to 1.2 milliradians with an exit beam diameter in 
the range 0.6 to 2 mm (Hecht 1992). 
The Ar-ion laser is excited by a high-current discharge that passes along the length of the 
laser tube. An initial spike of a few thousand volts breaks down the gas, then the voltage 
drops to between 90 and 400 V, while the current increases to between 10 and 70 A. High 
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current densities in the centre of the laser tube provide the energy that both ionises the 
argon atoms and provides the pumping to the upper excited states. 
Cooling is provided by forced air or by water. The power supplies of multi~watt lasers 
may also require cooling. The efficiency of Ar-ion lasers is between 0.001 and 0.2 percent 
and will be lower for lasers emitting a single wavelength as opposed to both primary 
wavelengths. Quoted electrical inputs are 8 to 26 kW for a typical 3 to 5 W multiline 
output (Hecht 1992). 
Air-cooled lasers up to about 100 mW can be powered from a standard 230 V supply. 
Higher radiant powers will require a three-phase supply at 415 V. 
A typical Ar-ion laser will consist of several components, most of which are heavy. A 
small air-cooled laser may consist of a power supply, a control module and the laser head, 
where the latter contains integral cooling fans. Higher radiant power lasers will consist of 
a power supply (which may require input from a three-phase generator, especially if used 
out-of-doors), a control module (possibly with a remote radiant power/current control), 
laser head, cooling water pump and cooling water supply, which may be direct from a 
mains supply or may be from a storage tank. The water may also be passed through a 
cooling plant. 
A 20 W laser head alone may weigh 100 kg and be 2 m long with a cross section of 0.2 m 
by 0.2 m. An important consideration for peripatetic laser display work is the ability to 
safely move, install and dismantle the laser system. The mixture of high voltages (at high 
currents) and water is potentially hazardous. 
As described in section A.2.1, the cones on the retina, which give the perception of 
colour, are believed to have peak responses in the red, green and blue parts of the 
electromagnetic spectrum. Therefore, combining a He-Ne laser operating at 632.8 nm 
with the green and blue emissions from an argon laser should provide a white light 
source. From the data plotted in figure 3.2, the ratio of the radiant powers would have to 
be 1:0.34:0.93 for 632.8, 514.5 and 488.0 nm, respectively. Since the maximum radiant 
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power from a He-Ne laser is about 70 mW, this means that the maximum power in the 
514.5 nm line is restricted to 24 mW and 65 mW for the 488.0 nm line. This can be 
achieved easily using an air-cooled argon laser, but the absolute brightness will only be 
sufficient for small venues. 
A.2.3 Krypton-ion Laser 
The operation of the krypton-ion (Kr-ion) laser is similar to the argon-ion described in 
section A.2.2. However, this laser has a strong emission at 647.1 nm (red). There are also 
emissions at a number of other wavelengths, principally 406.7 nm (violet), 413.1 nm 
(violet), 468.0 nm (blue), 530.9 nm (green), 568.2 nm (yellow) and 676.4 nm (red). 
The Kr-ion laser is less efficient than the Ar-ion laser, requiring about ten times more 
electrical power for the same radiant power. Most Kr-ion lasers are therefore water-
cooled. Typical lasers used in the entertainment industry have a maximum radiant power 
of less than 1 W. 
A.2.4 Mixed Gas Lasers 
Mixed gas or white light lasers have a combination of krypton and argon in order to 
produce a range of wavelengths. It is possible to generate any colour from a combination 
of red, green and blue light. Therefore, the emissions from a laser generating these three 
colours can, in theory, be combined to produce any colour, including white light. 
Originally, the 488.0 nm and the 514.5 nm emissions from the Ar-ion laser were 
combined with 647.1 nm emission from Kr-ion. However, the addition of these 
wavelengths could not generate a brilliant white light. The next stage was to include the 
568.2 nm emission to add some yellow. Modem white light lasers aimed at the 
entertainment industry are quoted as emitting radiation at eight wavelengths. These. are 
stated in table A.2, along with the ion source and the relative radiant power for a modem 
commercial laser (Cambridge Lasers 1994). 
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Table A.2 Emission Wavelengths from a Commercial Wbite Light Laser 
. 
Wavelength Ion Source Relative Radiant Power Relative Photopic 
(nm) (514.5nm= 1) Response (to 555 nm, 
514.5 nm =1) 
676.4 Kr 0.2 0.006 
647.1 Kr 1.0 . 0.175 
568.2 Kr . 0.3 0.375 
530.9 Kr 0.3 0.430 
514.5 Ar 1.0 1.000 
488.0 Ar 0.8 0.290 
. 
476.5 Ar 0.3 0.068 
457.9 
. 
Ar 0.1 0.001 
As discussed in section 3.1.1, the response of the eye is wavelength dependent. Ideally the 
relative proportion of the total emission of the laser at each wavelength should be in 
inverse proportion to the response of the eye to give white light. This is usually achieved 
by attenuating the output at particular wavelengths. However, if this is done at 
manufacture, the radiant power at some wavelengths (particularly the green) may be less 
than desirable for some of the effects which do not require multiple colours. As can be 
seen from the last colunm in table A.2, the eye's response to the standard output from a 
Krl Ar laser at 457.9 nm is a factor of 1000 less than that at 514.5 nm. The useful 
emissions in terms of a laser light show tend to be restricted to the six lines from 647. I 
nm to 476.5 nm. 
The means of combining and attenuating radiation at individual wavelengths external to 
the laser is described in the section on optical components. 
A.2.5 Helium-cadmium Laser 
The heIium-cadmium (He-Cd) laser has been used in the past for entertainment 
applications but is not widely used today. The main visible emission is at 441.6 nm (blue) 
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at up to about 150 miIliwatts. The other major emission is at 325 nm in the ultraviolet, but 
there are also emissions in the red (636.0 nm) and green (537.8 nm). The use of the three 
colours potentially could be used to develop a white light laser but it is not believed that 
this has been used in the entertainment industry. 
The He-Cd laser contains metallic cadmium, which has to be heated to about 250°C, and 
helium gas. The excitation energy is provided by a direct-current discharge, typically of 
about 1.5 kV. The laser pumping is provided by excited helium atoms which excite and 
ionise cadmium atoms. 
A typical He-Cd laser is between 0.002 and 0.02 percent efficient. Therefore, between 500 
and 5000 W of electrical power is required to produce 100 mW laser radiant power. Most 
models operate on a standard 230 V supply. Convection air cooling is adequate for low 
radiant powers: the larger units require forced-air cooling. 
Beam diameters are between 0.2 and 1.2 mm with a divergence of between 0.5 and 3 
mradians (Hecht 1992). 
Special hazard considerations include the high voltages which are direct current. If access 
is gained to the interior of the laser casing then the heater may present a potential bum 
hazard. If the 325 nm ultraviolet emission is accessible during maintenance or alignment 
work then special attention to prevent exposures above the maximum permissible 
exposure at this wavelength is required. 
A.2.6 Copper Vapour Laser 
The copper vapour laser has recently been used for display purposes in a tour by Pink 
Floyd (Oxford Lasers 1994). This laser produces emissions at 510 nm (green) and 578 nm 
(yellow). The main difference between the copper vapour laser and the other lasers 
discussed so far is that the emission is pulsed rather than continuous. This is inherent in 
the physics of the laser. Copper metal is heated to about 1500°C to provide adequate 
metal vapour pressure. Neon is generally added to the cavity to improve the quality of an 
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electrical discharge which directly excites the copper atoms. The atoms can be excited to 
one of two upper lasing levels. The lifetime is very short (several nanoseconds) so high 
vapour densities (5 x 1019 m·3) are required to ensure sufficient atoms remain in an 
excited state to produce stimulated emission. The lower laser levels are metastable with a 
relatively long relaxation time (tens to hundreds of microseconds). This means that these 
, 
lower levels fill up and laser action stops. The laser process can only start again when 
these lower levels have emptied. Therefore. the requirement is to produce a lot of excited 
atoms in a very short period of time and then try to empty the lower levels sufficiently that 
the upper levels can be populated again. Typical commercial copper vapour lasers operate 
at between 4 and 12 kHz. 
The copper vapour laser is inherently very efficient compared with most other lasers. The 
pulse of optical radiation may be of the order of IOns duration. From a velocity of light of 
approximately 3 x 108 m S·I (actually slightly less than this in a vapour). a photon travels 
about 3 m during this time. If the cavity is about 1 m long. the maximum number of 
passes through the cavity will be 3. 
The maximum average power is about 25 W for commercial copper vapour lasers. 
Individual pulses last from 8 to 80 ns. Assuming 10 ns and a pulse repetition rate of 10 
kHz. this gives a peak power of 250 kW for each pulse (25/10000 J/pulse divided by 10 
ns to give the peak power per pulse). 
The beam diameter for copper vapour lasers range from 20 to 80 mm while the 
divergence is from 3 to 5 milliradians. The lasers are between 0.2 and 1 percent efficient 
so a 10 W laser dissipates about 2 kW of heat. This can be removed by forced-air cooling. 
This laser can operate from a single phase 230 V supply but larger. water cooled devices. 
require three-phase mains at 415 V (Hecht 1992). 
The copper vapour laser uses up the copper metal during operation because it condenses 
on parts of the assembly where it cannot be heated up again. Therefore. copper wire is 
added approximately every few hundred hours of operation. 
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The high voltage, high current, discharges which drive copper vapour lasers present a 
potential electrocution hazard. A charge may be maintained on the circuit after the laser 
has been switched off. The high temperatures will present a bum hazard. The switching 
circuit will normally consist of a thyratron. There may be significant radiofrequency 
radiation from this device and, potentially, x-rays. The cabinet should provide adequate 
shielding but caution will be required during maintenance and servicing with the covers 
removed. 
The laser radiation presents a particular concern because of the pulsed nature of the 
emission. 
A.2.7 Gold Vapour Laser 
The gold vapour laser operates in a similar manner to the copper vapour laser. The 
principal visible emission is at 628 nm (red). A gold vapour laser was used alongside a 
copper vapour laser recently at an outdoor show at Huilongtan Park, Shanghai, China 
(Messenger 1995). 
A.2.8 Neodymium: Y AG Laser 
The neodymium:YAG (Nd:YAG) laser comes from a family of solid state lasers where 
the active medium is a solid. The solid is mainly a crystal of yttrium aluminium garnet 
(YAG) which is doped with impurity ions of neodymium. The principal emission is at 
1064 nm, which is in the near infrared. However, the output beam can be frequency 
doubled to produce 532 nm radiation (green) using a potassium titanyl phosphate (KTP) 
crystal. These lasers have found widespread use in medical applications and most of the 
entertainment lasers tend to be modified medical lasers. It is believed that the first use of 
an Nd:YAG for entertainment took place at Stanford University in November 1993 
(Anderson 1994). 
The laser rod can be excited by either using a flashlamp, an arc lamp or by using another 
. laser. The last . technique is more efficient and increasing use is being made of 
217 
semiconductor lasers. These can be used in an array and most of the laser radiation can be 
focused into the Nd:YAG crystal. The optimum pumping wavelength is about 800 nm 
which is a region of efficient GaAlAs semiconductor lasers. When a flashlamp or an arc 
lamp is used a small fraction of the emitted radiation is in the pumping wavelength 
region. 
Nd:YAG lasers used in the entertainment industry are operated either continuously or Q-
switched. Q-switching produces very short pulses of laser radiation from a few 
nanoseconds to hundreds of nanoseconds. The average power is no greater, but the energy 
is delivered in a short pulse. 
An example Nd:YAG which is commercially available for use in the entertainment 
industry has the following specification: output power 40 W (assumed to be the average 
power); pulse repetition rate 25 kHz and beam divergence 8.0 milliradians (Laser Rays 
1994). The laser is pumped using a krypton arc lamp, operates from a single phase 230 V 
mains supply, generates 4.4 kW of heat and is water cooled. The system comprises a head 
(0.81 m x 0.41 m x 0.20 m), weighing 36 kg, and a power supply (1 m x 0.66 m x 0.46 
m), weighing 118 kg. The laser is controlled via a laptop computer. 
The continuing development of semiconductor lasers will ensure that higher powered 
Nd:YAG lasers will become available in smaller packages with lower electrical power 
requirements. This wiJI make them increasingly attractive to the entertainment industry 
because they are generally much more robust than ion lasers producing the same level of 
brightness. 
Nd: Y AG lasers containing flashlamps or arc lamps will contain high voltage power 
supplies and, in the case of the flashlamp, potentially charged circuits when the laser is 
switched off. These optical sources will also present a risk to the eye and skin of persons 
working on the laser with the covers removed. The lamps may also be hot and subject to 
shattering, especially when hot, if mechanically mistreated. 
The primary laser radiation from the Nd:YAG laser is invisible (1064 nm). Radiation at 
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this wavelength is still focused by the eye onto the retina and unintentional viewing could 
therefore result in retinal bums. This radiation should only be accessible during servicing 
work with the cover removed. However, checks should be made to ensure that the 
infrared radiation is blocked adequately during normal use of the laser. 
The Q-switched laser radiation presents a particular concern because of the pulsed nature 
of the emission. It would be possible to receive several pulses in the eye from a scanned 
beam. 
A.2.9 Semiconductor Lasers 
The semiconductor or diode laser is likely to have a great deal of impact on the laser 
entertainment industry in the future. Early semiconductor lasers emitted radiation in the 
infrared region of the electromagnetic spectrum. However, devices are now commercially 
available which emit at 635 nrn (equivalent to the red helium-neon laser) and at lower 
wavelengths. As technology advances it should be possible to have red, green and blue 
semiconductor lasers so that multi-colour displays using these lasers will be possible. 
Each individual semiconductor laser may emit up to several milliwatts but it is possible to 
have arrays of these lasers to build up to radiant powers of a few watts. The power source 
for each laser is usually a few volts. This combined with the small physical dimensions of 
each laser make the laser system small compared with the alternatives. The use of such 
lasers for pumping other lasers, for example the Nd:YAG, make the lasing process 
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extremely efficient. 
The beam from an individual semiconductor laser is highly divergent. Therefore, 
collimating optics is required. This may form an integral part of the individual laser 
package or may be mounted externally. Semiconductor lasers are also available in so-
called pigtailed configuration with an optical fibre attached. 
Semiconductors generally present a much reduced risk of electric shock but the power 
supplies required for large banks of diodes may still present a risk. The assumption that a 
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laser is only powerful if it is big does not apply here. For this reason special attention is 
required to the laser radiation hazard. 
A.2.IO Other Lasers 
There are a number of other types of laser which could potentially be used for 
entertainment purposes. One family is the dye laser which makes use of an organic dye in 
a solvent. These require optical pumping from either a flashlamp/arc lamp or from 
another laser. The main problem with the dye laser is the potential health effects from the 
dyes and disposal problems. 
A variation of the Nd:YAG laser is the Nd:YV04laser which is commercially available 
with a 0.5 mm thick chip of Nd:YV04 in close contact with a 2 mm thick KTP crystal. 
Pumping is provided by a 500 mW semiconductor laser at 809 nm (Randolph 1995). The 
current maximum radiant power is about lOO mW continuous and the unit is about 38 
mm x 38 mm x 100 mm. One suggested application for this laser, albeit at a lower radiant 
power, is direct projection of images onto the retina. 
A.2.11 Summary of Lasers Used in Entertainment 
There are a number of lasers used in the laser light show. industry. They each have 
advantages and disadvantages. As technology progresses there is likely to be a trend 
towards solid state and semiconductor lasers. 
A.3 Optical Connection 
The laser may be contained within an optical processing system (OPS), it may by coupled 
directly to the OPS, or the link may be via a fibre optic cable. 
Mounting the laser inside the OPS is an ideal option for systems using lasers which are 
physically small and which require no cooling. Most of the alignment can be carried out 
before installation. However, for a fixed installation it is still possible to install a large ion 
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laser head within the OPS, especially if the OPS is already of similar dimensions to the 
laser head. 
The most common method of connection for larger lasers is to mount the laser head 
directly beside the OPS. This requires alignment between the two assemblies. 
As fibre optic cables reduce in price and the transmission efficiency improves, remote 
connection of the laser head and the OPS becomes more attractive. In its simplest form 
the laser head could be floor or vehicle mounted thus reducing the manual handling 
problems and the strength of the off-ground support. The fibre optic cable may then be a 
few metres long at most. However, it is also reasonable to run the fibre over tens of 
metres, possibly splitting the beam into several fibres. The OPS could then be mounted 
some way from the laser. The additional factors to be considered from a safety perspective 
include the quality of the protection of the fibre, probability of damage and accessibility to 
non-authorised persons. Some of these fibres may be carrying several watts of laser 
power. 
A.4 Primary Optics 
The optical systems used for laser light shows are usually separated into primary optics, 
which covers the optical components connected to the laser head (whether directly or by a 
fibre optic cable), and secondary optics, which are around the venue and physically 
remote from the laser radiation source. 
The primary optics wiII vary in complexity depending on the budget available and the 
type of effects to be produced. Laser effects generally fall into two categories: beam 
effects, where the beam is made visible, and images, where the beam is projected onto a 
screen (which may be an actual screen or, for example, a tree or a building). The simplest 
effect is a straight beam coming directly out of the laser head. Some of the earlier 
displays, such as that forming part of the Christmas lights down Oxford Street in London, 
were straight beams. However, to see a laser beam part of it must be scattered into the eye. 
If there is no scattering medium in the. air the beam will not be visible. The laser 
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companies usually use some fonn of smoke generator (although vapour generator is 
perhaps a more precise tenn), but fine rain or light mist is equally effective out-of-doors. 
The laser beam can be directed through dispersive optics or it can be scanned. The optical 
components will be described in the following sections. An image can be generated on a 
screen by scanning a laser beam. In this situation the ideal is for the beam travelling to the 
screen to be invisible, which conflicts with the beam effect requirement. If the beam is 
scanned such that the same point on the image is revisited once approximately every 0.1 s 
the brain perceives a picture, although there is significant flicker. Once the scan rate 
reaches about 30 Hz, the image is perceived as solid by most observers and it is not 
possible to see that it is made up of a scanned spot. The persistence of vision with regard 
to moving objects was studied by Roget and he presented a paper on this to the Royal 
Society (Roget 1824). Wertheimer produced a monograph on the perception of motion in 
1912. This has been reviewed by Sekuler (Sekuler 1996). This early work fonned the 
basis for the movie film industry. However, it has implications for generating animations 
using lasers. The work by Roget demonstrated that a solid image could be generated by a 
scanned object; Wertheimer showed that the brain required a 'blank' between images to 
produce movement. For movie film this is achieved by presenting a series of still 
photographs to the viewer. The zoetrope also achieves the illusion of motion by 
presenting a series of still images to the observer. In this case sequential images are 
viewed through slits. However, for a proportion of the time, the eye sees no image at all. 
The generation of laser animations relies on the image being presented as a series of 
frames. Therefore it is usual, but not essential, to blank the laser beam between frames. 
Control data used to achieve this is presented later, with an indication of the relative on to 
off times. Another significant factor observed by Wertheimer was the ability of the eye to 
generate motion. An example of one of the experiments perfonned by Wertheimer was to 
present a vertical bar to an observer and then present a horizontal bar, ie the vertical bar 
rotated about its bottom edge by 900 • The observer perceives the bar falling over, or adds 
infonnation that does not exist. 
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A.4.1 Scanning Systems 
The simplest fonn of scanning system is to use a hand-held mirror. The beam can be 
made to dance around and relies on the dexterity of the operator. The control of the beam 
is limited and there is a high risk of the laser beam going in an unplanned direction. There 
have been anecdotal reports of this means of scanning being used in, for example, viIlage-
hall discotheques with ion lasers up to a few hundred milIiwatts. 
The laser operator can make use of the movement of a loudspeaker to modulate the laser 
beam in time with the music. This can be achieved by stretching a rubber membrane over 
the front of the loudspeaker and mounting the mirror on the membrane. The mirror could 
also be mounted directly on the central part of the loudspeaker or a cantilever system 
could be used to amplify the movement (McComb 1988). 
Mirrors mounted on mirror shafts can be used to produce Lissajous-type patterns on a 
screen. An article in a hobby electronics magazine (Goodman 1988) describes a two-
motor system which is available in kit or assembled fonn, complete with a controller. The 
rotation rate of each motor can be controlled manually, automatically, or by an external 
source (such as from an audio system). 
Most laser display companies use galvanometer scanning. There are currently two models 
which comprise most of the market: the General Scanning (GS) 0120D and the 
Cambridge Technology (CT) 6800H. The principal difference between the two scanners 
is that the G 120D has a torsion spring which returns the scanner to the central position if 
the drive signal is lost whereas the 6800H does not. Both scanners operate by rotating to 
an angle when a voltage is applied to the coil. The technology has been developed for 
military applications and has been applied through industry to the light show industry. 
Therefore the precision of the scanners is probably much better than required to produce 
laser light show effects. A comparison of some of the features of the two types are scanner 
are presented in table A.3. 
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TableA.3 Comparison of General Scanning and Cambridge Technology 
Galvanometer Parameters 
Parameter GSG120D CT6800H 
Body size 33.0 mm x 33.0 mm x 22.9 34.5 mm x 25.4 mm 
mm diameter 
Mirror size 10 mm diameter maximum Typically 24 mm x 12 mm 
maximum 
Mechanical scan angle 20· 40· 
(peak-to-peak) . 
. . 
Rated maximum scan 300Hz Not specified but 600 Hz 
rate used during setup 
Rotor inertia 0.028 g_cm2 0.015 g-cm2 
Galvanometers used for scanning are usually installed in pairs. The laser radiation is 
incident on a mirror mounted at the end of the rotating shaft. Rotation of the mirror about 
its centre line provides a scanning motion in one plane. The beam is reflected from the 
first mirror onto a second mirror on a second galvanometer mounted at 90· to the first, 
thus providing a scanning motion in another plane. Complex patterns can be built up by 
programmed movements of the relevant galvanometers. 
The position of the galvanometer is determined by sending a current signal to the coil. 
Position sensors relay a signal back to the drive card. The movement of the galvanometer 
is determined by the error in the sensor. The GS units use a capacitive system whereas the 
CT units use an optical system. The GS units require a drive signal to maintain an angle 
away from the central position (to drive against the torsion spring). The CT units require 
no drive signal once the required angle has been reached. 
The drive circuit boards provided by the manufacturers are matched to their 
galvanometers. In the case of the CT units, each board is matched to an individual 
galvanometer before supply. The GS boards generally drive· two galvanometers. Both 
manufacturers provide position and velocity (differential of position signal) which can be 
used to ensure that the galvanometer is operating correctly. 
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Some laser companies opt to manufacture their own drive boards and there are a number 
of manufacturers in the United States who specialise in drive boards for the entertainment 
industry. Drive boards are available which are switchable between the two manufacturer's 
galvanometers and which claim to match the OS units to the performance of the CT units 
(Makhov 1995). Some of the 'home-made' boards will tend to drive the galvanometers 
harder than intended by the manufacturer. With the OS scanner this can result in failure of 
the torsion spring. The galvanometer should still work but the performance will be 
degraded. Both types of galvanometer may be subject to accelerated bearing wear and 
potential failure. 
The input signal to the drive card is likely to be ±5 or ±1O V to achieve the fuIJ swing of 
the mirror. This voltage level may be supplied from an analogue source such that the 
galvanometer moves smoothly in sympathy with the source signal (assuming the 
galvanometer can physically keep up with the drive signal). An analogue square wave can 
be used to test the performance of a galvanometer system. Alternatively the drive signal 
may be derived from a digital number, converted into a voltage level from an digital to 
analogue converter (DAC). The number of bits available will determine the resolution of 
angular movement of the galvanometer. 
There are no uniformly accepted standards for providing signals to the drive boards. 
However, the International Laser Display Association (ILDA) are working towards a 
series of standards which have been accepted by several companies, especially in the 
United States. These standards specify the rate at which signals should be sent to the 
galvanometers - either 12,000, 24,000 or 30,000 points per second (ILDA 1995). If the 
show consists of graphics or writing on a screen then the number of points available to 
generate an image can be determined from the image refresh rate. At 30 Hz, 400, 800 or 
1000 points would be available. Not all of these points would necessarily be available for 
producing an image. Some may be anchor points (used to ensure that a sharp edge appears 
on an image) or blanked (to ensure that an animated image runs at the same rate 
independent of how much of the image is actually seen on the screen and to move 
between images). 
225 
The data used to generate an image is usually stored in binary format. One such format 
used in the UK is as follows (Brown 1996). Each image or animation file consists of 
twelve bytes of filename, 80 bytes of description, 44 bytes of control values which 
indicate the animation sequence, 74 unused bytes, followed by the frame data. Each frame 
consists of a 32 bit word. Y is in bits 0 to 11; x is in bits 16 to 27; bit 12 is blanking and 
the colour is bits 13 to 15 (bit 13 is on for reflect red; bit 14 for reflect green and bit 15 for 
reflect blue). The first point in the frame is repeated eleven times (five blanked, followed 
by six unblanked). The last point is repeated twelve times, eight unblanked followed by 
four blanked. 
An example file for a flat scan is plotted in figure A.I. The y values are constant with 
time, only the x values change. 
Flat Scan 
x .s a function of time 
3500,-------------------------------------------------, 
3000 
3" 2500 
C 
~ 2000 
.. ~ 1500 
Iii 
'j(' 1000 
500 
O+--r~--+_~_+--~~_+--r_~_+--~~_+~~~_+~ 
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 
lime (arbitrary unI1.) 
Figure A.I Values of x as a function of time for a flat scan (y is constant) 
The image generated on a screen is shown in figure A.2. 
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Flat Scan 
xvsy 
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Figure A.2 Flat scan plot of x vs y over a complete cycle (scan to the right and back) 
Figure A.3 shows the left hand section of figure A.2 amplified to demonstrate how the 
spacing of the points used to plot the scan changes with x. 
Flat Scan 
Left end only 
2000,----------------------------------------------. 
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1600 
i 1400 
!i 1200 
_ 1000 
~ BOO 
.!.. 600 
,.. 400 
....... I ••• • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • 
200 
O+---~--_+--~----~--~--_+--~----~--~--~ 
500 700 900 1100 1300 1500 1700 1900 2100 2300 2500 
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Figure A.3 left hand end of flat scan (scan from left to right only) 
The transfer of laser shows between systems and companies depends on similar 
performances of the galvanometers. A number of test patterns are available which can be 
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used to demonstrate that the parameters have been optimised. One such test pattern is 
plotted in figure AA 
Sample Test Pattern 
4000~--------------------------------____ ~ 
3500 
~ 3000 
.. § 2500 
~ 2000 
~ 1500 
.!. 
... 1000 
500 
o+------+------~------~----_+----~ 
o 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 
x (arbitrary units) 
Figure A.4 Galvanometer setup test pattern 
It is also possible to use an acousto-optic modulator (AOM) to scan the laser beam. These 
are normally limited by their scan angle and generally utilise lenses to both reduce the 
beam diameter before it enters the AOM and to amplify the movement of the beam after 
the AOM. An advantage of the AOM is that there are no moving parts. The deflection 
angle (for example about 30 at 70 MHz for 632.8 nm laser radiation) is directly 
proportional to a radiofrequency (RF) drive signal. Therefore if the RF signal is removed 
the deflection stops in a time dependent on the acoustic velocity - there is no mechanical 
inertia in the system. Typical acoustic velocities are a few km S·I (NEOS 1984). 
A.4.2 Beam Blanking 
If the laser beam is scanned to produce writing, for example, the image produce will be 
similar to that produced on paper without lifting the pen off the paper. To overcome this 
problem the laser beam needs to be switched on and off very quickly. This can be 
achieved by using a galvanometer which is driven using a square wave signal. Typically 
the beam will be deflected to a beam dump when the galvanometer is at the central 
position. A voltage is applied to direct the beam through to the scanning galvanometers. 
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The movement of the galvanometer need not be great. The response time for a er 6800H 
driven 20 (relating to a change in drive voltage of about a volt) is about 300 ~ (Langram-
Goldsmith 1995). It is also possible to use an AOM as a blanking device. 
Many laser display systems will be provided with test patterns for setting up the blanking. 
One such test pattern is presented in figure A.5. The blanking is adjusted until the 
horizontal tail of the 4 is invisible, with the cut-off between the two vertical bars. 
Test Pattern for Z-Blanklng 
25OO~----_------~ 
'iii' 2000 
'! 
~ 1500 
:I! 1000 
of! 
~ 500 
'" 
o+---~--~--~--~ 
o 1000 2000 3000 4000 
x (arbitrary units) 
Figure A5 Test Pattern for Aligning Z-Blanking 
A4.3 Rotary Actuator 
It may be necessary to switch the laser beam down different paths to introduce different 
effects, such as straight beams onto mirrors, or through different optical components. One 
method of achieving this is to use a mirror which is switched into the beam under operator 
control. A popular actuator in the UK is the General Scanning GM20 although models are 
available from a number of other manufacturers. An arm is connected to the shaft of the 
rotary actuator. With no current applied the actuator is at rest with the arm and mirror 
lying flat. When the drive current is applied to the actuator the arm rotates lifting the 
mirror into the path of the beam. A schematic of an actuator is presented in figure A.6 and 
an example of the application of them is in figure A7. 
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Dichroic 
or plane 
Actuator . InlITor 
t 
Pivoted arm 
Figure A.6 Schematic of an Actuator 
Red, Green, Blue Reflected 
Laser Beam 
(incident) (colours selected) 
Colour selection 
Figure A. 7 Example of the Use of Actuators to Select Colours 
AAA Beam Splitter 
A single laser can be used to produce a number of effects at the same time by splitting the 
beam into two or more beams. The beam splitter may be a partly transparent metal film, 
specially designed prisms or may reflect laser radiation at one polarisation and transmit at 
the orthogonal polarisation. ltis also possible to use multilayer interference coatings to 
selectively reflect particular wavelengths. 
Beam splitters are generally rigidly mounted. The laser radiation either always passes 
through the beam splitter or it is directed to it (for example using a rotary actuator) when 
required. The beam split may be 50-50 or it may be any other ratio required. 
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A.4.5 Diffraction Grating 
Diffraction gratings are passive dispersive optical devices. The incoming beam is split 
into a number of output beams. The grating may be either a transmitting device or a 
reflective device. Transmitting devices are more common in the primary optics. The 
degree of dispersion is a function of the lines per mm. 
If a diffraction grating is used with a laser emitting radiation at a single wavelength, a 
series of secondary diffracted beams will be produced. There will also generally be the 
undiffracted central maximum or zero order which, when assessing the irradiance, will 
represent the worst case exposure situation. If the diffraction grating is used with a laser 
emitting several wavelengths, such as the mixed gas laser, the diffracted beams will be 
split into the different wavelengths. The longer wavelength emissions will be diffracted 
more than the shorter wavelength emissions. The dominant blue and green wavelength 
emissions from a mixed gas laser can be seen clearly separated from the dominant red 
emission. The lower intensity remaining wavelength emissions can be perceived by 
careful observation. Again, the undiffracted central maximum will have the same 
appearance as the primary beam. 
Some installations inhibit the central undiffracted maximum by the use of a beam stop but 
this is not believed to be common practice. 
An optical system may contain a number of different diffraction gratings to give different 
degrees of dispersion. Diffraction gratings which diffract in two dimensions are also 
routinely used. The different grating may be mounted on an effects wheel called a 'gobo' 
in the lighting industry. There is generally a straight-through position with no diffraction 
grating and then a number of positions with gratings. The gobo is usually driven by a 
stepper motor under operator control. The gobo may be mounted on the external side of 
the galvanometers such that any scanned patterns are diffracted. By this means an image 
can be generated and then replicated a number of times, dependent on the diffraction 
grating used. 
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Some installations rotate the diffraction grating .. This is especially effective if the output 
of one diffraction grating is transmitted through a second diffraction grating rotating in the 
opposite direction. This produces a sea of beams which, if used in conjunction with a 
mixed gas laser are rainbow coloured. 
It is also possible to use diffractive elements to produce images, such as logos from a 
single input beam. This has the advantage of no moving parts but requires greater input 
power to produce the same brightness as a similar image scanned image. Currently, each 
diffractive element is custom made but research is progressing on active diffractive 
elements where the output image can be changed under programme control. 
A.4.6 Luminaire Effects 
Laser companies experiment with a number of reflective and transmissive objects to 
produce interesting effects. A piece of shower glass is effective at randomly refracting an 
incident laser beam. If this is rotated a wash of colour can be produced on a screen from a 
mixed gas laser. This is sometimes used in conjunction with a beam splitter such that part 
of the beam passes through the luminaire to give a background on a screen while the 
remainder of the beam is directed to scanning system to produce graphical images on the 
same screen. The beam from a multi-line laser may be passed through a prism before the 
luminaire. 
AA.7 Three-Dimensional Images 
There are several approaches to producing three-dimensional images and all currently 
have limitations. The first is to use two colours which are scanned onto a screen in 
slightly different positions. The audience are provided with spectacles which are fitted 
with different colour filters. Therefore the each eye only sees one of the two images. The 
limitation with this is that it is restricted to a few colours. There is also the inconvenience 
and cost of providing all spectators with spectacles. 
A second technique is to use polarisation rather than colour to provide two separate 
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images. This technique can provide full colour images but still relies on the audience 
being provided with spectacles - this time with polarising filters. The technique also relies 
on the polarisation being maintained and therefore its effectiveness out-of-doors may 
depend on the weather. 
The third technique is the so-called volumetric display. In this case the laser is scanned 
onto a helical display screen which rotates. Essentially the surface on which the beam is 
incident is moving in space. Therefore the position of the observer relative to the helix 
wiIl be important to ensure that parts of the screen are not observed. This system is 
currently restricted to small-scale displays but is does overcome the problem of the 
observer wearing spectacles (Belfatto 1995). 
A.4.8 Colour Selection 
Most of the larger lasers used in the entertainment industry emit laser radiation at more 
than one wavelength (see section A.l). A diffraction grating can be used to separate out 
the individual colours but this results in significant losses or complicated optics to regain 
the energy from all of the diffracted orders. A significant proportion of the incident beam 
is still contained in the undiffracted order. Dichroic mirrors or filters can be used to 
separate out the individual wavelengths. For an argon-ion laser this will require one 
device. For a mixed gas laser this will require up to seven stages to separate the eight 
wavelengths. The losses in such systems can be considerable. 
A recent introduction to the laser light show industry is the polychromatic acousto-optic 
modulator (PCAOM). Models are available aimed at the laser light show industry (MVM 
1995 and Crystal Technology 1993). These devices are polarisation dependent so the 
input beam needs to be polarised to the manufacturer's specification to gain maximum 
transmission efficiency (claimed to be typically greater than 90%). Input apertures are 
generally 3 mm and devices can accept up to 16 W of laser input power. 
The PCAOM operates in a similar manner to the AOM described earlier. However. each 
wavelength can be selected individually. depending on the frequency of the 
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radiofrequency (RF) radiation used to excite the crystal (for example tellurium dioxide). 
The significant advantage with a PCAOM is that the different wavelengths can be added 
independent of each other. Typical RF frequencies as a function of wavelength and the RF 
drive power are presented in table AA. 
Table AA 
Channel 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
AA.9 Lenses 
Typical Drive RF Radiation Frequencies 
and Drive Power as a Function of 
Wavelength for a PCAOM 
Wavelength Frequency Drive Power 
(nm) (MHz) (mW) 
676 110.25 290 
647 116.14 260 
531 149.30 245 
515 .. 155.87 225 
488 167.79 170 
476 173.68 140 
466 179.35 140 
458 . 184.69 140 
Lenses may be used within the optical system. They may be used to ensure that the beam 
is focused onto the mirror of a blanking galvanometer. This in turn ensures that the 
blanking edge is sharp. After the blanking mirror a second lens is required to re-collimate 
the beam. This simple piece of optics means that the divergence of the laser beam, as 
quoted by the manufacturer, is no longer valid. The divergence will have to be determined 
for the system as used. 
A second use of lenses is to create a more divergent beam, for example to irradiate an 
external optical device, such as a mirror ball which is discussed in section A.5.3. The laser 
beam is likely to be switched to the lens using a rotary actuator. There is also likely to be 
some form of adjustment or a range of interchangeable lenses to take into account the 
different distances to the mirror ball in different venues or peripatetic operations. 
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As has already been discussed, lenses may be used in conjunction with AOMs because of 
the small degree of scan available with these devices. 
AA.! 0 Mirrors 
The direction of the laser beam within the primary optics will be changed using mirrors. 
Ideally the mirrors should have the reflecting surface on the front face otherwise ghost 
reflections will occur from the surface of the glass. Such mirrors are more expensive than 
standard rear reflection mirrors and may be substituted. The path of any stray reflections 
should be monitored carefully. 
The steering mirrors will normally be adjustable by some means. Mounts are available 
which can be adjusted from above the beam path. However, these tend to be more 
expensive and are not commonly used in laser light show systems. 
The mirrors mounted on the galvanometers are subject to considerable rotational forces 
when the galvanometers are driven at high accelerations and decelerations. They need to 
be able to withstand this. 
It should also be recognised that components other than intentional mirrors can produce 
reflections. These could include the structure of the primary optical cabinet, support 
structures and tools, rings and watches, etc. 
AA.!! Beam Losses 
The various optical components in the primary optical system will cause losses, the 
degree of which will often depend on the quality of the optics. A· fundamental 
consideration is that what is not reflected or transmitted, is absorbed. At high input laser 
powers, or more strictly, irradiances the percentage absorption does not need to be very 
high before the component suffers significant thermal stress. Most laser quality optical 
components should easily withstand such insults but lower quality components may be 
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used in some installations . 
. A.4.12 Beam Dump 
There may be times when part of the beam is not required. An example is when only the 
green or the blue emission from an argon-ion laser is required. The other emission needs 
to be dumped somewhere. Laser radiation above 500 mW is capable of starting a fire, 
depending on the diameter of the beam and the exposure duration. Therefore the 
intentional dumping of the beam should be to a part of the system which can cope with 
the full radiant power of the laser. 
A.4.13 Beam Stop 
A special form of beam dump is a beam stop. This is likely to be a relatively slow acting 
(few hundred milliseconds) solenoid with a circular cross section. At rest the tip of the 
solenoid rod projects (normally down) into the path of the laser beam. When the solenoid 
is activated, the rod is pulled up out of the beam. Failure of the control system power 
supply should ensure that the solenoid falls back to the stop position. 
The location of the beam stop depends on the design of the optical system. Normally it 
will be before any splitting of the beam to ensure that only one is required. However, on a 
simple system it may be in the final optical path before the pair of scanning 
galvanometers. 
It is also possible to use an AOM as a beam stop. However, these are more expensive than 
electromechanical systems. 
A.4.14 Masking Plates 
In order to physically restrict the direction of the laser beam from the primary optics it is 
possible to have a shaped aperture. through which the laser beam it emitted. For an 
installed system this can be a permanent plate attached to the aperture with an appropriate 
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shape. For a peripatetic display, it may be possible to have adjustable plates which can be 
tailored to each event. As with the beam dump, the masking must be able to absorb the 
primary laser beam without adverse effect. The edges of the blanking plates should also 
not be reflective. Otherwise, if a beam clips the edge it will be reflected in an uncontrolled 
manner. 
Masking plates are a simple engineering control which can provide a high degree of 
protection from the consequences of failure of many of the components in the primary 
system. 
A.S Secondary Optics 
Secondary optics cover the optical components not included within the primary optical 
processing system. These may be fixed or moving components around a venue and the 
laser beam normally travels through the air to get to them. Optical systems, such as pairs 
of galvanometer scanners, which are fed from fibre optic cables are considered primary 
optical systems although they may be some distance from the laser head. 
Nearly all of the secondary optics are mirrors of some form or other. However, the screens 
used to project images are also included. Examples of each are described in the following 
sections. 
A.S.1 Plane Mirrors 
The simplest form of secondary optical component is the plane mirror. There may be a 
number of these in any venue. Normally they are fixed but some may be under operator 
control and move using servo motors. The control signals may be transmitted by wire, but 
some use radio-controlled model servo systems. 
The amount of laser radiation reflected from a mirror will be essentially the same as that 
incident on it. The divergence is also likely to be conserved. Therefore the laser radiation 
from a mirror should be considered as hazardous as that incident upon it. There is a 
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widely held view among laser display operators that once the beam has been reflected 
from two mirrors it is "safe". This should not be accepted without a careful consideration 
of the actual situation. 
The mounting and attachment of the mirror are important. For a permanent installation the 
mirrors may be fixed in position. However, they are more likely to have some degree of 
adjustment. Mirrors mounted in discotheques and night clubs are likely to be subject to 
significant vibration. Therefore the mounting brackets should be of such a design that the 
fixings do not become loose. The attachment of the mirror itself to the support bracket or 
backing plate also needs to be considered. The most effective system is to have a 
mechanical attachment system rather than just relying on double-sided adhesive tape. 
It is a simple process to mask the mirror position in a fixed installation to ensure that the 
reflected path is restricted. Should the mirror move, the laser beam would strike a beam 
dump. Such an arrangement is also possible with some thought for a peripatetic 
installation but would have to be straightforward to implement. 
A.5.2 Diffraction Mirrors 
Diffraction mirrors of either one or two dimensional dispersement are used as targets 
either directly from the primary optical system or from beams reflected from external 
mirrors. The comments relating to primary mirrors also apply here. Occasionally, 
diffraction mirrors are mounted in rotating assemblies. 
A.S.3 Mirror Balls 
Mirror balls have been popular since the early part of the twentieth century for use in 
ballrooms. Their use has extended to discotheques and night clubs. The mirror ball 
contains a number of plane mirror facets. They are most effective when rotating at a few 
revolutions per minute and when illuminated by optical radiation from a number of 
different directions and the radiation covers the diameter of the mirror ball. Therefore, the 
most effective optical source is a spot light rather than a 11Ifer. 
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In order to make a laser effective on a mirror ball, the beam needs to have diverged to be 
at least a significant fraction of the diameter of the mirror ball. This can be achieved by 
using distance or a diverging lens. A third option isto make the laser beam appear to be a 
larger diameter than it actually is. This is achieved by using the mirror ball as a target for a 
spiral graphical image. 
The reflections from a mirror ball go in all directions. If the mirror ball is rotated, the 
reflections will also rotate. In order to assess the exposure condition for the audience who 
may be subjected to the reflected beams it is important to know the technique used to 
irradiate the mirror ball, the size of the facets and the rotation speed. 
Some laser companies use mirror balls which have either parts of the mirror ball masked 
off or sections with no reflective facets. This can be used to ensure that the reflections 
only go up towards the ceiling, for example. 
The use of mirror balls out-of-doors may need special consideration. Although a 
stationary mirror ball can be clamped in position (although they rarely are), a rotation 
mirror ball will be suspended from the drive motor. The mirror ball will be subject to 
movement by the wind which, in extreme cases could mean that the laser beam misses the 
mirror ball completely. 
A similar device to the mirror ball is the pyramid spinner. This device projects the 
reflected beams in one direction - if mounted with the axis vertical, the beam would be 
reflected down or up, depending on which way up the pyramid was. There are also other 
variations on this concept of a rotation reflective device which may be encountered. 
A.6 Screens 
Screens may be purpose designed projection screens, they may be the sides of a building, 
trees, clouds or any other surface on which the laser radiation is projected to form an 
image. One of the main benefits of using laser radiation for image projection is that, 
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generally, there is no focusing of the beam. Therefore, the image is in focus irrespective of 
the distance. This means that non-flat surfaces can be readily used. 
A.6.1 Projection Screens 
Projection screens may be mounted on walls, permanently suspended from ceilings, on 
motor drives from ceilings, or temporary installations. Standard photographic projection 
screens can be used provided they are able to accommodate the irradiance levels without 
damage. The ideal screen provides diffuse reflections where a fraction of the incident 
radiation is reflected equally into the eyes of the spectators, such that they can all see the 
image. However, the amount of radiation incident on the eye will be a function of the 
distance the observer is from the screen. Many such screens also have a specular 
reflection component. 
Photographic projection screens are designed to be viewed from one side only. However, 
screens of similar construction are also available for use as back-projection screens. In 
some laser display applications in discotheques, for example, the projection screen may be 
in the centre of the dance floor and therefore may be viewed from any angle. These 
screens are normally a mesh such that a proportion (perhaps 50%) of the laser radiation 
passes through the screen. However, some screens are solid and act as a Lambertian 
emitter from both the front and back surfaces. The optical density of such screens is 
generally about 2, but caution should be exercised in evaluating any directly transmitted 
component of the incident beam. 
The eye hazard from the diffuse reflection from screens should be considered. This will 
depend on the irradiance at the screen and the closest that persons will reasonably be from 
the screen. Consideration also should be given to the method used to construct the image: 
a scanned image will mean that the scattered radiation reaching the eye is also a scanned 
image on the retina. The path of the laser radiation having passed through the screen also 
needs to be analysed. 
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A.6.2 Water Screens 
As has already been stated, water fonns a good reflector of laser radiation. A fountain of 
water can be fonned into a water screen. This can be used as a target for laser generated 
images. Again, the degree of transmission of the laser radiation needs to be considered 
during the display. In addition, the consequences of the water supply failing such that the 
screen disappears need to be addressed. 
A.6.3 Cloud Screens 
Depending on the cloud ceiling level, and the density of the water vapour in the clouds, it 
is possible to use clouds as a screen. In common with other out-of-door laser displays the 
potential for laser exposure of aircraft need to be considered. Such displays tend to use 
lasers around 10 W upwards. 
Cloud displays are visible over large distances and the potential for distraction of, for 
example, motorists should be borne in mind. 
A.6.4 Trees and Buildings 
For large out-of-door laser displays it is common to make use of the surrounding 
environment. At a stately home or in a park there are likely to be trees surrounding the 
audience area The buildings may provide a large convenient screen area. The structure of 
the stage may also be used as a screen. 
Since the screen may not be a flat surface or may be irradiated at an oblique angle, it is 
possible to use geometric correction hardware on the laser effect control system to correct 
for this (LSDI 1995). 
In all cases the potential for personal exposure needs to be addressed, both under the 
planned display condition and the reasonably foreseeable incidents. 
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A.7 Control Systems 
There are essentially three types of control systems and any particular performance may 
make use of one or all of them: manual control; dedicated programmable control; or 
computer control. The last two may be operated manually or automatically. Examples of 
the type of control systems are described in this section. Particular safety issues are 
identified. 
A. 7.1 Manual Control 
The simplest form of laser display control is manual. This can mean manual control of the 
laser itself, the primary optics and, possibly, the secondary optics. At its most basic level 
this will be a laser and a hand-held mirror. However, it may be a primary optical system 
containing a scanning system where the drive signals to the scanning system are 
controlled, for example, from a signal generator. A line scan can be generated by 
providing a sine wave drive signal to a single galvanometer. Providing the same drive 
signal will produce lissajous fignre graphics. 
Such manual control is unlikely to be seen at anything other than low-budget 
discotheques, for example. This manual technique is likely to present the greatest risk of 
inadvertent exposure of people. However, this should be balanced against the likely use of 
lower radiant power lasers. 
A. 7.2 Programmable Controllers 
Laser display programmable controllers may be truly programmable by the laser operator 
of may be pre-programmed by the supplier. However, most have some form of operator 
control. These controllers may be operated by pressing buttons to trigger effects or they 
may be controlled by, for example, pre-programmed tapes. Pre-programmed laser displays 
are attractive at night clubs where the disc jockey has control over the music and lights. At 
specific times they run a show from tape which has been programmed, and the effects 
aligned, by the laser company. 
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Graphical images can also include text. An effect from each of the three categories can be 
assigned to each of the alphabetical keys. The alignment for each effect assigned to each 
key can be independent and is controlled using the tracker ball. The effects can be made to 
rotate, flip, etc. They can also be made to change size. Effects can be linked together in a 
sequence which produces simple animations. The beam shutter is controlled from the 
'blackout' key. This controller is typical in that it requires password access before the 
controls become effective. In this case it requires a different password before any of the 
programmable parameters can be changed. 
Automatic systems providing pre-programmed shows generally present less of a risk than 
those operated by a person. However, a pre-programmed show may be presented by a 
person with limited training in laser safety. 
A.7.3 Computer-Based Controllers 
It is possible to complement the programmable controllers with additional control signals 
provided from a personal computer. However, there are a number of computer-based laser 
display controllers. In its simplest form, the computer-based system consists of digital to 
analogue converters (DACs) plugged into a personal computer. The position of one or 
two scanners (usually galvanometers) are decided by software. The respective angle of 
each scanner is then determined by the analogue voltage generated at the output of each 
DAC. 
Computer based systems became widely available as computer processing power became 
. available at a reasonable price. Probably one of the first such computerised systems was 
based on the Commodore Amiga which was designed to control external devices. 
Lasershow Designer for Windows (pangolin 1995) has been developed from the Amiga 
system and uses a Motorola 68030 microprocessor running at 40 MHz on a plug-in board 
as the main graphics generator. Up to four boards can be used to control up to four 
scanner pairs at the same time. The computer also controls up to six colour channels. 
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The advantage of the sophisticated computer based systems such as Lasershow Designer 
is that the laser show can be developed using the graphical interface in Microsoft 
Windows. The operator sees the graphical images on the computer screen as they will 
appear on a projection screen. It is also possible to carry out the development work live, 
such that the images are developed and projected at the same time. 
Lasershow Designer is also able to interface with the musical content of a laser show. The 
pre-recorded music can be on CD-ROM which can be read by the compact disc reader in 
the computer. The timing information from the music can be related to particular laser 
effects using timing codes. The whole show can then be pre-recorded. The growth of 
standardisation amongst the laser display companies in the United States has meant that 
Alesis Digital Audio Tape (ADAT) and Aquila SMPTE standards can be exchanged with 
some assurance that the laser show will perform exactly as planned by the programmer. 
A.S Communication Between Controller and Optics 
Most systems use hard wired communication between the laser display controller and the 
optical systems. This is likely to remain the best technology for permanent installations. 
However, for events out-of-doors where, for example, several lasers are used, the cable 
runs may present a hazard to the audience or may be subject to damage. Some laser 
companies have experimented with the use of radio links between their control consoles 
and the optical systems. High gain directional antenna systems can be used between two 
points which should be relatively interference free. However, consideration has to be 
given to what will happen if the radio link does fail, or if the signals are not understood at 
either end. 
If several lasers are used, each should have an operator who is in a position to take control 
of the laser if necessary. The communication link between the operators may be by a hard-
wire system but it is more likely to be by personal mobile radio (PMR). As is cited in 
chapter 3, it is possible for such communication systems to interfere with the operation of 
galvanometers. 
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A,9 Summary 
Laser display systems can be simple devices with a laser and hand-held optical 
components. They can also be complex computer controlled systems with multiple 
beams, sometimes from one laser, sometimes from several lasers. However, each system 
is a product of individual components. Each has its own function and potential hazards. 
The operation of each of the components of the optical system has been described. 
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Appendix B 
Description of Laser Entertainment Events 
B.l Outdoor Classical Laser and Fireworks Concert A 
B.l.l Introduction 
The grounds of a stately home were used to stage an outdoor charity classical concert 
accompanied by a fireworks and laser display. The laser company, Company A, had 
submitted the appendix to the HSE Guidance, PM19 (HSE 1980), for approval to the 
licensing authority, the local District Council Environmental Health Department. The 
author attended the event at the invitation of the Environmental Health Department 
because they felt they had insufficient expertise to assess the laser safety. 
The audience consisted of about 2000 people who sat either on the grass or brought tables 
and chairs with them. Many members of the audience were treating the event as purely 
social and, unlike a performance in a theatre, it could not be assumed that they would 
necessarily have been looking at the stage. A significant proportion of the audience were 
consuming alcohol during the performance. 
The fireworks display was positioned well behind the stage and appeared to be carried out 
in a very professional manner. The fire brigade were present and did show a passing 
interest in the safety aspects of the laser display. 
B.I.2 DetailS of Laser System 
Three class 4 lasers were used. The layout of the lasers is shown in figure B.l. Although 
the original paperwork stated that there would be two Spectra Physics 168 argon ion 
lasers and one Coherent Purelight argonlkrypton laser, there were three argon ion lasers 
on the day. 
246 
Plan view 
Stately Home 
Tardis 
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Figure B.I Layout of Event A 
The system used by Company A was claimed by them to be unique. The laser system. 
optics and control consoles were contained in a prefabricated 'tardis·. This reduced the 
time required to set up the display. A schematic of the tardis is shown in figure B.2. 
The laser show was controlled by the operator at the rear of the audience under directions 
from a member of the production company. However. there was no direct control of the . 
two lasers beside the stage from this position. This was achieved under radio control to a 
second operator located in the stage right laser position. This second operator was able to 
control the two stage lasers from this position. The author was assured that a third person 
was actually close to the stage left tardis to terminate the laser should the need arise. 
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Figure B.2 'Tardis' layout 
Three-phase mains power was supplied from a generator located away from the lasers. 
This was supplied by the production company. 
B.1.3 Problems Experienced 
A plan of the site with the. positions of the lasers marked on it was supplied prior to the 
event. The layout on the day was rotated approximately 45° counter-clockwise. This 
reduced the potential for the laser radiation to be directed towards the stately home but 
was fortuitous rather than planned. 
The laser behind the audience was originally specified as being an ArgonlKrypton of 2 W 
nominal output power with a beam divergence of 5.3 rnrad. The laser used on the day was 
a 4 W argon ion with a beam divergence of 3.2 rnrad. If the calculations of maximum 
permissible exposure had been critical from the original laser then, without a site visit, 
clearance could have been given for a situation that was potentially hazardous. 
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Company A were aware of the potential for eye injury should the laser radiation be 
directed into the audience. Measurements taken by the author confirmed that the 
maximum permissible exposure levels were unlikely to be exceeded on the stage. 
Masking panels (aluminium plates, painted matt black) were positioned to restrict the 
beam so that it could only be directed horizontally or at angles above horizontal. There 
was also an additional section of the blanking plate on the laser to the rear of the audience 
which blanked out the stage. 
The tardis units were mounted on castors typical of the type used on transport cases by 
sound and stage engineers. The integral locking mechanism was the only means of fixing 
the tardis in place. The tardis was also mounted on a platform which was constructed on 
each site. The whole system was not stable and relied on the operator not carrying out any 
sudden movements. 
The blanking plates were fixed in position with adhesive tape. This meant that they were 
vulnerable and could easily be accidentally moved .. 
Handheld radios of unknown frequency, but probably in the VHF region, were used to 
communicate between the operators. It was noted that the transmitters were capable of 
inducing sufficient current in the laser beam-positioning galvanometers to deflect the laser 
beam. This should not present a safety issue if the blanking system is effective, but does 
raise the issue of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC). 
The lasers used were cooled by water held in bowsers. The water supply to fill the 
bowsers came from standpipes around the site. Each bowser took approximately 1.5 hours 
to fill with water. About 50 minutes prior to the performance commencing the operator 
noted that the bowser for the laser behind the audience was empty. The cooling water 
pump had been left running after an earlier test of the laser, the return pipe had fallen out 
of the bowser and drained the water. The human element then became significant. The 
operator and support team were now under extreme pressure to refill the bowser in what 
they knew to be less time than actually required. There was also concern over the state of 
the cooling water pump which had been running dry for an unknown time. 
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Sufficient water was put into the bowser by the start of the performance to allow the laser 
to operate. However, the pump bearings were leaking water adding to the concern of the 
operator. Just as the performance was due to start the operator realised that a cover, which 
had been placed over the front of the beam aperture to protect it from the rain, was still in 
place. This was hurriedly removed, probably disturbing both the position of the blanking 
plates and the tardis on the platform. 
The beams from the rear laser were initially directed into the air, as planned. However, 
when the operator initiated some 'screen writing' onto the trees behind the stage, the 
beam was directed into the audience, approximately 20 m in front of the tardis. The 
operator acted quickly to get the beam up into the air. 
The stage left laser did not operate initially and received attention from one of the 
Company A support crew. When the laser did eventually operate, the beam was low and a 
video recording taken at the time demonstrates that the beam was directed into the 
audience on a number of occasions. This may have been due to the blanking plate being 
moved or due to the tardis moving. It may also be significant that it had been raining all 
day and the ground was soft: the tardis may have been sinking into the ground. 
B.1.4 Conclusion 
Human elements played significant parts in the problems that were experienced with this 
performance. The laser company were aware of the hazards, although they were not able 
to quantify them, and appeared to be sincere about their desire to keep the beams out of 
the audience. Better engineering could have prevented most of the problems they 
experienced. An interesting problem here was the electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) 
issue where the radio interfered with the galvanometer. Proper screening of the optical 
system would have prevented such interference. However, it does raise the issue of other 
parts of the laser display system which could be subject to EMC problems. 
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The EHO was fully capable of assessing the electrical, mechanical and water safety of the 
laser display. However, he had no expertise of assessing laser radiation safety. The 
provision of plausible calculations of laser beam exposure conditions by the laser 
company caused some concern. When these were analysed in some details it was apparent 
that they did not relate to this specific event. 
B.2 Outdoor Classical Laser and Fireworks Concert B 
B.2.l Introduction 
The performance at this stately home was similar to that at Concert A except that the 
event was a commercial venture and a different laser company, Company B, were used. 
The invitation to attend came from the production company. The local Environmental 
Health Officer did not ask for any details of the laser display and no information was 
volunteered by either the production company or Company B. 
Discussions prior to the event revealed that the laser company were not convinced that the 
laser radiation should be kept away from the audience. The show was a limited version of 
what they would normally do because of the author's presence. However, the laser 
operator considered that the audience attended such events in order to be 'irradiated by the 
laser'. No calculations were available to allow a judgement to be made on whether 
scanning the audience with the laser radiation would present an acceptable risk, both as 
intended and in the event of a failure condition. 
The audience consisted of about 8000 people. The layout was similar to Concert A but 
was very cramped. 
B .2.2 Details of the Laser System 
Three lasers were used in a similar layout to the Concert A event. Each was stated as 
being 4 W nominal radiant power. The laser to stage right was an· argonlkrypton which 
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was capable of being directed 3600 around its position. The lasers were mounted on 
scaffolding which was constructed for each of the three laser positions. 
Laser cooling was provided by a different means for each of the three lasers. The laser at 
the rear of the audience was cooled by water from a bowser. There was only one 
standpipe which was located close to the stately home. The site of the performance was on 
a slope rising away from the stage. This presented some problems with water pressure. 
The laser to stage right was cooled by water from the same standpipe but with continuous 
feed via a small reservoir. The third laser was cooled by re-circulating water from a 
refrigeration plant. 
All three lasers were controlled from the position of the laser at the rear of the stage. This 
required a control cable to pass through the audience towards the stage. 
B.2.3 Problems Experienced 
The organisation of the laser company was less than ideal. They explained that they 
preferred to set up on the day before. However, since this event was being staged 
throughout the country and had been held the evening before across the other side of the 
country, the stage would not be in place until the morning of the performance. The stage 
is the key component of the show. All ancillary equipment, such as the lasers and sound 
systems are positioned relative to the stage. The generators for powering the lasers would 
also not be in position until the stage arrived. 
The construction of the scaffolding towers and the installation of the laser and associated 
equipment took until early evening. The public had access to the site from about 6 pm 
with the music commencing at 7 pm: the lasers were due to start at 9.30 pm. Company B 
were not in a position to test the lasers until about 8.45 pm. This meant that the audience 
was essentially complete with about 8000 people present. 
The operator claimed that the control optics always defaulted to a high elevation when 
switched on. This was proved to be erroneous because the beam was directed at the rear 
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of the head of a member of the audience approximately 10 m from the laser. Although the 
operator reacted quickly to switch the beam off, the irradiance would have been sufficient 
for the risk of eye injury to have been high. 
The operator carried out the alignment procedures on all three lasers and was under a high 
degree of stress because of the time limitation and the difficulty of moving through the 
audience to the other lasers. The laser control position to the rear of the audience was 
eventually surrounded by the audience. This encouraged a number of interested people to 
come along and ask questions of the operator. 
When the show commenced a significant proportion of the effects involved irradiation of 
the audience. The author found the radiation from the stage lasers uncomfortable at about 
100 m. Many members of the audience were being exposed at much shorter distances. 
The performance was recorded on video tape and the laser radiation often struck the 
camera lens. 
Helium-filled reflective balloons were on sale during the event. Had the laser company 
been concerned with keeping the laser radiation out of the audience then these balloons, 
under some conditions, could have resulted in a potential exposure pathway for the 
audience. However, in general, such balloons would have resulted in an increased beam 
divergence for the reflected beam. 
B.2.4 Conclusions 
The attitude of the laser company towards laser safety gave some cause for concern. 
However, the Environmental Health Officer did not get involved and the production 
company did not seek any safety assurances from the laser company. Therefore, there was 
no external control over what the laser company were doing. 
There was no blanking of the beam because the laser company did not consider this 
necessary. The admission by the laser company that the show had been sanitised slightly 
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because of the author's presence raises questions regarding the potential for eye injuries at 
events where this company is involved. 
The laser company were able to produce sample calculations which purported to support 
the argument that the exposure of the audience to the laser radiation was at levels below 
the maximum permissible exposure. However, the calculations did not relate to the 
specific show given and certainly did not take into account many of the beam effects used. 
B.3 Outdoor Display at a Marina C 
B.3.l Introduction 
The laser display at a Marina was part of a Twinning Association event organised by the 
proprietor of the Marina. The author attended at the request of the local Environmental 
Health Officer since the District felt it had insufficient expertise to assess the laser 
radiation safety issues arising from the event. However, he was fully competent to assess 
the electrical and mechanical aspects of the event. 
The laser was provided by Company C as a favour to the proprietor. The laser display was 
set up and operated by a freelance show designer. 
The event was staged to raise money for the Twinning Association. Two German 
Minesweepers from the twin town were based at the Marina for the duration of the event. 
The proprietor had been on the local radio several times during the week to complain 
about the involvement of the Environmental Health Officer. 
A public footpath passed through the site of the laser show and was the main cause for 
concern by the licensing authority. 
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B.3.2 Details of the Laser System 
Two Coherent Innova 70 2 W argon ion lasers were mounted on piles at the marina. A 
control point was set up on the deck of one of the German Minesweepers. 
The lasers were water cooled using water from standpipes located on the Marina. The 
mains transformers were mounted at the top of the piles close to the laser. 
The layout of the site is shown in figure B.3 in plan. The proposed arrangement for the 
mirrors and laser beams is shown in figure B.4: the final arrangement is shown in figure 
B.S. 
The laser operator was in radio contact with a sound engineer who was responsible for the 
recorded music to accompany the laser display. Four separate performances were planned: 
only three took place - see section B.3.3. 
Laser control ~==== '7 German Minesweepers 
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~.~O~~~~~~~O~r I Club House ~ Mirror ball 
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Figure B.3 General layout of Event C 
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Figure B.5 Final Layout of Event C 
A fun-fair was constructed during the days before the event. Some of the final 
components were constructed on the day of the event. The lasers and mirrors were 
installed during the evening prior to the event. All of the alignment was carried out during 
the night prior to the event. 
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B.3.3 Problems Experienced 
The laser operator was aware that irradiating the audience with laser radiation was 
undesirable. Pressure from the Environmental Health Officer restricted the number of 
mirrors and the position of the mirrors to areas away from accessible areas. 
During the day of the performance a helter-skelter had been constructed behind the Club 
House. The top of the helter-skelter was in a direct line with the laser radiation should the 
beam either miss the mirrors on the Club House or if the beam was larger than the mirror. 
The proprietor agreed that this attraction and an octopus which raised riders into the path 
of the beam would be closed down during each of the performances. 
The lasers were mounted on piles. No account had been taken of the possibility of the 
piles moving as the tide went in and out. Therefore, the lasers had been aligned with the 
mirrors, and blanking plates fitted, with a particular tide state. This problem was identified 
approximately 1 hour prior to the timetabled start of the show. 
The operator was not familiar with the control console. He had used similar versions but, 
because the console operation was heavily dependent on the version of software it was 
running, he had to familiarise himself with it. The major problem was that all of the 
effects had been programmed in during the night and supposedly saved to a floppy disk. 
The data had not actually been saved. This was discovered about one hour before the start 
of the show. 
It was decided to proceed with the operator driving the show live. The lasers were re-
blanked to limit the beam to at least 3 m above the height of the footpath. The 
Environmental Health Officer maintained radio contact with the operator throughout the 
show. Due to the time delay, the show started about an hour late, only three performances 
took place. 
It was difficult to judge how many people turned up to the event. Two thousand had been 
expected. However, it was considered that the proprietor put a number of people off by 
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commenting adversely about the Environmental Health Officer's interest in the laser 
safety on the local radio. 
B.3.4 Conclusion 
The only potential for exposure was during the setting up process. However, it is 
suggested that measures to restrict exposure were only taken because of the presence of 
the Environmental Health Officer. The failure to store the programme data put the 
operator under a lot of pressure. 
Laser radiation exposure was an issue at the early stage of the design of this event. 
However, the mechanical issues, such as movement of the lasers and optical systems in 
relation to the rest of the venue, including mirror systems, and the failure of the computer 
system to store the show, generated the laser radiation safety issues closer to the 
performance time. The EHO was fully qualified to assess the mechanical issues but was 
not confident with the implications of the changed exposure situation. 
B A Drive-In Movie and Laser Show D 
BA.! Introduction 
This display at an airfield was a bonfire-night fireworks display promoted by a local radio 
station. The laser display company will be referred to as Company D. The author attended 
to support the District Environmental Health Officer who felt he had insufficient expertise 
to assess laser radiation safety, although he was fully competent to assess the other 
hazards, such as electrical and mechanical hazards. 
The operator was not able to provide measurements or calculations to support the planned 
exposure of the audience to the laser radiation. These calculations had to be carried out by 
the author using information supplied by the laser operator. 
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B.4.2 Details of the Laser System 
The display was carried out with a single 20 W Spectra Physics argon ion laser. This was 
loaned to Company D by the manufacturer. The laser was mounted on a scaffolding tower 
adjacent to a mobile 'drive-in movie' projection caravan. The caravan provided a 
convenient mask to restrict laser radiation from being directed below horizontal (at about 
3 m) in the direction of the audience. 
The laser was used to project cartoon images on to a screen which, at other times, was 
being used as the projection screen for the drive-in movie. A mirror ball was positioned 
on the screen. Initially, the paperwork from the laser company indicated that the mirror 
ball would be 1 m in diameter with 0.015 m facets and located at the top of the screen. On 
the day the mirror ball was 0.76 m (30") diameter with 0.01 m facets and it was mounted 
at the bottom of the screen. Mirrors were attached to the support tower for the screen at a 
height of about 3 m and were directed into the sky. 
The main concern with this display was the radiant power of the laser. The nominal ocular 
hazard distance was calculated as 2 km. The potential for any hazard could be minimised 
by directing the beams into the air. However, the beam path between the laser and the 
mirrors was horizontal. The mirror ball also potentially redirected the laser radiation into 
areas occupied by the public. 
B.4.3 Problems Experienced 
The changes from the original specification with the mirror ball meant that calculations 
had to be repeated on location. The Environmental Health Officer was prepared to insist 
that the mirror ball should not be used but required evidence to support this. The 
calculations demonstrated that the maximum permissible exposure levels would only be 
exceeded if the beam was not expanded and the mirror ball stopped rotating. Undertaking 
calculations under the time pressures inherent in live performances is not easy. The 
change of mirror ball was not considered significant by the operator, which demonstrated 
that the safety implications were not appreciated. However, it was reasonably foreseeable 
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that equipment may fail and be replaced, so operators should be in a position to assess any 
way that the safety judgements are invalidated. 
The laser was powered from a mobile generator which had been hired by the event 
organisers. The power cable was too short. The generator had to bedragged with a lorry to 
the correct position. This in itself was a hazardous operation but, since the operation took 
several hours to complete, meant that the laser company were pressed for time. The 
Environmental Health Officer had asked that the author should be happy with the laser 
safety aspects before the public were admitted to the site. This was not possible. The 
surrounding roads were becoming blocked with traffic and the police decided that the 
public had to be admitted. This demonstrates the importance of being able to judge the 
whole safety issue. A specialist laser safety adviser may not be in a position to make the 
necessary judgement. However, enforcing officers also need to be able to put the laser 
safety issue in perspective. 
The laser operator assured the author that the laser optics were aligned and blanked off at 
his premises such that exposure below horizontal was not possible. However, this relied 
on the laser and optics being horizontal. The operator had no means of checking this: 
When he carried out the final alignment he removed the blanking plates anyway. 
At the start of the first of two performances the laser tripped out due to a temperature 
problem. This was rectified within five minutes and the performance continued. 
B.4.4 Conclusion 
This event demonstrated that the laser company does not always do what it says it will do. 
The change of mirror ball was considered a minor change by them, as was the change of 
position. It showed a lack of understanding of the safety issues. 
The influence of parameters outside the immediate control of the laser operator such as 
power cables not being long enough and the laser overheating add to the pressure 
operators are under. 
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Laser radiation became the main safety issue at this event, despite the other hazards. This 
was mainly because of the difficulty of carrying out the assessments under time pressures. 
B.5 Trade Exhibition E 
B.5.1 Introduction 
Company E had been employed to put on a laser display as part of an advertisement on a 
stand at a trade exhibition at a Conference Centre. The author acted as Laser Safety 
Adviser to the venue and particularly gave advice to the venue manager responsible for 
radiation safety. The use of lasers at the venue was infrequent and the manager considered 
his investment in time to gain the necessary expertise was not justified. He was fully 
, 
competent to assess all non-laser-radiation hazards. 
B.5.2 Details of the Laser System 
A 4 W Spectra Physics 168 argon ion laser was to be employed on a trade stand 
approximately 5 m by 5 m. The laser was to be mounted below a table with the laser 
radiation directed vertically up past a personal computer in a perspex tube. Access to the 
keyboard of the computer was possible through a cut-out in the side of the tube (figure 
B.6). The beam was then directed from two mirrors to beam stops at the edges of the 
stand. The structure of the stand was made from highly polished stainless steel. 
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Figure B.6 Trade Exhibition 
B.5.3 Problems Experienced 
The diagrams of the display suggested that access to the laser radiation was relatively 
easy. The company were asked to justify the need to use such a high powered laser in such 
a small environment. They claimed it was the smallest laser they had. 
A site visit during the construction of the display stand also gave cause for concern. The 
structure was not substantial and subject to displacement when people moved across the 
floor. It was therefore likely that the beam could become misaligned either with the 
mirrors or with the beam stops. 
The author suggested to the venue manager that the laser should not be used because the 
safety of the visitors could not be assured. This was supported by the venue manager and 
the laser was not used. 
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B.S.4 Conclusions 
The task that this laser was required to perform could be adequately achieved using a 
much lower powered laser, such as 20 mW. Blanking panels could have been installed to 
ensure that the laser radiation would not be accessible to the visitors. Consideration 
should have been given to the stability of the display stand. 
This was an example where collaboration at an early stage could have overcome the 
problems. It is likely that the companies involved had put on similar displays at other 
venues without any questions being asked .. Calculations of the times to exceed the 
maximum permissible exposure levels under reasonably foreseeable fault conditions 
should have alerted the laser company to the risk of the display they intended to put on. 
The main safety issues here related to mechanical aspects of the design and construction 
of the display stand. The failures here made the laser radiation· the main issue. The venue 
also took account of the potential litigation resulting from an incident or accident 
involving a visitor to the exhibition. 
B.6 Trade Conference F 
B .6.1 Introduction 
Company F had been employed to provide laser effects as part of a· conference for 
insurance sales representatives at a Conference Centre. The author acted as Laser Safety 
Adviser to the venue and particularly gave advice. to the venue manager responsible for 
radiation safety. 
B.6.2 Details of the Laser System 
Two Spectra Physics 168 4 W argon ion lasers were used. One was .installed in the 
projection room above the entrance doors to the theatre hall. The other laser was mounted 
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at the rear of the stage. Both lasers were controlled by the operator located in the 
projection room. 
The laser in the projection room was used to sign-write on a screen on the stage. The laser 
on the stage was initially used to produce a fan of laser radiation above the audience and 
to sign-write on the walls to the side and rear of the auditorium. At a predetermined point 
in the performance the stage laser was to produce a fan of laser radiation below the screen 
on the stage. A smoke generator was used to produce a fog to hide a car which would then 
appear through the fan of laser radiation. 
B.6.3 Problems Experienced 
The projection room in which the laser was installed was very cramped. Cooling water 
hoses came through the door which meant that the door could not be shut. The optical 
bench was operated with the covers removed and was positioned at about chest height. 
The radiation was directed through the glass screen with a gap of about 0.5 m. There were 
significant specular reflections around the projection room. However, measurements were 
not carried out to quantify the hazard from these. 
The car, which was positioned behind the stage, was hidden from view during the first 
part of the performance by a venetian blind. This was to be operated remotely by the laser 
operator. The author was assured that this was interlocked such that the laser optics could 
not direct the radiation down until the blind had been raised. It was also pointed out that 
the operator could see the blind and would not activate that part of the sequence until he 
was sure that the blind was out of the way. 
During a run-through of the display the venetian blind failed to raise but the laser 
operator, who later admitted that he could not see the blind with the laser on for the first 
part of the show, still activate the relevant part of the sequence. A fan of radiation was 
directed across the auditorium at about head height. The author was the only person in the 
direct line of the beam and fortunately he was, at that moment, watching the operator 
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through the projection room window, ie facing the other way. The operator terminated the 
exposure promptly. 
The car which was to pass through the laser beam had to have a driver in it to ensure that 
it did not go off the end of the stage into the audience. Concern was expressed to the 
organisers about the number of specular reflectors which could potentially direct laser 
radiation at either the eyes of the driver or into the audience. This was accepted and 
measures were taken to mask items such as the door mirrors. 
B.6.4 Conclusions 
This display showed that the operator had little concern for his own safety or for those 
who may have been in the vicinity of the projection room. It also showed that the operator 
had not tested the interlocks connected to the venetian blind, if they existed. The operator 
was visibly shocked by the potentially hazardous irradiation of the auditorium and 
probably leamt a good lesson. 
The potential for stray reflections from items introduced into the beam had not been 
considered, even though some of these were actual mirrors. It was understood that no 
instruction concerning laser safety had been given to the driver. 
The design of the event was such that laser radiation issues should not have predominated. 
, 
The failure of the car to stop before it reached the edge of the stage presented a risk of 
death to those in the auditorium. The hazard was considered to be adequately controlled 
and the venue management considered that they could make the necessary judgements on 
the adequacy of the control measures. The main concern of the venue was that the laser 
radiation was something outside their area of expertise. Most importantly they considered 
they did not have a 'feel' for the magnitude of the risk associated with a given exposure 
situation. 
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B.7 Medical Laser G 
B.7.1 Introduction 
Entertainment is not the only time when laser radiation can potentially put the public at 
risk. Equipment which utilises laser radiation is often exhibited at trade exhibitions. The 
exhibitors like to demonstrate the equipment in operation. 
Company G had been given permission to exhibit a class 4 surgical laser on a display 
stand at a Conference Centre subject to approval from the NRPB. The exhibitors wanted 
to demonstrate the cutting capabilities of the laser by giving visitors to the exhibition 
stand the opportunity to cut apples. 
B.7.2 Details of the Laser System 
The laser was a 30 W carbon dioxide surgical laser. This type of laser is generally used for 
gynaecological surgery. In an operating theatre it would be under the control of a surgeon 
or consultant trained in its use with the minimum number of support staff necessary. 
B.7.3 Problems Experienced 
It was difficult to see how the exhibitor could control the potential exposure of its own 
staff, visitors operating the laser and other visitors. Since the laser was designed to cut 
people, given the opportunity it would do so. The exhibitor was advised that such use was 
not acceptable as presented. 
The Board was contacted the week before the exhibition was due to take place. The 
exhibitor had finished planning for the event six months previously. Early consultation 
may have provided a solution whereby the laser could have been demonstrated. 
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B.7.4 Conclusion 
Laser equipment which can potentially put visitors at risk is routinely displayed at trade 
exhibitions. The Board's contact with the Conference Centre means that it usually can 
contribute to the venue's decisions on whether such equipment can be allowed to be 
demonstrated. However, this venue is only one of a number in London alone where such 
demonstrations are taking place. 
Marketing staff may not have the necessary laser safety expertise. Manufacturers and 
distributors should ensure that consideration is given to this when products are launched 
or exhibited. 
One of the main factors here was training. The product, in normal use, would be operated 
by persons who have been trained in both the medical aspects of the procedure and the 
safety aspects of the laser, including the laser radiation. The procedure relies heavily on 
administrative controls and personal protective equipment. Such control measures are not 
adequate when laser products are used by untrained personnel, except under extremely 
well controlled conditions. 
B.8 Laser Games H 
B.8.! Introduction 
There are a number of different laser 'tag' game systems which operate on a similar 
principle. Participants have a 'gun' which incorporates a visible laser and an infrared light 
emitting diode. The former acts as an aiming device while the latter transmits information 
to various targets. Each player also has a body pack which includes various target 
receivers. 
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B.8.2 Details of the Laser System 
Information was provided by one of the laser game manufacturers (Megazone, 1994) and 
is understood to be typical of other systems in use. 
The laser gun contains a laser diode emitting at 635 nm (+ 1 0 nm, -5 nm) and is part of a 
system using the name Phasar. The diode manufacturer's specification gives the radiated 
power as 3 m W (Philips, 1993). However, the specification for the manufactured gun 
states the following: 
Table B.l Specification for laser gun 
Classification (to BS EN 60825: 1992) Class 1 
. 
Maximum radiated power . 0.95mW 
. 
Maximum emission duration 200ms 
Maximum pulse rate 4Hz 
Divergence 3.0 rnrad 
Spot size at lens 6mmx4mm ± 1 mm 
Spot size at 5 m contained within 15 mm diameter circle 
The laser games are normally operated as a franchise. Information is supplied to the 
franchisee on how to operate the game safely. The instructions include a section on 
supervision and state that the players should "avoid pointing the Phasar into their eyes or 
the eyes of other players". 
Other systems visited by the author, have Class 2 warning signs on the guns. 
268 
B.8.3 Problems Experienced 
It is assumed that the laser radiation is coincident with the infrared radiation. Therefore, 
there is an incentive for the players to aim the laser at the target area of the opponents. It 
has been observed that some of the guns do not have the two radiations coincident. Where 
this has been observed, the laser radiation has always been directed higher than'the light 
emitting diode. This error is adjusted for by skilled players. One particular system was 
'sufficiently out of alignment that aiming at the opponent's head provided the best 
correction for hitting the chest pack at a distance of about 3 m. 
The justification for the assignment of the product to class 1 is interesting. The relevant 
standard at the time was BS EN 60825: 1992 (BSI 1992). Light emitting diodes were not 
included within this Standard and therefore only the diode laser had to be taken into 
account. The accessible emission limit for class 1, as given in table 1 of the Standard, is 
1.05 mW for a single 200 ms pulse. As soon as more than two pulses are emitted the 
product becomes class 2. The classification of these products under BS EN 60825-1: 1994 
(BSI 1994), which includes light emitting diodes, is likely to result in the products being 
assigned to class 3B. 
B.8.4 Conclusion 
Most of the laser games use lasers which are class 2 under BS EN 60825: 1992 and 
deliberate exposure of people's eyes should be avoided. Repeated exposure may increase 
an individual's aversion or blink response time. A simple test jig could be supplied by the 
manufacturers to ensure that the laser radiation remains coincident with the infrared 
radiation. There are likely to be a number of other hazards associated with playing these 
laser games. These will include the chemicals used to produce the fog effect, the loud 
music and the potential for impact with the facility structure under reduced, or strobed, 
lighting conditions. Local authority EHOs are likely to have adequate expertise to assess 
these other hazards. 
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Appendix C 
1. 
2. 
THE CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 
NATIONAL RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION BOARD 
LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY 
LOCAL AUTHORITY LASER SAFETY AWARENESS QUESTIONNAIRE 
Local AuthoI1ty ..................................................................................... . 
Address 
........................................................................................... 
....................................................... ....................... ..... ....... . 
....... ......... ................................ .... ............ .......... ........... ... .. . 
Postcode ................................................... , ........................................... . 
Telephone ............................................................................................. . 
Fax ....................................................................................................... . 
Name of person filling out this questionnaire ........................................ . 
Position ... ~ .............................................................................................. . 
Date questionnaire completed ............................................................... .. 
How many times has your LOcal AuthOrity had to deal 
with the use oflasers In the entertalnment Industry In 
the LAST 12 MONIHS? 
If possible can you break this down Into the following 
categoI1es: 
Permanent Installations (one week or longer) - Indoor 
- Outdoor 
Temporary Installations (less than one week)- Indoor 
- Outdoor· 
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D I(""omove . to qu .. Uon 3 
Please enter 
number of each 
type of event In 
the appropriate 
box. 
B 
B 
Appendix C 
Types of lasers: 
Helium-Neon (He-Ne) 
Argon Ion 
Krypton/Argon (White Light or Mixed Gas) 
Copper Vapour 
Neodymlum:YAG (Nd:YAG) 
Others (please specify) _______ _ 
3. How would you judge the level of expertise of your 
staff who either have dealt with laser events or who 
would do if the need arose? 
4. 
No experience 
Basic knowledge 
Experienced 
(To judge the category to use, a set of test questions 
Is included with this questionnaire. Someone with 
Basic knowledge should be able to get to at least 
question 3 : an experienced Officer should be able to 
answer all 6 questions). 
How familiar are your staff with the HSE Guidance 
Document PM19? 
Never heard of it 
Know of Its existence 
Seen forms provided by laser companies 
Working knowledge 
Detailed knowledge 
Do you have a copy of PM19 for reference? 
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Please enter 
number of each 
type In the 
approprtate box. 
Number of staff 10 each category 
. 
Number of staff' In each category 
YES/NO 
appropriate 
AppendixC 
5. If you either use or would consider using external 
assistance where do/would you go? 
Other Local AuthOrity 
Chartered Institute of Environmental Health 
(CIEH) 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 
National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) 
Loughborough University 
Consultants 
Please tick a1l that 
apply 
Other (please specify) __________ _ 
6. Would you consider tralning staff in how to assess YES/NO 
the safe use of lasers in the entertaInment industry? 
If you have answered NO. please stop here and 
return the questionnaire in the reply-paid envelope. 
Thank you for your time. 
Delete as 
applicable 
7. What level of tralnlng would you require? Please tick all that apply to your staff 
8. 
Overview seminar (up to 2 hours) 
Basic awareness (1 day) 
Working knowledge (2 days) 
Detailed knowledge (4 days) 
I do not know enough to judge 
What format of presentation would you prefer? . 
Formal lectures only 
Lectures supported by syndicate exercises 
Workshop (worked examples With 
demonstrations) 
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a) If costa were 
equal 
bl If costs differed 
according to the 
raHo 1:1,.;,5_,2_--. 
xl 
x 
1.5 
x2 
I-----l 
. 
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9 How far would you be prepared for staff to travel for 
such training? 
10. 
11. 
Anywhere In UK 
A regional centre - eg Glasgow. Leeds or 
Oxford 
Up to 100 miles 
Up to 50 miles 
Within the County of this local authority only 
Please put In order of preference U to 
5) where 1 Is moat prd'clTed option 
Would you prefer any form of training to be assessed YES/NO 
by a formal examination? 
Delete as 
applicable 
If you have answered NO. please stop here and 
return the questionnaire In the reply-paid envelope. 
Thank you for your time. 
If you answered YES to question 10. should this 
examination be accredited? 
If YES. by whom? 
CIEH 
HSE 
NRPB 
Loughborough University 
Other (please specifyJ _______ _ 
YES/NO 
Please uck one 
only 
Delete as 
applicable 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. 
Please return it in the reply-paid envelope. 
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Questions to test the level of expertise in assessing the safety of laser 
systems at an entertainment event. 
1. What is the most common type of laser used in the entertainment 
industry? 
2. What is the potential harm from an entertainment laser? 
3. Which British Standard covers laser safety? 
4. What is the maximum permissible exposure for the laser specified 
in I? 
5. What is the nominal ocular hazard distance for the laser in 1 if the 
radiant power is 1 watt and the divergence is 2 mrad? 
6. How is your answer to 5 altered if the beam is scanned? 
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DI Laser Questionnaire 
Please help our research by completing this questionnaire - even if you have no intention of ever 
installing a laser system. Please tick the boxes or enter information. 
1. Which of the following best describes you? 
Venue with installed laser systems Cl 
Venue which hosts temporary laser shows Cl 
Venue with no lasers now, but have had them in the past Cl 
Venue that has never had lasers Cl 
Venue planning to install lasers Cl 
Laser display company Cl 
Laser system supplier Cl 
2. Which of the following types of lasers do you have now or have had? 
Helium-Neon (He-Ne) Cl 
Argon Ion (Ar) Cl 
Mixed GaslWhite Light (KrIAr) Cl 
CopperYapour Cl 
Neodymium:YAG (Nd:YAG) Cl 
Other (please specify)'--___________ _ 
3. How often is the laser used? 
More than once per day 
Once per day 
At least once per week 
At least once per month 
At least once per year 
Less than once per year 
It is not used 
4. How is the laser operated? 
Trained specialist laser operator 
Operated by DJ 
Operated by lighting jockey 
Pre-recorded show 
Manual selection of stored effects 
Manual show 
Cl 
Cl 
Cl 
Cl 
Cl 
Cl 
Cl 
Cl 
Cl 
Cl 
Cl 
Cl 
Cl 
5. Approximate year of installation oflasers (or commencement of business ifnot a venue) 
6. Name of supplier(s) oflasers, _______________ _ 
7. Do you have a Laser Safety Officer? Yes 
If yes, please give an indication of how helshe was trained: 
In-house training 
Trained by laser supplier 
External course 
No formal training 
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Cl 
Cl 
Cl 
Cl 
Cl 
No 
AppendixD 
8. Are you aware of the Health and Safety Executive guidance document PMI9? 
Yes Q No Q 
If no, please go to question 11 
9. Do you have a copy ofPM19? Yes Q No Q 
10. Do you find PMI9 easy to understand? Yes Q No Q 
11. Would you be interested in a practically-based laser safety guidance document? 
Yes Q No Q 
12. If you wanted help on laser safety, who would you approach? 
Local Authority (Environmental Health Department) Q 
Local Authority (other Department) Q 
Health and Safety Executive Q 
National Radiological Protection Board Q 
Loughborough University Q 
Laser supplier Q 
Another disco/night-club, etc Q 
Safety Consultancy Q 
Trade Association (please specify), _________ _ 
Other (please specify), ____________ _ 
13. Are you interested in arranging laser safety training for your staff? 
Yes Q No Q 
14. Would you find a series of articles on laser safety in DJ useful? 
Yes Q No Q 
15. Are you interested in a confidential laser safety audit? 
16. If yes, how much would you be prepared to pay? 
17. What type of venue are you, if appropriate? 
Discotheque 
Night-club 
Pub 
Hotel 
Theatre 
Laser game venue 
Open arena 
Yes 
Other (please specify), ________ _ 
18. What is the normal capacity of your venue? 
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Q No Q 
Q 
Q 
Q 
Q 
Q 
Q 
Q 
. 
AppendixD 
I will be grateful for the following infonnation about your venue but please remain anonymous if you 
wish. 
Nameofvenudcompany ____________________________________ __ 
Postcode (or country if non-UK)' ________________________________ _ 
yourname' ________________ ~ __ ~ ______________________ ~ 
yourpositionl ________________________ _ 
Telephone' ___________________________________________ __ 
Faxo ____________________________________________ __ 
We are looking for a number ofUK venues and laser companies to assist with our research. This will 
include a risk assessment on the use of lasers at your venue or a discussion on the implications of 
installing a laser system for the fIrst time. If you wish to be considered please attach your business card 
here . 
John O'Hagan, NRPB 
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Suggested Sections for a Laser Display Safety Record 
I. Description of the Laser Display 
A. Company Details 
B. Venue Details 
C. Description of the Event 
1. Date 
2. Timetable 
3. Plan of the Site 
D. Lasers 
E. Other Equipment 
ll. Safety Structure 
A. Company 
1. Laser Display Operators 
2. Laser Safety Officer 
3. Managing Director 
B. Venue 
1. Venue Manager 
2. Health & Safety Manager 
C. Promoter 
1. Name & Address 
2. Managing Director 
3. Principal Contact 
4. Health and Safety Manager 
D. Equipment Manufacturers! Agents 
1. Lasers 
2. Generators 
3. Cooling Plants 
4. Optical Systems 
5. Smoke Generators 
278 
E. EmergencyAssistance 
m. Control Measures 
A. Training 
B. Engineering Controls 
C. Security Arrangements 
D. Safety Signs 
E. Protective Eyewear 
IV. Written Procedures 
A. Installation 
B. Alignment 
C. Performance 
D. Dismantling 
V. Risk Assessment 
A. General 
B. Transport 
C. Installation 
D. Alignment 
E. Performance 
F. Dismantling 
G. Significant Conclusions from the Risk Assessments 
VI. Liaison 
A. Licensing Authority 
B. Health and Safety Authority 
C. Civil Aviation Authority 
D. Other Aviation Authorities 
E. MarinelHarbour Authorities 
F. Fire 
G. Police 
H. Ambulance (including volunteer groups) 
VII. Entertainment Licence 
A. Copy of Document or reference to its location 
B. Details of conditions specific to The Laser Display Company 
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vm. Audit Record 
A. Management review log 
B. Operator check list record 
C. Enforcing Officer check log 
D. Portable Appliance Testing log 
E. Residual Current Device checks 
IX. Certificates 
A. Insurance (public and product liability) 
B. Safety checks (third party) 
C. Laser Power Meter(s) 
x. Working Section 
A. Correspondence with venue, promoter, etc 
B. Copy of appropriate parts of contract 
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Example Laser Display Record 
The Laser Display Company 
Laser Display Safety Record 
The Stately Home 
Somewhere 
6 May 1997 
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Introduction 
This Record is produced by The Laser Display Company as part of its general 
commitment to safety. It is intended to meet the Company's duties under Section 6 of 
the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and Regulations made under that Act, 
particularly the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992 and the 
Provision and Use of Equipment Regulations 1992. Due consideration is taken of the 
British Standard covering laser safety (BS EN 60825-1: 1994) and current guidance 
from the Health and Safety Executive (HS(G)95) on the Radiation· Safety of Lasers 
Used for Display Purposes. 
The Record is presented in this comprehensive form to ensure that all of the 
necessary information is available for our employees, enforcing officers, the venue 
management and the promoter. 
The assistance of the National Radiological Protection Board with the drafting 
and format of this Record is gratefully acknowledged but The Laser Display Company 
accepts full responsibility for the accuracy of the information contained herein. 
1. Description of the Laser Display 
1.1 Company Details 
The Laser Display Company 
1 The Beam 
Shine 
Brightshire 
XY12AB 
Telephone: 
Fax: 
1.2 Venue Details 
01999 999999 
01999 999999 
The Stately Home 
Somewhere 
Anyshire 
AB12XY 
Telephone: 
Fax: 
1.3 Description of the Event 
01999999999 
01999999999 
Laser display effects will be used to support a live performance by a classical 
orchestra. This particular show is in support of the GLOBF charity. Other visual effects 
will illc!ude fireworks and a water fountain. The event will take place in the grounds of 
The Stately Home. 
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1.3.1 Date 
7 May 1997 
On-site meeting took place on 10 April 1997. A record of the meeting is filed in 
Section 10 of this file. 
1.3.2 Timetable 
1000 Arrive on site and commence assembly 
1400 Complete assembly and commence alignment 
1500 Alignment complete 
1700 Open to public admission 
1900 Music starts 
2130 Laser Show starts 
2230 Performance finishes and commence dismantling 
2330 Depart site 
1.3.3 Plan ofthe Site 
A plan of the site showing the layout of the stage, audience, lasers and 
associated equipment is filed after this page. Further plan and side elevations are also 
included to show the extent of the laser beams in relation to the audience and 
neighbouring buildings. Since the laser beams are to be projected beyond the confines 
of the venue, a plan of the region in which the venue is located is also included. 
lA Lasers 
Three lasers will be used for this performance. Details are as follows: 
Laser 1 & 2 
Manufacturer: 
Model: 
Serial Number: 
Type: 
Wavelengths: 
DuoLase 
Display 100 
123456 
Krypton/Argon (white light or mixed gas) 
476.5nm 
488.0nm 
514.5 nm 
530.9nm 
568.2 nm 
647.1 nm 
676.4nm 
Power: 4 W maximum (sum of all wavelengths) 
Beam divergence: 3 mrad (full angle at lie x peak power points) 
Inithl beam diameter: 2 mm (at lie x peak power points) 
Class: 4 
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Laser 3 
Cooling: 
Electrical supply: 
Manufacturer: 
Model: 
Serial Number: 
Type: 
Wavelengths: 
Water 
60 A three phase 
DuoLase 
Display 20 
98765 
Argon 
488.0nm 
514.5nm 
Power: 7 W maximum (sum of both wavelengths) 
Beam divergence: 2 mrad (fuIl angle at lie x peak power points) 
Initial beam diameter: 2.5 mm (at lie x peak power points) 
Class: 4 
Cooling: Water 
Electrical supply: 60 A three phase 
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1.5 Other Equipment 
The following is an inventory of the equipment, other than the lasers described 
. above, which will be brought onto the site as part of the laser display: 
3 off diesel generators 
3 off heat exchanger plants 
3 off scaffolding towers 
3 off primary optical systems 
2 off mirror balls 
3 off control consoles 
Control cables 
Power cables 
Cooling water pipes 
3 off smoke generators 
2. Safety and Operational Structure 
2.1 The Laser Display Company 
2.1.1 Laser Display Operators 
Mr John Smith (Person in charge on site) Mobile phone: 0999999999 
Ms Alison Doe 
Mr Fred Bloggs 
The three operators have UHF PMR radios for communication between them on site. 
2.1.2 Laser Safety Officer 
Mr Bert Major Mobile phone: 0999 999999 
The Laser Safety Officer is responsible for ensuring that the Company operates to a 
high level of safety. He reports directly to the Managing Director. 
2.1.3 Managing Director 
Mr Frank Blair Mobile phone: 0999999999 
2.2 Venue 
2.2.1 Estate Manager 
Mr Eric Ashdown Telephone: 01999 999999 or 0999 999999 (mobile) 
The Estate Manager is the main point of contact on site regarding services. 
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2.2.2 Health and Safety Manager 
Ms Florence Starling Telephone: 01999 999999 or 0999 999999 (mobile) 
2.3 Promoter 
2.3.1 Name and Address 
The Anything Goes Right Company 
23a Building Block . 
Ourtown 
Ourshire 
7Z65AB 
Telephone: 
Fax: 
01999999999 
01999999999 
The contract for the laser show is between The Laser Display Company and The 
Anything Goes Right Company. 
2.3.2 Managing Director 
Mr Mike Lotsamoney Mobile phone: 0999 999999 
2.3.3 Principal Contact 
Ms Amy Curry Telephone: 01999 999999 or 0999 999999 (mobile) 
Ms Curry is the main point of liaison between The Laser Display Company and the 
Promoter. She is considered the Customer. 
2.3.4 Health and Safety Manager 
Mr Ivor Plaster Telephone: 01999 999999 or 0999 999999 (mobile) 
2.4 Equipment Manufacturers/Agents 
2.4.1 Lasers 
DuoLase 
Unit 1 
The Big Industrial Estate 
Histown 
Hisshire 
AA127Z 
Telephone: 
Fax: 
01999 999999 
0999999999 
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Principal Contact: Mr A Person 
~---------------------------------------------------
2.4.2 Generators 
The Generator Supply Company 
Their Address 
Telephone: 
Fax: 
01999 999999 
0999999999 
Principal Contact: Mr A Person 
2.4.3 Cooling Plants 
The Cooling Plant Supply Company 
Their Address 
Telephone: 
Fax: 
01999 999999 
0999999999 
Principal Contact: Mr A Person 
2.4.4 Optical Systems 
The Laser Optics Supply Company 
Their Address 
Telephone: . 
Fax: 
01999999999 
0999999999 
Principal Contact: Mr A Person 
2.4.5 Smoke Generators 
The Smoke Generator Supply Company 
Their Address 
Telephone: 
Fax: 
01999999999 
0999999999 
Principal Contact: Mr A Person 
2.5 Emergency Assistance 
In the first instance, the senior laser display operator from The Laser Display 
Company will be responsible for immediate assistance in the event of an incident 
involving the Company's operations at the venue. This will be backed up by the 
Company's other staff on site. First aid kits and appropriate fire extinguishers are 
available the whole time the Company representatives and its equipment ar~ on site. 
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It has been agreed (see Contract filed in Section 10 of this file) that the promoter 
will provide first aid cover for employees of The Laser Display Company as part of its 
normal arrangements for its own employees and members of the public. 
3. Control Measures 
3.1 Training 
The Laser Display Company recognises that the main control measure to reduce 
the risk of injury to all persons it the quality of the training of its employees. The 
training of the employees involved with this show is as follows: 
. 
Name . Formal Training Experience 
Mr John Smith In-Company training scheme Joined Company 5/3/91. 
attended from 114191-4/4/91. Experienced show designer and 
Update session last attended operator. Has been responsible for 
411/97. 35 shows in the last twelve months. 
Qualified First Aider - retested 
5/4/97. 
Ms Alison Doe In-Company training scheme Joined Company 5/8/95. Provides 
attended from 2018/95-23/8/95. support to more experienced 
Update session last attended operators. 
411/97 
Mr Fred Bloggs In-Company training scheme Joined Company 5/8/95. Provides 
attended from 2018/95-23/8/95. support to more experienced 
Update session last attended operators. 
411/97 
Mr Bert Major In-Company training scheme Joined Company at the beginning 
attended from 116/89-4/6189. (3/4/88). Experienced laser show 
Update session last attended designer and operator. Has been 
411/97. responsible for 20 shows in the last 
Attended US New York state twelve months and 10 fixed 
. 
laser display training course installations. 
6/9/92-819192. 
3.2 Engineering Controls 
Where possible our laser display installations are designed to minimise the risk 
of injury to any person. As such, the laser and primary optical systems are rigidly 
mounted on the same baseplate to minimise the risk of relative movement. All optical 
components are securely mounted with a minimum of two fixing bolts or screws. The 
optical path with the primary optics is constrained by the use of local shielding covers. 
The laser apertures are all masked. Although these masked are adjustable, they are 
secured after adjustment by four fixing bolts. 
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The primary optical system is of a revolutionary design which allows all 
adjustments on site to be made from above with the minimum of covers removed. No 
alignment within the laser chassis is made on site. 
3.3 Security Arrangements 
Each of the lasers is key operated. Once the laser is mounted in position and 
coupled to the primary optical system there are no accessible beam paths until the 
control system is activated. . 
Each of the control systems is password protected. The shutter can only be 
opened, and laser radiation made accessible, when the correct password is entered. 
The control consoles, lasers and optical systems are located in restricted areas. 
Access to these areas is for pass holders only. 
3.4 Safety Signs 
Each laser control area is designated a Laser Controlled Area when the key to 
the laser is in place (whether switched on or not). Signs are placed prominently at the 
entrance to each Laser Controlled Area as follows: 
Caution Laser Starburst symbol with the legend "Laser Controlled Area" 
Prohibition symbol with the legend "Laser Display Company Authorised 
Personnel Only" 
The name of the responsible person and the Laser Safety Officer, along with 
details of how to contact them are also displayed. 
3.5 Protective Eyewear 
During normal operations and normal alignment work it is not necessary to wear 
laser safety eyewear. However two pairs of KIf Ar goggles are available should some 
unforeseen alignment work be necessary. These are designed to provide sufficient 
protection in the event of an accidental eye exposure. 
Manufacturer: The Laser Eyewear Company 
Stated OD: 17? 
Stated wavelength: 17? 
Indications: ???? 
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4 Written Procedures 
Written procedures have been prepared by the Company for the operations 
carried out away from the Company's premises. These are separated to cover 
installation of the laser display system, alignment work, the performance and 
dismantling. In each case a contingency plan has been prepared to cover reasonably 
foreseeable incidents or accidents. 
Each member of staff is required to have read and understood the contents of 
these Written Procedures. A record of this is maintained in Section 8 of this file. 
Where the involvement of third parties required for the successful 
implementation of these Written Procedures this has been agreed in writing (see Section 
8). 
4.1 Written Procedures for Installation 
4.1.1 Introduction 
These Written Procedures have been prepared for the installation of the laser 
display at The Stately Home on 6 May 1997. They should be seen as implementing, at 
least in part, The Laser Display Company's duties under Section 6 of the Health and 
Safety at Work etc Act 1974. 
4.1.2 Responsibilities 
The Laser Display Company is represented on site by: 
Mr John Smith Mobile phone: 0999 999999 
The Laser Safety Officer is: 
Mr Bert Major Mobile phone: 0999 999999 
4.1.3 Duties 
All staff will work in a safe and responsible manner with due regard for their 
own safety and that of others. 
4.1.4 Emergency Arrangements 
The most likely incidents during installation relate to physical impact and 
falling. There should be no risk of injury from laser radiation. Where appropriate, first 
aid should be applied and, if necessary, the relevant emergency services summoned. 
First aid support is available from The Stately Home by telephoning 01999 999999. 
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4.2 Written Procedures for Alignment 
4.2.1 Introduction 
These Written Procedures have been prepared for the alignment of the laser 
display at The Stately Home on 6 May 1997. They should be seen as implementing, at 
least in part, The Laser Display Company's duties under Section 6 of the Health and 
S,afety at Work etc Act 1974. 
4.2.2 Responsibilities 
The Laser Display Company is represented on site by: 
Mr John Smith Mobile phone: 0999 999999 
The Laser Safety Officer is: 
Mr Bert Major Mobile phone: 0999 999999 
4.2.3 Duties 
All staff will work in a safe and responsible manner with due regard for their 
. own safety and that of others. 
Before powering up any of the equipment a check should be made of the layout 
and integrity of the power and water systems. The structural integrity of the support 
structure should be confirmed. 
A particular concern during alignment work is the potential for accidental 
exposure to the laser radiation. To minimise the potential for this, the number of people 
in the vicinity should be minimised and, if reasonably possible, eliminated completely. 
Alignment should be carried out at the minimum power necessary and, where 
possible, should be carried out with the laser beam constrained, ie by using local 
shielding. It should be recognised that alignment with external optical components 
during daylight may require almost full power. 
4.2.4 Emergency Arrangements 
The most likely incidents during alignment relate to laser radiation exposure. 
During alignment with the primary optical system, the operator is at greatest risk. 
However, alignment with the secondary optics may expose others. If an actual or 
suspected eye exposure occurs then a judgement will need to be made on the course of 
action. If the incident involves a third party then they should be referred to an 
ophthalmologist. An employee of the Company will be encouraged to see an 
ophthalmologist within 24 hours. 
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Other accidents and incidents could occur which relate to working at height, 
high voltages, etc. Where appropriate, first aid should be applied and, if necessary, the 
relevant emergency services summoned. First aid support is available from The Stately 
Home by telephoning 01999 999999. 
4.3 Written Procedures for the Performance 
I Introduction 
These Written Procedures have been prepared for the perfonnance of the laser 
display at The Stately Home on 6 May 1997. They should be seen as implementing, at 
least in part, The Laser Display Company's duties under Section 6 of the Health and 
Safety at Work etc Act 1974. 
4.3.2 Responsibilities 
The Laser Display Company is represented on site by: 
Mr John Smith Mobile phone: 0999 999999 
The Laser Safety Officer is: 
Mr Bert Major Mobile phone: 0999 999999 
4.3.3 Duties 
All staff will work in a safe and responsible manner with due regard for their 
own safety and that of others. 
Before powering up any of the equipment a check should be made of the layout 
and integrity of the power and water systems. The structural integrity of the support 
structure should be confirmed. 
Communication links between the three operators should be confinned prior to 
the commencement of the performance. 
The show will have been pre-programmed and aligned to ensure that no 
members of the audience or other staff are at risk. 
4.3.4 Emergency Arrangements 
The lasers incorporate temperature sensors which turn the respective laser off in 
the event of cooling failure. Loss of power to the laser will automatically terminate the 
emission of laser radiation. 
In the event of a developing situation in the audience, such as unruliness, each 
operator is aware of the duty to terminate the laser show if appropriate. Each operator 
can make this decision without reference to the other operators. 
292 
Failure of the control system or primary optics should result in a failure to safety 
due to the masking of the laser apertures. However, the operator will decide whether the 
performance from that laser can continue safely in any form. 
If an actual or suspected eye exposure occurs then a judgement will need to be 
made on the course of action. If the incident involves a third party then they should be 
referred to an ophthalmologist. An employee of the Company will be encouraged to see. 
an ophthalmologist within 24 hours. 
Other accidents and incidents could occur which relate to working at height, 
high voltages, etc. Where appropriate, first aid should be applied and, if necessary, the 
relevant emergency services summoned. First aid support is available from The Stately 
Home by telephoning 01999 999999. 
4.4 Written Procedures for Dismantling 
4.4.1 Introduction 
These Written Procedures have been prepared for the dismantling of the laser 
display at The Stately Home on 6 May 1997. They should be seen as implementing, at 
least in part, The Laser Display Company's duties under Section 6 of the Health and 
Safety at Work etc Act 1974. 
4.4.2 Responsibilities 
The Laser Display Company is represented on site by: 
Mr John Smith Mobile phone: 0999 999999 
The Laser Safety Officer is: 
Mr Bert Major Mobile phone: 0999 999999 
4.4.3 Duties 
All staff will work in a safe and responsible manner with due regard for their 
own safety and that of others. Due consideration should be given to the lighting levels 
and the presence of members of the public and vehicles (particularly those from other 
employers). 
If there is a requirement for the cooling water to continue to flow for a period 
after the end of the performance then due consideration should be taken of the risks 
associated with this. Equally, when the cooling water is drained, this should be to a 
ditch and not in the vicinity of the structural work and high voltages. 
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4.4.4 Emergency Arrangements 
The most likely incidents during dismantling relate to physical impact and 
falling. There should be no risk of injury from laser radiation. Where appropriate, first 
aid should be applied and, if necessary, the relevant emergency services summoned. 
First aid support is available from The Stately Home by telephoning 01999 999999. 
5. Risk Assessments 
These risk assessments are provided in compliance with The Laser Display 
Company's duties under Regulation 3 of the Management of Health and Safety at Work 
Regulations. Consideration is also given to the requirements for an Installation Safety 
Assessment in Chapter 4 of the Health and Safety Executive guidance HS(G)95 "The 
Radiation Safety of Lasers Used for Display Purposes". 
The methodology used here is based on that developed by the National 
Radiological Protection Board and Loughborough University. We are grateful for the 
practical assistance that they have provided but the responsibility for the content and 
adequacy of the assessment rests with The Laser Display Company. 
The assessment is considered as a function of the life cycle of the display for 
each section of the display and considers groups of people at risk. The assessment is 
presented in a format similar to that recommended in the Health and Safety Executive 
guidance ''The Five Steps to Risk Assessment". A hazard is defined as the physical 
entity which has the potential to do harm; a risk is the result of the hazard being realised 
coupled with the likelihood of it being realised. lri some cases, as appropriate, due 
account is also taken of the number of people at risk. 
5.1 General 
The Laser Display Company is committed to providing a safe environment for 
its employees and others who may be affected by its work activities, including members 
of the public. The assessment described here does not take account of work activities at 
our own premises. This is the subject of a separate assessment document. What is 
covered here is transport from our premises to the venue, and from venue to venue; 
installation of the laser display at the venue; alignment and testing of the display; the 
performance; and dismantling. 
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5.2 Transport 
The laser display system is transported from our premises to the venue in a 
***** truck owned by the Company. All of the equipment is transported in flight cases 
to minimise the risk of damage. 
. 
Hazards Persons at Risk Control Measures Comments 
Manual Handling Employees. Training Adequately controlled 
• crushed limbs Back lift on vehicle 
• crushed extremities Casters on flight cases 
• back iniuries 
Movement of Load Employees. Training Adequately controlled 
During Transit Others. Flight case installation No reported incidents by 
planned to minimise employees 
movement. 
Restrainin2 straps used 
Road Traffic Accident Employees. Driver training and The Company considers it 
Others. demonstration of has taken all reasonable 
competence with the •••• precautions to reduce the 
vehicle. risk of "own fault" 
All three operators are accidents and the 
competent to drive the probability of 
vehicle to ensure involvement with 
adequate rest periods. incidents caused by other 
especially after drivers. 
performances The company has had no 
accidents involving its 
vehicles since $$$$. 
Vehicle Breakdown Employees affecting Regular vehicle The Company considers it 
repair. maintenance. has taken all reasonable 
Others. Pre-joumey check precautions to reduce the 
schedule. risk of vehicle breakdown 
High visibility vests and to protect its staff . 
provided in vehicle to be should this occur. 
worn if vehicle does 
breakdown 
Vehicle Fire Employees Regular vehicle The Company considers it 
Others. maintenance. has taken all reasonable 
Pre-joumey check precautions to reduce the 
. schedule. risk of vehicle fire and to 
Vehicle fire extinguisher protect its staff and other 
carried in cab. Staff have should this occur. 
received training in its 
operation. 
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I 
5.3 Installation 
Most of the risks during installation relate to the weight of some components of 
the laser display system and working at height. It is assumed for this assessment that 
none of the equipment is switched on. The assessment for the alignment work covers 
the next stage where equipment is switched on. 
The assessment is broken down into the different segments of the display. 
5.3.1 Lasers 
Hazard . Persons at Risk Control Measures Comments 
Manual Handling -:- Employees Training Adequate 
• crushed limbs Others in the vicinity Provision of gloves for 
• crushed extremities employees 
• back injuries Provision of appropriate footwear for emDlovees 
Working at height Employees Training Adequate 
• falling Others in the vicinity Provision of appropriate 
• dronnin. the laser footwear for emDlovees 
5.3.2 Equipment Associated with the Lasers 
This section considers the installation of the cooling plants, the diesel 
generators, smoke generators, and cabling and pipework associated with these items . 
. 
Laser Exciters . 
Hazard Persons at Risk Control Measures Comments 
Manual Handling Employees Training Adequate 
• crushed limbs Others in the vicinity Provision of gloves for 
• crushed extremities employees 
• back injuries Provision of appropriate footwear for emDlovees 
Sharp Edges Employees Provision of gloves for Adequate 
. . emDlovees . 
Coolinl! Plants 
Hazard Persons at Risk Control Measures Comments 
Manual Handling Employees Training Adequate 
• crushed limbs Others in the vicinity Provision of gloves for 
• crushed extremities employees 
• back injuries Provision of appropriate footwear for emDlovees 
Sharp Edges Employees Provision of gloves for Adequate 
emDlovees 
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Diesel Generators 
Hazard Persons at Risk 
Manual Handling Employees 
• crushed limbs Others in the vicinity 
• crushed extremities 
• back injuries 
Balle Acid Em 10 ees 
Diesel fuel Employees 
Other in the vicinity 
Smoke Generators 
Hazard Persons at Risk 
Manual Handling Employees 
• crushed limbs Others in the vicinity 
• crushed extremities 
• back injuries 
Sharp Edges Employees 
Fluid Employees 
Cables 
Hazard Persons at Risk 
Trip hazard Employees 
Others in the vicinity 
Manual Handling Employees 
• crushed limbs Others in the vicinity 
• crushed extremities 
• back injuries 
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Control Measures 
Training 
Provision of gloves for 
employees 
Provision of appropriate 
footwear for em 10 ees 
Sealed unit 
Provision of gloves for 
employees 
Purpose fuel containers 
See also COSHH 
assessment contained in 
Section * ••• 
Control Measures 
Training 
Provision of gloves for 
employees 
Provision of appropriate 
footwear for em 10 ees 
Provision of gloves for 
em 10 ees 
Training. 
Anti-spill design. 
See also COSHH 
assessment in Section 
* •• * 
Control Measures 
Training of employees 
Consideration of cable 
routes. 
Cables are bri ht eHow 
Training 
Provision of gloves for 
employees 
Provision of appropriate 
footwear for em 10 ees 
Comments . 
Adequate 
Ade uate 
Adequate 
Comments 
Adequate 
Adequate 
Adequate 
Comments 
Adequate 
Adequate 
Cooling Water Pipes 
Hazard Persons at Risk Control Measures Comments 
Trip hazard . Employees . Training of employees Adequate 
Others in the vicinity Consideration of pipe 
routes. 
Pipes are bright red 
Manual Handling Employees Training Adequate 
• crushed limbs Others in the vicinity Provision of gloves for 
• crushed extremities employees 
• back injuries Provision of appropriate footwear for employees 
5.3.3 Primary Optics 
Hazard Persons at Risk Control Measures Comments 
Manual Handling Employees Training Adequate 
• crushed limbs Others in the vicinity Provision of gloves for 
• crushed extremities employees 
• back injuries Provision of appropriate footwear for employees 
Working at height Employees Training Adequate .. 
• falling Others in the vicinity Provision of appropriate 
• dropping the optics footwear for employees 
5.3.4 Support Structure 
Hazard Persons at Risk Control Measures Comments 
Manual Handling Employees . Training Adequate 
• crushed limbs Others in the vicinity Provision of gloves for 
• crushed extremities employees 
• back injuries Provision of appropriate footwear for employees 
Tower stability Employees Purpose designed Adequate 
• crushing hazard Others in the vicinity structure 
Wooden spreaders 
installed under feet. 
Outriggers installed at 
earliest opportunity 
Working at height Employees Training· Adequate 
• falling Others in the vicinity Provision of appropriate 
• dropping the laser . footwear for employees 
5.3.5 Secondary Optics 
Hazard Persons at Risk Control Measures Comments 
Manual Handling Employees Training Adequate 
• crushed limbs Others in the vicinity Provision of gloves for 
• crushed extremities employees 
• back injuries Provision of appropriate footwear for employees 
Working at height Employees Training Adequate 
• falling Others in the vicinity Provision of appropriate 
• dropping the optics footwear for employees 
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5.3.6 Operators 
Hazard Persons at Risk Control Measures Comments 
Poor working protocol Other Employees Training Adequate 
Others in the vicinity The Company regularly audits the work of 
its employees 
Poor workmanship Employees Training Adequate 
Others in the vicinity The Company regularly audits the work of 
its employees 
5.3.7 Staff other than Operators 
There are likely to be a number of other staff in the vicinity of the working areas 
during installation. This assessment considers the risks presented to the Company's 
employees by these other groups of staff, who are not employees of the Company. The 
contractual arrangement with the event promoter requires that these other groups of 
staff should consider the safety of our employees. 
Hazard Persons at Risk Control Measures Comments 
Stage installation Our Employees Our employees are not permitted to enter Adequate 
• large structure the immediate area of the stage until 
clearance has been given by the stage 
mana2er 
Sound installation Our Employees The work our employees are required to Adequate 
• large structure undertake is away from the sound systems 
• lorry movements and the proposed vehicle movements 
• trailing cables 
Other vehicle Our Employees All vehicle movements are controlled and a Adequate 
movements site §1"'ed limit of 10 mph will be imposed 
5.3.8 External Factors 
Hazard Persons at Risk Control Measures Comments 
Rain Employees . Suitable footwear and rainwear is provided Adequate 
Tarpaulins are provided for equipment Employees 
should be 
aware of the 
increased 
risk of 
slipping 
Sun Employees Sun hats and factor 15 sun lotion is Adequate 
provided 
Wind Employees As described in the previous sections, the Adequate 
Others in the vicinity stability of the various structures is 
considered important from an operational 
vie~2int. 
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5.4 Alignment 
The alignment stage is considered to start as soon as power is applied to the 
laser or any of the associated systems, including the cooling plant, or when the diesel 
generators are started. At the alignment stage it is assumed that covers may be removed 
from some of the equipment and the risk assessment takes this into account. 
5.4.1 Lasers 
The lasers are proprietary pieces of equipment which themselves comply with 
the requirements of the current British Standard on laser safety, BS EN 60825-1: 1994. 
The lasers are maintained and adjusted at our premises prior to transport to the venue 
and no further on-site alignment or adjustment is envisaged. Therefore, this section is 
included for completeness only. 
Hazard Persons at Risk Control Measures Comments 
High voltages . Employees Training. Access is not generally possible Adequate 
through engineering controls, ie secondary 
covers if the main chassis cover is removed. 
Access to laser area is restricted to 
employees by the use of a barrier and safety 
signs. 
High temperatures Employees Training. Employees know which surfaces Adequate 
are at an elevated temperature. During 
normal operation (including alignment) the 
accessible surfaces are not sufficiently hot 
to cause a burn. 
Laser radiation Employees Training. Appropriate protective eyewear is Adequate 
(may need to be available for alignment work. 
I Quantified) 
Collateral radiation Employees Training. Only one employee is permitted to Adequate 
(may need to be work in the immediate vicinity with the 
quantified) covers removed. The duration of exposure 
is kept to a ntinimum. 
5.4.2 Eauipment Associated with the Lasers 
This section considers the laser exciters, cooling plants, the diesel generators, 
smoke generators, and cabling and pipework associated with these items . 
Laser Exciters . 
Hazard Persons at Risk Control Measures Comments 
High voltages Employees Covers remain in place at Adequate 
Others in the vicinity all times 
Sharp edges Employees The exciter is sited away Adequate 
Others in the vicinity from thoroughfares. 
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Cooling Plants . . 
Hazard .. Persons at Risk Control Measures Comments 
Noise Employees Positioned away from Adequate 
(may need to be Others in the vicinity occupied areas 
Quantified) 
High pressure water Employees High pressure hoses and Adequate 
(may need to be Others in the vicinity clips used. Integrity of 
quantified) cooling system confirmed 
as soon as possible after 
.. . switch on 
Sharp Edges Employees Positioned away from Adequate 
Others in the vicinitv occuoied areas 
Diesel Generators 
Hazard Persons at Risk Control Measures Comments . 
Diesel fuel Employees Provision of gloves for Adequate 
Other in the vicinity employees 
Purpose fuel containers 
See also COSHH 
assessment contained in 
Section **** 
Diesel fumes Employees Exhaust to unoccupied Adequate 
. Others in the vicinity areas confirmed on site 
High temperatures . Employees Training Adequate 
Covers kept closed when 
unattended 
Noise Employees Covers kept closed except Adequate 
~may_need to Quantifv) Others in the vicinitv when access required. 
Battery Acid Emoloyees . Sealed unit Adequate 
Smoke Generators .. 
Hazard Persons at Risk Control Measures Comments 
Smoke Employees Minimum quantity Adequate 
Others in the vicinity necessary for alignment 
and testing used. 
See also COSHH 
assessment in Section 
. 
. . .. ** •• 
Sharp Edges Employees Positioned away from Adequate 
Others in the vicinitv l';eneral access areas 
Fluid Employees Training. Adequate 
Anti·spill design. 
See also COSHH 
assessment in Section . 
••• * 
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Cables . 
Hazard Persons at Risk Control Measures . Comments 
High voltages Anyone Annoured cables for high Adequate 
voltages. 
ReDs installed 
Trip hazard Employees Cables are bright yellow Adequate 
Others in the vicinitv . 
Coolin2 Water Pipes 
Hazard Persons at Risk Control Measures Comments 
High pressure water Employees Pipes are inspected prior Adequate 
Others in the vicinity to installation. 
High pressure hosing 
used with appropriate 
connectors 
Trip hazard Employees Pipes are bright red Adequate· 
Others in the vicinitv 
6. Liaison 
This section of the file is used to file relevant correspondence and notifications 
to/from various official bodies involved with the laser display or who could be affected 
by the display. 
6.1 Licensing Authority 
The Licensing Authority for the event is: 
The Somewhere District Council 
Somewhere 
XY94AB 
The principal contact is: 
Ms A Officer, Licensing Officer 
Telephone: 
Fax: 
01999999999 
01999999999 
Notification first made: 1 February 1997 
Copies of documents are filed here. 
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6.2 Health and Safety Authority 
The Health and Safety Authority for the event is: 
The Somewhere District Council 
Somewhere 
XY94AB 
The principal contact is: 
Mr B Safely, Senior Environmental Health Officer 
Telephone: 
Fax: 
01999999999 
01999999999 
Notification first made: 1 February 1997 
Copies of documents are filed here. 
6.3 Civil Aviation Authority 
Details of the event have been forwarded to the Civil Aviation Authority at 
Gatwick. A copy of the notification is filed in this Section of the file. 
Principal contact: 
Telephone: 
Fax: 
** ***** ******** 
01293573262 
01293573971 
6.4 Other Aviation Authorities 
Due to the proximity of The Stately Home to the following airports, these have 
been notified direct (copies of the correspondence is filed in this Section of the file): 
RAF****** 
Principal contact: 
Telephone: 
Fax: 
** ***** ******* 
01999999999 
01999999999 
The Somewhere Flying School 
Principal contact: 
Telephone: 
Fax: 
** ***** ******* 
01999999999 
01999999999 
303 
6.5 Marine1Harbour Authorities 
The Stately Home is sufficiently far inland that notification of MarinelHarbour 
Authorities is not considered appropriate. 
6.6 Fire 
The fire service local to The Stately Home is: 
The Somewhere Fire Brigade 
Principal contact: 
Telephone: 
Fax: 
** ***** ******* 
01999 999999 
01999 999999 
Details of the laser display have been forwarded to the Fire Brigade and it is 
understood that an on-site inspection will take place. 
6.7 Police 
The constabulary local to The Stately Home is: 
The Local Constabulary 
Principal contact: 
Telephone: 
Fax: 
** ***** ******* 
01999999999 
01999999999 
Correspondence with the constabulary is filed in this Section of the file. 
Particular concern has been expressed over the proximity to the main A??? trunk road 
and the potential for driver distraction. This has been addressed. 
6.8 Ambulance· 
On site first aid will be provided by ***********. Several Groups will provide 
ambulances and first-aiders to patrol the site. These are aware of the use of lasers on 
site. 
Principal contact: 
Telephone: 
Fax: 
** ***** ******* 
01999999999 
01999 999999 
In addition the County Ambulance Service will be summoned for assistance in 
the event of a major incident. 
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Principal contact: ** ***** ******* 
Telephone: 
Fax: 
01999999999 
01999999999 
7. Entertainment Licence 
This section is used to file infonnation relating to the Entertainment Licence. 
The Licensee is The Anything Goes Right Company. However, the Licence puts certain 
conditions on the use of the lasers. 
A copy of the Entertainment Licence is held in Section 7.1. Details of the 
particular conditions effecting The Laser Display Company are given in Section 7.2. 
8. Audit Record 
This Section of the file is used to file the audit records which assist in 
demonstration compliance with our own procedures as well as legal requirements. 
8.1 Management Review Log 
The Laser Safety Officer will review the planned laser display and certify in this 
section that he is satisfied that the perfonnance will be able to take place with a 
minimum of risk to all parties. 
8.2 Operator Check List Record 
This Section contains the final check list to be used by the Operator in charge on 
the day. It is used as an assurance that safety critical examinations of the laser display 
have been carried out. 
8.3 Enforcing Officer Check Log 
This log records the checks undertaken by the enforcing officer(s). 
8.4 Portable Appliance Testing Log 
This log confinns that all of the portable electrical equipment has been tested 
within the last six months. 
8.5 RCD Checks 
All RCDs should be checked prior to use. This is a log of these checks. 
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9. Certificates 
Photocopies of various certificates should be filed iri this Section. 
9.1 Insurance 
The Laser Display Company carried third party liability insurance up to 
£15,000,000 and product liability insurance up to £10,000,000. Employer liability 
insurance is to a maximum of £1,000,000. 
Copies of the relevant certificates are filed in this Section. 
9.2 Safety Checks 
The Laser Display Company employs The Laser Display lrispection Company to 
provide an independent audit of its working practices. The current certificate is filed in 
this Section. 
9.3 Laser Power Meter 
The Wizzo Laser Power Meter is calibrated every 12 months by the Laser 
Calibration Company. The current calibration certificate is filed in this Section. 
10. Working Section 
There are a number of records of meetings and correspondence which do not 
readily fit into one of the other file Sections. These should be filed here. By default, 
they should be filed in date order, with the oldest at the back working forward to the 
most recent. 
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